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ABSTRACT 
 As Bluetooth is firmly ensconced as one of the leading standardizations for 
wireless communication, it becomes imperative to rigorously quantify its security. To 
forward this quantification, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of Bluetooth's 
user-mediated authenticated key exchanges, Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry, in 
both the computational and formal cryptographic settings. Due to the reliance on 
intertwined human and machine functions in the specification of these cyborg protocols, 
new attack vectors arise for hostile actors to exploit. Consequently, we model a realistic 
adversary, one not only with access to both the user-to-device interfaces and 
device-to-device communication channels simultaneously, but also with the capability to 
compromise device display and input mechanisms. Our analysis shows that while 
Numeric Comparison and Initiator/Responder-Generated Passkey Entry achieve at least 
basic levels of security in our model, User-Generated Passkey Entry is insecure in the 
model. Furthermore, the categories of attacks depicted herein function as a blueprint for 
the compromise of other protocols with an active user component. To rectify the issues 
discovered by our analysis, we present the provably secure Dual Passkey Entry protocol 
with the Secure Hash Modification for addition to the Bluetooth standardization. Dual 
Passkey Entry demonstrates that full CYBORG security is a realistic and achievable goal 
with limited change to defined protocols. 
v 
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Bluetooth pairing has become nearly ubiquitous in the daily lives of Americans since its 
launch in 1999 where it earned the “Best of Show Technology Award” at COMDEX [1]. 
Since then, its standardization has now progressed to version 5.2 (v5.2) with multiple modes 
of operation: Basic Rate / Extended Data Rate (BR/EDR) and Low Energy (LE). Bluetooth 
has its own suite of protocols to secure communications under the Secure Simple Pairing 
family, first published in Bluetooth v2.1 and updated to Secure Connections in v4.2, which 
allowed for flexibility by providing four methods of authenticated key exchange dependent 
on device input/output (IO) capabilities: Just Works, Numeric Comparison, Out-of-Band, 
and Passkey Entry. Of these, Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry both rely on the user 
playing an active role. We term such user-mediated protocols cyborg protocols due to the 
joint reliance on human and machine functions to achieve a greater level of security than 
simply functioning without authentication.
Version History. Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) was developed in 2007 by the Bluetooth 
Special Interest Group (SIG) with v2.1 to provide greater security and simplify the pairing 
process for the user. This was mainly done as a result of the litany of attacks published against 
Bluetooth’s legacy pairing protocol [2]. Bluetooth v4.1 introduced Secure Connections (SC) 
which allowed for the FIPS approved elliptic curve P-256, vice only P-192, to be used in 
the pairing process for Diffie–Hellman key exchange [3]. Although Secure Connections is 
not required for use, all analysis in this study also applies to Secure Connections. Bluetooth 
also allows for two modes of operation: Basic Rate / Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) and 
Low Energy (LE). Secure Simple Pairing in LE is derivative of the same pairing methods 
used in BR/EDR. However, this analysis cannot be directly applied to Low Energy due 
to differences in how each mode, BR/EDR and LE, generate the authenticated key at the 
conclusion of pairing. When we refer to “pairing” between devices, we describe how two 
devices authenticate each other and agree on a shared key.
Framing the Problem. The human user as a trusted third party is a natural option for 
settings where certificates cannot be used or reliably updated, such as in the Internet 
of Things. The sheer number of devices with varying levels of computing power 
typically
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typically prevents a public key infrastructure from being viable. Thus, public keys used in 
CYBORG authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols are typically short-lived and not 
associated with identities a priori. As all values may be ephemeral to the session, the user 
interaction acts as a trusted third party (TTP) and authentication authority, providing 
assurance to the respective devices of their communication partner. However, modeling the 
user presents a problem to analysis as there is no intuitive method for representing their 
actions while also being faithful to the protocol and previous modeling practices. 
Moreover, there are questions of how much capability a theoretical adversary should be 
given to affect communications between a user and a device in attempts to compromise the 
protocol. Although such user-to-device attacks have been published [4]–[6], they remain 
largely unclassified in contrast to the oft investigated device-to-device attacks. These two 
issues, modeling the user and classifying user-to-device attacks, demonstrate that prior 
analysis of CYBORG AKEs is not complete and further investigation is necessary.
Numeric Comparison. Numeric Comparison is a pairing method that requires all devices 
to be able to display or communicate a six-digit number to the user and accept at least 
binary inputs from the user. The user’s role in Numeric Comparison is to confirm that two 
values displayed by the devices to be paired match, and then signal this via an affirmation to 
the devices. This method also makes no use of a PIN or password, thereby simplifying the 
pairing process for the user by not requiring any memorization. While Numeric Comparison 
has been analyzed and proofs of security exist [7]–[10], we will conduct a novel investigation 
encompassing the full AKE while also modeling user interactions.
Passkey Entry. Passkey Entry [11] relies on the generation and sharing of a random value 
(a passkey) via the user to achieve entity authentication. Investigations into the security of 
Passkey Entry have been largely ad-hoc [12]–[14], involving exploits in the re-use of random 
values across multiple executions of the protocol. While these attacks could be rendered 
moot by requiring ephemeral passkeys in keeping with Bluetooth’s recommendation; this 
change alone does not provide guarantees of security. Since a systematic analysis of Passkey 
Entry is lacking, it is still an open question whether Passkey Entry has other unidentified 
vulnerabilities.
Capturing the User. Furthermore, user communications are regularly treated as out-of-
band in the analysis of cryptographic protocols, but recent attack techniques that specifically
2
target user-to-device communications demonstrate the criticality of including a treatment
of user-to-device channels in protocol analysis. Notably the Tap ‘n Ghost attack [4], which
specifically targets Bluetooth devices, necessitates a treatment of user communications as
in-band. Tap ‘n Ghost is notable for demonstrating a break that not only induces control of
the device display, but also corrupts a honest user’s inputs to the device without actively
attacking device memory. Leading AKE models do not capture user-to-device attacks like
Tap ‘n Ghost, due to the sole focus on device-to-device communications.
Cryptographic Modeling Techniques. Cryptographic analysis of protocols mainly falls
into two competing schools: formal modeling and computational modeling. Formal model-
ing has its roots in Dolev and Yao’s seminal paper [15] investigating public key protocols.
Meanwhile, computational modeling draws from a similarly pivotal paper from Bellare and
Rogaway [16] on authentication and key exchange. To differentiate formal and computa-
tional modeling without going into too much detail at this early stage, one major difference
is how these schools model cryptographic messages. Under formal modeling, messages are
uniquely identified via symbolic expressions from a defined alphabet. Formal modeling also
makes the assumption that cryptographic algorithms (such as encryption) behave as they
would in an ideal setting (i.e., all encryption is perfect and functions like a one-time pad).
Meanwhile, a message is uniquely identified by its bit-string in the computational setting.
Cryptographic algorithms are also assumed to be imperfect and are deemed secure by how
computationally hard it is for an adversary to break defined security properties. These dis-
tinctions has far-reaching consequences in analysis. While both formal and computational
models capturing user-to-device communications in the analysis of CYBORG-style authen-
tication protocols have emerged [9], [17], [18], modeling for key exchange is lacking until
now.
Contributions. The above paragraphs present three critical gaps: the provable security of
Numeric Comparison, the provable security of Passkey Entry, and a suitable model for
CYBORG AKEs. We address these gaps, presenting an analysis of Bluetooth Basic Rate /
Extended Data Rate (BR/EDR) versions 2.1–5.2 Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry
(abbreviated Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry respectively) in both the formal and
computational settings, which covers both device-to-device and user-to-device communi-
cations. This analysis applies to Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry under both the
Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections Bluetooth security framework. We introduce
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a computational model for AKEs to do this, capturing adversaries capable of exploiting
user-to-device transmissions. Abusing notation, we call this the CYBORG model. We also
adapt existing infrastructure provided by the formal modeling tool, Tamarin-Prover [19], to
capture both device-to-device and user-to-device communications for a formal analysis.
Our specific contributions include the following.
• Provide the first security framework in computational analysis for CYBORG AKEs,
where the user is an active participant in protocol execution.
• Propose a method for capturing the user’s role within a protocol using Tamarin-Prover
for a formal analysis of CYBORG AKEs.
• Provide the first systematic separation of all variants of adversarial capabilities against
user-to-device channels.
• Conduct the first computational analysis of Numeric Comparison (in its entirety) for
Bluetooth BR/EDR, under either Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections, that
addresses both device-to-device and user-to-device communications.
• Conduct the first computational analysis of PasskeyEntry (in its entirety) for Bluetooth
BR/EDR, under either Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections, that addresses
both device-to-device and user-to-device communications.
• Demonstrate that Numeric Comparison achieves only the lowest level of CYBORG
security in our model.
• Demonstrate that all current versions of Passkey Entry fail to provide security under
any CYBORG model variant unless liberties are taken to restrict the information
analyzed for authentication.
• Propose the Secure Hash Modification to Passkey Entry and demonstrate that the
modified protocol provides security improvements across all passkey generation vari-
ants.
• Present Dual Passkey Entry, where the initiator and responder both generate a passkey
to be shared via the user, and demonstrate that, composed with the Secure Hash
Modification, the new protocol provides the highest-level CYBORG security in our
model.
• Conduct the first formal analysis of Passkey Entry (in its entirety) for Bluetooth
BR/EDR, under either Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections, using Tamarin-
Prover that addresses both device-to-device and user-to-device communications.
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Outline. This thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we survey relevant literature on the
above topics and introduce pertinent concepts to the reader. InChapter 3,we define important
mathematical properties applying to hash functions, message authentication codes, elliptic
curves, and pseudorandom functions for future use in both computational and formal proofs.
In Chapter 4, we summarize Bluetooth’s security terms, definitions, and functions as they
pertain to Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry. We also present the full protocols at
this stage. In Chapter 5, we present the CYBORG model for the computational analysis of
AKEs. In Chapter 6, we present our computational analysis of Numeric Comparison and
Passkey Entry under both weak and strong session modeling within the CYBORG model.
In Chapter 7, we propose the Secure Hash Modification and Dual Passkey Entry additions
to the Bluetooth specification. In Chapter 8, we prove that the original variants of Passkey
Entry achieve an improved degree of CYBORG security in conjunction with the Secure
HashModification and that Dual Passkey Entry with the Secure HashModification achieves
the highest classification of CYBORG security. In Chapter 9, we present our techniques for
formal modeling CYBORG protocols within Tamarin-Prover and the results of our analysis.
In Chapter 10, we summarize the findings of this thesis and suggest avenues of future work.
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Our review of applicable research and literature on our subject is split into three main
sections. First, we will discuss the various methods employed to analyze cryptographic
protocols. These can be organized into two main schools of thought: formal analysis and
computational analysis. Second, we will review what other research has been conducted on
the user’s role in authentication and key exchange. Finally, we will present an overview of
research into Bluetooth’s security protocols and relevant findings on the various security
measures employed by Bluetooth throughout its history. A major contribution of this paper
is in the area of user modeling and thus we feel it necessary to highlight the work of others
to advance this topic.
2.1 Cryptographic Analysis
In the following section, we present foundational papers for both formal and computational
analysis, and further applications of the proposed models. We also briefly discuss automatic
tools that implement both methods of analysis and have proven successful in their efforts.
2.1.1 Formal Analysis
One view of analysis that deserves mentioning is formal analysis. Formal analysis (also
referred as symbolic analysis) uses the theory of formal language as an analytical framework.
All strings, numbers, and messages are now abstracted to be formal expressions as part of
an underlying grammar that includes cryptographic algorithms as idealized functions. Thus,
formal analysis sacrifices rigor for simplicity and is limited to only discovering logical faults
in cryptographic protocols. Though formal analysis has applications in automated protocol
analysis and for showcasing a protocol’s logical security, it will not be focused on for this
research but will be used to confirm the computational results. Computational analysis
will be the focal point due its more rigorous definitions of security and its underlying
mathematical framework. Although the preciseness of computational analysis is arguably a
detriment to the modeling of user-to-device communications due to its inherent complexity,
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accurately accounting for the user is an improvement of such protocol analysis as it more
closely models the real world.
Dolev–Yao Model
The modeling method introduced by Dolev and Yao in their 1983 paper laid the groundwork
for future work in formal analysis [15]. They had the initial foresight to model encryption
and decryption as idealized functions. An idealized function is one that operates exactly
and perfectly as theoretically defined. For instance, an ideal encryption function would
yield no information on the associated plaintext or key to an adversary given access to the
ciphertext. Other steps were taken by Dolev and Yao to enable a more formulaic approach
to cryptographic analysis. For one, the adversary was modeled as having complete control
of communications sent from device to device it is now commonplace to call this type of
adversary the “Dolev–Yao adversary”. In addition, all texts and keys are modeled as formal
expressions vice strings of bits. Formal expressions being a concatenation of symbols from
a defined alphabet and stemming from formal language theory [20].
The motivation behind their work was to attempt to model the active adversary in public
key protocols: something that had not been actively pursued at the time of their research.
Ultimately, this paper was a major step in the continued analysis of cryptographic protocols
against ever-stronger adversaries.
Shortly after publication of Dolev and Yao’s 1983 paper, Even and Goldreich extended the
model to examinemulti-party ping-pong protocols [21]. Another early use of the Dolev–Yao
model was in the analysis of the Needham–Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol
by Lowe [22]. Lowe showed that a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack initiated by an active
adversary could break the authentication of the protocol by using one of the participants
as a decryption oracle. The paper ultimately led to the recommendation of including
identifying information in the plaintext to be encrypted, for which Lowe proved security
using the Failures Divergences Refinement Checker (FDR) [23]. FDR was an automatic
verification tool initially developed by the Office of Naval Research as a model verification
tool for statemachines [24].AlthoughFDR is not currently in use, Lowe’s initial employment
of it to analyze the Needham–Schroeder protocol demonstrated the efficacy of automatic
verification tools.
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Automatic Tools for Formal Verification
One limitation of the Dolev–Yaomodel is that it can only prove logical security of a protocol
since all analysis is performed under idealized conditions. However, the idealization of
cryptographic primitives proposed by the model initiated research into the development of
automatic tools as shown by FDR [24]. The Interrogator [25] and theNRLProtocol Analyzer
[26], both coded using the Prolog language, were two of the first such developments.
ProVerif, Scyther, and Tamarin are three more modern automatic verification tools that
have seen widespread use in recent formal analyses [27]–[29]. ProVerif is also based
off the Prolog language and was initially developed by Blanchet. We examine a specific
application of ProVerif to Bluetooth in Section 2.2.2, but it was also used to examine
Kerberos [30]. Scyther, originally developed by Cremers, included the novel additions of
unbounded verification and guaranteed termination. The flexibility of the program allowed
its author to investigate multi-protocol attacks and some of the protocols in the ISO/IEC
11770 and 9798 standards [31]–[33]. Tamarin is a newer entry to the automatic verification
market andwas developed by a team of researchers to include Basin, Cremers, Dreier,Meier,
Sasse, and Schmidt as a successor to Scyther [19]. Tamarin comes with honest modeling of
modern key exchange methods to include Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange and bilinear
mappings; it also allows a user to define his own security properties and adversarial queries
for use in analysis. The advances in the field of automatic verification provided by Tamarin
enabled the most comprehensive symbolic modeling of the TLS 1.3 protocol at the time by
Cremers, Horvat, Scott, and van der Merwe, which provided supporting evidence for the
inclusion of the “Finished” messages into the TLS 1.3 handshake [34].
2.1.2 Computational Analysis
The other leading modeling framework when analyzing cryptographic protocols is com-
putational analysis. Under this framework, strings, numbers, keys, and messages are all
taken to be bits. Cryptographic functions are then simply algorithms that act on these bits
to produce their output. There are three main pieces needed for computational analysis:
description of the protocol, adversarial capabilities, and a win condition. We note that al-
though formal analysis also includes these three pieces, its inherent assumptions (like formal
expressions and idealized functions) restrict the modeling choices. The first is a description
of the protocol and a presentation of its various components. This stage typically involves
defining relevant terms specific to the protocol, any assumptions, and a depiction of all
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communication flows. Additionally, a method for capturing execution of the protocol and
its participants is also presented; recent applications of computational analysis typically
employ session oracles that store relevant protocol-specific information for this piece. The
second part of a computational model involves defining the adversary, modeled as a Turing
machine. We define adversarial capabilities and give him access to oracle queries to con-
trol execution of the protocol to be analyzed and learn secret information. The adversary
operates opposite a challenger, who is in complete control of the protocol environment and
oversees the answering any adversarial queries. The last major piece to a computational
analysis is the definition of the security game. At this point, the cryptographer formulates
the winning condition(s) for the adversary. One can then demonstrate how well or poorly
a protocol limits the ability of the adversary to win. This often leads to a presentation
of provable security for the protocol under the given model via reductions to complexity
hardness assumptions. The development of computational models thus arises from how one
defines these three major pieces and applies them to the analysis of cryptographic protocols.
Bellare-Rogaway Model
Computational analysis has its roots in a foundation-laying paper by Bellare and Rog-
away [16]. In their paper, Bellare and Rogaway used the idea of matching conversations,
whereby communication partners come to an agreement on the messages exchanged in a
protocol instance, to capture what it means for intended communication devices to be part-
nered in execution. Partnering is relevant to computational analysis because it enables the
cryptographer to analyze whether two devices that engaged with each other through a pro-
tocol and should achieve the goal of the protocol (mutual authentication, authenticated key
agreement, etc.) actually achieve it in the presence of some defined adversary. The writers
then used their newly developed tools to analyze the provably secure protocols MAP1 (a
mutual authentication protocol), and AKEP1/2 (authenticated key exchange protocols). We
will use BR93 as an acronymwhen referring to this model in future points within this paper.
The BR93 model has seen multiple applications to common protocols and was vital to
the development of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) standard. We direct the reader to
Krawczyk’s security analysis of SKEME [35], a protocol for secure key exchange developed
through the Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) work toward the standardization of
the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). IKE was eventually built and standardized in RFC
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2409 [36] using ideas and techniques inherent in the SKEME protocol, along with the
Oakley [37] and ISAKMP [38] protocols. In addition, Abdalla and Pointcheval used an
adapted version of the BR93 model to show that their password-based encrypted key
exchange protocols SPAKE1 and SPAKE2, attain provable security [39]. Lindell also used
the BR93 as a basis for his security model that analyzed Numeric Comparison v2.1 [13],
a paper we give further attention to in Section 2.3.1. Outside of direct application to the
analysis of security protocols, theBR93model is oft cited in cryptographywhen undertaking
a computational analysis proof as the progenitor ofmoremodernmodels thatwe nowdiscuss.
Canetti-Krawczyk Model
Canetti and Krawczyk furthered Bellare and Rogaway’s work with the publication of their
evolved model in 2001 [40]. The CK01 model, as we will refer to it in this paper, pivoted
away from the idea of matching conversations used in BR93 and instead presented the idea
of session identifiers. Instead of relying on matching on all messages exchanged between
two devices, the cryptographer defines relevant messages or computed values to be checked
for matching. A session was defined to be a single instance of a protocol run at a party
and they distinguished instances through a tuple of the identity of the participant running
the protocol, the identity of its assumed partner in the protocol, a unique session identifier,
and role. Two instances can then be identified to be matching if the parties involved believe
they are talking with each other, their roles in the protocol are not equal, and their session
identifiers are the same. The idea of using session identifiers will become useful in our own
computational analysis of Bluetooth as defining what constitutes a matching conversation
can prove difficult in user-mediated protocols. Canetti and Krawczyk also furthered the
development of adversarial models. One query they included in their adversarial model was
the Session-State Reveal query; this call would allow an adversary to obtain internal state
information, as defined by the protocol, of incomplete sessions. In contrast to queries like
Reveal, which give access to computed session key(s), or Corrupt, which gives access to
long-term private key(s), Session-State Reveal can give access to any ephemeral information
the cryptographer allows in analysis. They also introduced the notion of session expiration
as a way to analyze whether a protocol achieves forward secrecy, which is when compromise
of one session key does not compromise past session keys. This was investigated by the
protocol action of deleting any named session key from device memory and analyzing if the
adversary could distinguish these expired keys from random. Their developments allowed
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them to propose the SIG-DH protocol, an authenticated key exchange provably secure in
their model.
An instance of the SIGMA protocol, short for "SIGn-and-MAc" and originally proposed by
Krawczyk [41], was analyzed under a post-specified version of the CK01 model in [42] as
a result of its inclusion in IKE, following the discovery of security vulnerabilities in IKE’s
original form [43]. Aiello, Bellovin, Blaze, Canetti, Ioannidis, Keromytis, and Reingold
also used a version of CK01 to analyze the JFK protocol [44], a protocol that also combines
signatures and MACs to achieve authenticated key exchange. These applications and others
ultimately proved that the CK01 model was a worthy compliment to the BR93 model in the
field of computational analysis.
Extended Canetti-Krawczyk
In 2007, LaMacchia, Lauter, and Mityagin published what they termed an extension of the
CK01 model, colloquially referred to as the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model (eCK) [45].
In their paper, LaMacchia et al. reasoned that a party only has two possibilities of secrets,
ephemeral and long-term. This led them to scrap the previously proposed session-state
reveal query for an ephemeral key reveal query in their adversarial model. They reasoned
that so long as an adversary does not have both the ephemeral and long-term secrets of a
party, then a protocol should remain secure. The NAXOS protocol, which included the novel
idea of using the hash of both a party’s ephemeral and long-term secrets as a Diffie–Hellman
exponent, was born out of their developments in computational analysis and was also proven
secure in eCK. The combination of the ephemeral and long-term secrets via a hash function
has since been coined the “NAXOS trick” due to its prevalence in protocols proven secure
in the eCK model. The eCK model proved to be the first that placed strong emphasis on
securing protocols against leaking ephemeral secrets and has seen widespread application
to other protocols that rely on the NAXOS trick for security [46], [47]. The NAXOS trick
is important because it combines ephemeral and long-term keys in such a way that reveal
of any one does not allow for computation of the session key. This combination combines
the explicit authentication provided by long-term keys and the freshness provided by the
ephemeral keys. The model also sparked a discussion on the random oracle model, which
assumes that a hash function produces random outputs for distinct inputs. The random
oracle model was necessary for the proof of NAXOS under eCK as a result of the NAXOS
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trick. A desire to avoid use of the random oracle model led to the production of protocols
secure in the eCK model absent an application of the NAXOS trick [48], [49].
2.2 User Modeling in Cryptographic Analysis
2.2.1 Security Ceremonies
Introduced by Ellison in 2007 [50], security ceremonies are defined to be network protocols
that also include human beings as possible nodes in the network and includes communi-
cation avenues for computer devices to users and users to users. Through his definition of
ceremonies, Ellison makes the claim that there are no OOB communications; all possible
network communications are from device-to-device, user-to-device, or user-to-user. The
lack of OOB communication functions as a starting point in an analysis of user interaction
in HTTPS and e-mail ceremonies. Ellison’s analysis raises concerns about the security of
said ceremonies due to their reliance on honest user interaction and the assumption that
adversaries cannot affect user-to-device and user-to-user communication.
Carlos, Martina, Price, and Custódio [10] expand on Ellison’s original ideas and present a
formalization of adversarial capabilities for security ceremonies in keeping with the Dolev–
Yao model. Defined capabilities include "Eavesdrop," whereby an adversary can listen on
any ceremony communication channel, and "Spoof," whereby an adversary can assume
the role of a participant in a ceremony and send messages on his behalf. They go on to
employ their new model to analyze Numeric Comparison and describe three possible attack
scenarios that compromise the user-to-device and user-to-user communication channels.
Their first attack is similar to an attack we propose under the CYBORG security model
herein that involves an attacker with the capability to spoof messages from a device to
a user. We continue to build on preceding work in ceremonies by applying the ideas of
Ellison and Carlos et al. within a computational setting and present adaptations of the Spoof
capability as adversarial queries within a computational model. We will also henceforth
refer to all communications from device to device as occurring over the Device-to-Device
(DtD) channel and all communications from user to device (or device to user) as occurring
over the User-to-Device (UtD) channel. We use the term channel to refer to the transmission
medium that DtD or UtD communications transverse. In regard to the DtD channel, this is
typically via radio waves. For the UtD channel, the communications have greater variance
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in transmission medium. Common examples being a message from a device to a user
transmitted visually (e.g. reading a device display) or a message from a user to a device
transmitted via internal electronic signals (e.g., keyboard or button presses).
2.2.2 Formal Analysis of Numeric Comparison with ProVerif
Although some cryptographic analysis has been done on the Secure Simple Pairing com-
munication protocol [7], [8], [51], the user’s role in the protocol is typically ignored. Chang
and Shmatikov broke with this practice in a formal analysis of Numeric Comparison [9]
and found a previously unknown break in the protocol using ProVerif as a result. The issue
arises when the same device is allowed to execute concurrent sessions and the user is unable
to associate the comparison values with a specific session. Of note, the current Bluetooth
specification places no requirement on implementors to distinguish these values for the
user during Numeric Comparison as of the most recent version [11]. They modeled the
user as its own process within ProVerif that communicated over secure channels, meaning
the adversary could not read or write to channels used by the user. Chang and Shmatikov
saw this as a necessary formalization to model the idea of the user looking directly at the
screen, but the specification places no restriction on whether the adversary can replay or
delete information on the UtD channel. Modeling the user as its own process is mirrored in
this work by modeling the user as its own session oracle that interacts with not only other
devices in the protocol, but also the adversary.
2.2.3 Three-Party Possession User-Mediated Authentication Model
Hale developed the 3-Party Possession User Mediated Authentication (3-PUMA) model to
formalize the user-to-device interactions required in the ISO 9798-6 Mechanism 7a authen-
tication protocol [17]. In this protocol, it was the purpose of the protocol to demonstrate
data possession on behalf of the devices. However, the inclusion of an active third-party lead
to the development of 3-PUMA as no other computational model could accurately capture
user actions in a rigorous fashion. Additionally, Hale distinguished between communica-
tions sent over the DtD channel and the UtD channel. This was done to allow the model to
differentiate an adversary’s capabilities over the two distinct channels. Another important
contribution of Hale’s paper is initial research into what should contribute to the session
identifier of a CYBORG protocol, settling on messages sent between devices and sent from
14
the user to both devices. Her investigation into the above was a major contributing factor to
our own algorithm for the construction of a relevant, user-device transcript; the user-device
transcript could then be used to rigorously define matching conversations between devices.
2.2.4 Mediated Epoch Three-Party Authentication Model
Dowling and Hale further expanded computational analysis of user-mediated protocols with
an examination of the Signal protocol under their Mediated Epoch Three-party Authenti-
cation (META) model. The META model advances analysis of user mediated protocols
by allowing the adversary queries that affect UtD communication. This is a logical next
step in analysis with the increased prevalence of real-world attacks on the UtD channel
described previously. Specifically, they introduced the ShowUser and ControlUser queries,
which allow an adversary to modify or create messages from a device to the user and from
the user to any device, respectively. They separate adversarial attacks into two threat set-
tings: the compromised device setting (CompDev) and the compromised user (CompUser)
setting. The motivation behind this development was to model two types of adversaries.
The compromised user setting models an adversary that is unable to learn secret device
state information but can affect how the user and device communicate with each other via
malware, social engineering, etc. The compromised device setting models the reverse, an
adversary capable of learning device state information via a side channel attack or other
means, but cannot affect how it communicates with the user.
In our own research, we build upon the groundwork laid by Dowling and Hale with an
analysis of Bluetooth and the development of the CYBORG security model. Bluetooth’s
multiple modes of communication with varying types of interaction with the user lends
itself to an analysis similar to the one Dowling and Hale undertook when examining Signal.
In META, the ControlUser query enabled the adversary to create and modify messages from
the user to any device and any session. However, social engineering attacks tend to only
apply over a finite amount of time vice forever. Additionally, Ghost-like attacks are confined
spatially by those in contact with the Ghost Touch generator vice all devices. We therefore
make the decision to tie the ControlUser query to a single device and session vice any. We
see this as a better approximation of defensible real-world attacks, such as where an attacker
may have the means to launch a Ghost-like attack on one device’s touch screen but not the
other.
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In addition, the scoping of the ControlUser and ShowUser queries have consequences when
defining user freshness and leads to a natural expansion into four baseline variants of user
freshness: compromise of the communication channel from the initiating device to the user
(type 0), the responding device to the user (type 1), the user to the initiating device (type
2), and the user to the responding device (type 3). We can consider the Tap ‘n Ghost attack
as an example this model captures. This attack involves compromise of communications
from a single device to a user and from the user to the same device. Thus, we can model
this attack as a simultaneous combination of either both a type 0 and type 2 compromise
(CompUser02), if the initiating device is being targeted, or a type 1 and type 3 compromise
(CompUser13), if the responding device is being targeted. In our model, the action of
executing the Tap ‘n Ghost attack corresponds to both a ShowUser query and a ControlUser
query involving the same device, as shown in Figure 2.2.
Though we expanded the CompUser environment, we did not apply the CompDev envi-
ronment to this research as investigating the security of modern AKEs when devices are
allowed to be fully compromised is a wasted endeavor. This is because at some point the
device executing the AKE will have to compute a session key. However, in the CompDev
environment the adversary could simply reveal the device secrets used to compute this
session key and render its secrecy moot.
2.3 Security Analysis of Bluetooth
When discussing Bluetooth’s cryptographic protocols we take a two-pronged approach.
First, we present work on the provable security of Bluetooth as conducted in a compu-
tational setting. In light of this presentation, we then proceed to discuss relevant attacks
on Bluetooth that exploit security vulnerabilities. This construction demonstrates that the
analysis conducted on Bluetooth has not fully captured its vulnerabilities and the advanced
adversaries present in modern scenarios. This thesis intends to capture these additional
vulnerabilities with the CYBORG security model that implements an advanced adversary
and does not side-step the user’s role in the protocol.
Secure Simple Pairing was first published in version 2.1. Secure Simple Pairing introduced
four methods of authenticated key exchange dependent on device input/output (IO) capa-
bilities: Just Works, Out-of-Band, Numeric Comparison, and Passkey Entry. Devices could
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then agree on the specific protocol to execute based on the exchange of IO capabilities to
ensure they could be executed properly. Secure Simple Pairing was subsequently updated to
Secure Connections in version 4.2, which provided functionality for the Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) approved elliptic curve P-256, vice only P-192, during pairing.
Of these, Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry both rely on the user playing an active
role in an authenticated key exchange (AKE).
2.3.1 Analysis of Bluetooth SSP
Lindell performed the first computational analysis of Bluetooth Numeric Comparison under
v2.1 in 2009 using an adapted version of the BR93 model that incorporated the idea of
session identifiers from the CKmodel. In his adaptations, he restricted the session identifier
to be only the exchanged public keys during the Diffie–Hellman key exchange. In addition,
he did not allow for any leakage of long term, ephemeral, or session-state information by
the adversary. Under his model, he also showed that allowing session oracles to run multiple
executions of the protocol became meaningless and therefore allowed him to restrict his
analysis to only the single execution setting. The security game then encompassed having
the adversary win by either non-negligibly guessing the link key or non-negligibly having
two session oracles accept without matching session identifiers. This then led to a proof
of security reliant upon the DDH assumption for the Diffie–Hellman group used in the
protocol, the 2-universality of SHA-256, and the computational binding, non-malleability,
and pseudorandomness of HMAC-SHA-256. The proof presents a great first step in the
analysis of Numeric Comparison but in keeping with our advancement in knowledge of
what constitutes a “secure” protocol it is imperative that we revisit the Bluetooth protocol.
Sun, Sun, and Yang conducted a two-part computational analysis of Numeric Comparison
[8], [51]. The first part shares many similarities with Lindell’s original proof of security for
v2.1 with a couple exceptions [8]. For one, the analysis allowed for devices to run multiple
instances of the pairing protocol sequentially vice only be allowed to run a single instance.
Sun et al. focused on the adversary’s capability to distinguish the derived session key from
random. Their results showed that v5.0 of Numeric Comparison satisfied a similar level of
security as originally shown by Lindell, andwas secure under their model given that HMAC-
SHA-256 is a collision resistant pseudorandom function and the Diffie–Hellman group used
in pairing satisfies the DDH assumption. The second part conducts computational analysis
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into the privacy of Bluetooth pairing in the low energy setting [51], where privacy is defined
to be whether an adversary can derive device identity. They then show how Bluetooth
pairing in the low energy setting leaks device identity if devices use long-term values for
their respective secret and public keys; this leads to the natural improvement in the protocol
to require these keys to be ephemeral.
2.3.2 Relevant Attacks on SSP
Many published attacks exist against Bluetooth that attempt to circumvent its security
guarantees. While the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), the governing body behind
Bluetooth standardization, claims active MitM attacks have at most a one-in-a-million
chance at attacking the Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols, researchers have
published methods for greatly increasing an adversary’s odds [11]. In this section, a few of
the most relevant attacks on Bluetooth pairing are presented with possible countermeasures.
NIST Summary of Security Threats and Vulnerabilities
Before examining some particularly devasting attacks that warrant an in-depth exploration,
we begin with a discussion into the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST)
“Guide to Bluetooth Security” that summarized the security modes adopted by Bluetooth
and possible security threats and vulnerabilities [3]. NIST identified 27 exploitable vul-
nerabilities in Bluetooth’s pairing protocols. Some vulnerabilities of note include static or
weakly generated Diffie–Hellman keys and passkeys, presence of downgrade attacks, and
the ability to conduct unbounded authentication attempts. Furthermore, two attacks we ex-
amine in the forthcoming sections present real-world examples of the issues involved with
the reuse of passkeys and allowing devices to downgrade to security modes that provide no
protection from an active adversary. Some other focused security threats include Bluejack-
ing, a message-sending attack akin to phishing, and fuzzing attacks, a form of side channel
attack on a Bluetooth-enabled device’s radio. The risks are still great when using Bluetooth
and necessitate the need for better understanding of the protocol’s computational security.
One could conceivably argue that the confluence of the above vulnerabilities means that
Bluetooth is insecure. Although this may be true, reaching this conclusion requires a struc-
tured analysis not simply a listing of vulnerabilities and attacks. NIST attempts to improve
user awareness and mitigate its presented security threats and vulnerabilities with a 37-point
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checklist for users to reference when looking to implement countermeasures.
BT–Niño–MitM Attack
Haataja and Toivanen produced possibly the most famous attack on Secure Simple Pairing
termed the BT–Niño–MitM attack. This was an exploit designed to avoid Numeric Com-
parison, Passkey Entry, or Out-of-Band pairing altogether by intervening during the IO
capability exchange and forcing the devices into the Just Works protocol, which provides
no active MitM protection [52]. The design of the attack is displayed in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Diagram of attack ows for BTNiñoMitM attack. Source: [52].
The physical layer disruption attack is only employed if a pairing already exists among the
devices. In such a case, the attacker jams communications between the two devices and
forces the user to attempt a new pairing and link key generation. This is done to replace the
previously generated link key, which is presumably secure, with a compromised one. From
here, the attacker performs a MitM attack during the IO capability exchange to force the
devices into the Just Works pairing protocol where the MitM attack can continue unabated
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by the user. In terms of application to our own analysis, we rule out the possibility of this
attack by assuming honest exchange of pre-protocol information.
The primary solution to this type of attack proposed by Haataja and Toivanen involves a
command window for the user to act on following the IO capability exchange, “The second
device has no display and keyboard! Is this true?” From here, the user can decide whether
to proceed with the pairing via a “Proceed” command or halt the pairing due to suspected
adversary involvement via a “STOP” command [52]. This solution places more emphasis on
the user to thwart the BT–Niño–MitM attack but also still enables Just Works as a possible
pairing option, which has certain compatibility benefits. From a usability perspective, the
greater dependence on the user in this solution has perhaps prevented widespread adoption
in updated Bluetooth specifications. Another unique solution to the problem posed by the
BT–Niño–MitM attack is to implement a server that ties a device’s radio frequency identifier
(RFID) to Bluetooth device identity and can be securely communicated with to ensure
malicious devices are not present [53]. It is important to note that the proposal is scaled to
be implemented locally and is infeasible at a large scale; however, it could prove viable in a
local operational setting for USMC devices.
Re-Used Passkey Attack
As pointed out by NIST in [3], the reuse of secret material in a cryptographic setting can
prove devastating to protocols; Lindell was the first to demonstrate that the reuse of the
random key in Passkey Entry can lead to a MitM attack on the protocol [13]. The attacker
simply passively eavesdrops on a pairing protocol, learns the bits of random password by
comparing commitment values with their respective nonces, then mounts a MitM attack
using the derived passkey. Barnickle, Wang, and Meyer expanded on Lindell’s results with
their development of Bluetrial to mount the attack in a feasible amount of time and with a
90% success rate; thereby cementing the reused passkey as a viable vector to exploit in real-
world scenarios [12]. Finally, in 2018, Sun, Mu, and Susilo showed that the attack was still
viable under v5.0 and proposed a novel solution to the problem [14]. Their recommendation
involved combining the user generated random value, termed the passkey, communicated in
the beginning of Phase 2 with the Diffie–Hellman key, DHKey, generated at the conclusion
of Phase 1 to produce a new random value A∗ that they concluded to be secret even under
the assumption that the original random value is re-used.
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Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack
Biham and Neumann recently published an attack on Secure Simple Pairing they termed
the Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack that exploits the non-authentication of the ~-
coordinate of the DHKey and allows for either complete denial of service or total com-
promise of the generated long-term key. This accomplished through a MitM attack during
the public key exchange step of Secure Simple Pairing wherein the adversary intercepts the
public keys and sets each point’s ~-coordinate to 0.
Since % 1~ = 0, by definition we have that 2% 1 = O where O is the point at infinity for
our curve  (see Section 3.3 for preliminary work on elliptic curves). Computation of the
DHKey then becomes trivial under the assumption that the initiating device’s secret key is
even, something that should reasonably happen 50% of the time:
DHKey = [( 0]% 1
= (2:)% 1 = (:)2% 1 for some 0 ≤ : < ?
= (:)O = O .
An easy-to-implement solution that Biham and Neumann recommend, though surprisingly
rare in practice, would be to validate that the received public keys satisfy the elliptic curve
equation [54].
Tap ‘n Ghost
Maruyama, Wakabayashi, and Mori recently published the first active attack on mobile
devices that specifically exploited the touchscreen, which they termed “Tap ‘n Ghost” [4].
The attack has multiple requirements in order to be viable as presented in their research:
the mobile device to be attacked needs to be an Android smartphone enabled with NFC
and the phone needs to be unlocked. To execute the Tap ‘n Ghost attack, Maruyama et al.
pre-built a table for users to place their mobile devices onto that could execute the “Tap ‘n
Ghost” attack unbeknownst to the user. The “Tap ‘n Ghost” is then a two-pronged attack on
a user’s device. We display a diagram depicting a high-level view of the attack in Figure 2.2.
First the attacker executes a Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP) attack. The TAP attack works
by using NFC communication to force a pop-up on a user’s device requesting to connect
to a Wi-Fi port or Bluetooth device. Next, a Ghost Touch Generator attacks the capacitive
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touchscreen of the user device and corrupts user input to force the device to believe the
user selected an option to proceed with the connection. Once the adversary has successfully
enticed a connection to a malicious device, he then gains full control of the user’s device.
This is a devastating attack to Bluetooth. Maruyama suggest various software improvements
to NFC and touchscreens to help mitigate the efficacy of their attack. Preventing the physical
corruption of a table proves to be a much harder problemwith no efficient solution proposed
by the authors.
Figure 2.2. Tap `n Ghost. Adversary uses a Tag-based Adaptive Ploy to
display a message from device A to the user requesting to pair to a malicious
device Eve. When the user denies this request, a Ghost Touch Generator
corrupts the input and forces acceptance by device A. These actions map
to a ShowUser query and ControlUser query, respectively, in the CYBORG
model.
The “Tap ‘n Ghost” attack motivates the inclusion of novel adversarial queries when analyz-
ing user-mediated protocols. Maruyama et al. described two specific attacks that separately 
attacked the two pathways involved in user-to-device communication. The TAP attack en-
ables an adversary to create messages sent from a device to the user and the Ghost attack 
enables an adversary to modify messages sent from a user to a specific device. This attack 
provided real-world justification for the creation and description of the ShowUser, to model 
TAP-like attacks and ControlUser, to model Ghost-like attacks, queries in the CYBORG 
security model. Additionally, being able to employ the attacks separately warrants multiple 
threat scenarios in the compromised user setting to account for all viable combinations of
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 threat scenarios in the compromised user setting to account for all viable combinations of 
corruption.
2.3.3 Modeling Choices
To account for the above research into Bluetooth vulnerabilities, the following modeling 
choices were made. In regard to the NIST attacks, we attempted to model a complete 
adver-sary with the capability to affect both DtD and UtD communications. We define a 
typical Dolev–Yao adversary over the DtD channel to capture control over DtD 
communications and we give the adversary access to the ShowUser and ControlUser 
queries to model social engineering attacks like Bluejacking. Since much research has been 
devoted to the BT–Niño–MitM attack and viable solutions have been published, we do not 
devote research to preventing this exploit and assume the adversary actually attempts to 
break the Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols. To enable the research of 
other vulnerabilities against Passkey Entry aside for re-used passkey attacks, and for 
simplicity’s sake, all ex-changed passkeys are assumed ephemeral in this research. The 
viability of this assumption is based off the version of Passkey Entry employed. There are 
three variants of Passkey Entry based off who generates the passkey: the initiating/
responding device or the user. For the former, it is reasonable to assume that advanced 
mobile devices, like smartphones or modern laptops, have access to a pseudorandom 
number generator for ephemeral passkey generation. However, for the latter, it is necessary 
to assume that the user has access to some form of secure number generation (e.g., RSA 
SecureID keyfob). As preventing the Fixed Coordinate Invalid Curve Attack is trivial and 
does not involve the protocol, we place no effort into modeling this attack and assume all 
devices will validate that received public keys lie on the employed elliptic curve. Finally, 
much of the modeling choices in regard to the user stem from adequately capturing the Tap 
‘n Ghost attack. We refer the reader to Section 5.2 for further discussion on the specifics.
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A cryptographic hash function, as defined by NIST, is a function that maps arbitrarily-sized
bit strings to fixed-sized bit strings and satisfies the following:
1. "it is computationally infeasible to find for a given output, an input which maps to
this output, and
2. it is computationally infeasible to find for a given input a second input which maps to
the same output" [55].
The above properties are referred to as preimage resistance and second-preimage resistance
respectively. However, the desirable qualities of hash functions are not limited to just these
two. Another commonly referenced property of a hash function is collision resistance. Rog-
away and Shrimpton examine the properties and inter-relationships of preimage resistance,
second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance in [56]. We give rigorous definitions
of the latter two properties below as they are relevant to this work.
Definition 3.1.1. Let H be a hash function andA a PPT adversary. We defined the second-
preimage resistance (sec-pre) of H as such: given msg ∈ {0, 1}∗ and hash value such that
H(msg) = hash, A cannot find a second-preimage, msg′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, such that msg′ ≠ msg
and H(msg′) = hash with more than negligible probability. We denote A’s advantage in
breaking sec-pre of H as Advsec-preH,A .
Definition 3.1.2. Let H be a hash function andA a PPT adversary. We defined the collision
resistance (col-res) of H as such: A cannot find two messages msg1 ≠ msg2 such that
H(msg1) = H(msg2) with more than negligible probability. We denote A’s advantage in
breaking col-res of H as Advcol-resH,A .
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3.2 Message Authentication Codes
The message authentication code (MAC) is a means by which one ensures authenticity and
integrity in cryptographic protocols. We provide a mathematical definition of the MAC
below, which we adapt from [17].
Definition 3.2.1. We define a message authentication code (MAC) overM = {0, 1}∗ (the
set of all possible messages), K = {0, 1}k (the set of all possible keys), T = {0, 1}t (the set
of all possible tags), to be the tuple of algorithms (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) defined as follows:
• Kgn(1_) $→ K: A probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes as input 1_ where
_ is the security parameter, and outputs a key, K ∈ K.
• MAC(K,msg) $→ tag: A probabilistic message authentication algorithm that takes
as input a key, K ∈ K, and message, msg ∈ M, and outputs a tag, tag ∈ T .
• Vfy(K,msg, tag) → {: A deterministic verification algorithm that takes as inputs a
key, K ∈ K, a message, msg ∈ M, and a tag, tag ∈ T and outputs a verification bit,
v ∈ {0, 1}.
We also require for the correctness of a message authentication code MAC that for all
msg ∈ M, K ∈ K, and tag ∈ T , Vfy(K,msg, tag) = 1 iff MAC(K,msg) = tag.
3.2.1 Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
AnHMAC, called a hash-basedMAC, is one commonMAC implementation and is typically
written as HMAC-H where “-H” is the specific hash function used (e.g., HMAC-SHA256).
We now direct the readers toward the definition of an HMAC as it was originally described
by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk in RFC 2104 [57]. This definition was constructed under
the assumption that the hash function used in the HMAC operates iteratively on blocks of
data with a fixed length. For example, although SHA-256 can accept any size input and
produce a hash, it operates on input in blocks at 32-bytes at time.
Definition 3.2.2. A hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) over M = {0, 1}∗
(the set of all possible messages),K = {0, 1}k (the set of all possible keys), T = {0, 1}t (the
set of all possible tags), is a message authentication code with the below implementation of
the MAC algorithm:
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HMAC-H(K,msg) = H((K′ ⊕ opad)‖H((K′ ⊕ ipad)‖msg)) → tag: A deterministic
message authentication algorithm that takes as input K ∈ K and msg ∈ M and
outputs a tag, tag ∈ T where opad = (0x36)b, ipad = (0x5c)b, H is the associated




H(K) |K| > b
K otherwise .
The usefulness of the HMAC as a secure MAC construction cannot be understated. Bellare
et al. originally proved that an HMAC was a pseudorandom function (PRF) under the
assumption that the hash function used in the construction was also a PRF and weakly
collision-resistant [57]. Bellare expanded this result to show that the hash function need
only be a PRF and the weakly collision-resistant condition was in fact extraneous [58].
This solidified the usefulness of the HMAC construction, and proved that it could be used
securely evenwhen constructedwith SHA-1 andMD5,whichwerewidely used but provably
not weakly collision-resistant hash functions [59], [60].
The hash function used in Secure Simple Pairing as part of the HMAC construction is
SHA-256. NIST Special Publication 800-107, which details recommended best practices
for the use of approved hash functions and their proven security properties, asserts that
SHA-256 has a preimage resistance of 256 bits, a second preimage resistance in the range
of 201-256 bits (where the variation is caused by the ratio of message length to input block
size), and a collision resistance of 128 bits. These values fall within the expected range for
a 256-bit output hash function and highlight that no explicit breaks have been found for
this algorithm. Truncating the output of SHA-256, or its associated HMAC, will reduce the
security of the function to a function of the length of the truncation [55].
3.2.2 Strong Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack
In Figure 3.1, we display the security game for Strong Unforgeability under ChosenMessage
Attack (SUF-CMA) in algorithmic notation. This experiment models an attacker’s ability
to break the unforgeability of a MAC by forging a new message or a new tag of a known
message-tag pair, or by forging a wholly new message-tag pair that verifies correctly.
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EXPSUF-CMAMAC,A (_):
1: K $← Kgn(1_)
2: win← 0, ( ← ∅




2: ( ( ∪ {(msg, tag)}
3: return tag
MAC.Vfy(msg, tag):
1: v← Vfy(K,msg, tag)
2: if (v = 1) ∧ ((msg, tag) ∉ () then
3: win← 1
4: return win from experiment
5: end if
6: return v
Figure 3.1. Security experiment for SUF-CMA of a message authentication
code algorithm MAC = (Kgn,MAC,Vfy) and adversary A.
We conclude our discussion of SUF-CMA with definitions for adversarial advantage and
security as formulated in [17].
Definition 3.2.3. We define the adversarial advantage against the SUF-CMA experiment
described in Figure 3.1 for a PPT adversary A against a message authentication code
MAC to be:
AdvSUF-CMAMAC,A (_) = Pr[EXP
SUF-CMA
MAC,A (_) = 1] .
Definition 3.2.4. We say that some message authentication code MAC is SUF-CMA
secure if the advantage for any PPT adversary A interacting according to the experiment
EXPSUF-CMAMAC,A (_) is upper bounded by some negligible function negl(_):
AdvSUF-CMAMAC,A (_) ≤ negl(_) .
3.3 Elliptic Curves
Definition 3.3.1. An elliptic curve  is defined to be the following set of points over a finite
field F@ of prime order @ > 3:
{% = (%G , %~) = (G, ~) ∈ F@ × F@ : ~2 − G3 − 0G2 − 1 ≡ 0 mod @} ∪ {O},
where O is the point at infinity and 403 + 2712 . 0 mod @.
This is a generalized definition of elliptic curve as needed for the purposes of this paper and
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we direct the interested reader to [61] for a refresher or [62] for an in-depth examination on
elliptic curves.
Definition 3.3.2. Point addition (+), is defined as the operation acting on two points %1 =
(G1, ~1), %2 = (G2, ~2) in the elliptic curve  over a finite field F@ as follows.
• If %1 = %2 = O, then %1 + %2 = O + O = O.
• If %1 = O or %2 = O (say %2 without loss of generality), then %1 + %2 = %1 + O = %1.
• Let f ≡ (~2 − ~1) (G2 − G1)−1 mod @, if %1 ≠ %2.
• Let f ≡ (3G21 + 0) (2~1)
−1 mod @, if %1 = %2 and ~1 . 0.
• Then we have %1 + %2 = (G, ~) = (f2 − G1 − G2, f(G1 − G) − ~1) if f is defined, or
%1 + %2 = O otherwise.
We state without proof that the elliptic curve  over a finite field F@ together with the group
operation +, forms a finite abelian group with O as the identity element. We use the notation
<% for < ∈ F@ and % ∈  to signify point multiplication in this elliptic curve group, which
is defined as repeated point addition of % with itself.
Definition 3.3.3. It is said that a point % ∈  has order = ∈ F@ if it holds that:
=% = O.
Definition 3.3.4. The set of points in an elliptic curve  equal to :% for 1 ≤ : ≤ =, where
% ∈  is of order =, forms a cyclic subgroup of  . The point % is referred to as the base
point of this cyclic subgroup.
Definition 3.3.5. Let % be a base point in  of order =. The cofactor ℎ ∈ F@ of % is defined
to be the number such that:
| | = =ℎ.
Definition 3.3.6. If base point % ∈  has a cofactor of 1, then it is said that % is a generator
of  .
We then use the tuple of values (@, 0, 1, %, =, ℎ) to identify cyclic subgroups of elliptic
curves, where the given parameters are as defined above.
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Elliptic curves are useful because they allow us to execute Diffie–Hellman key exchange
using keys of smaller sizes than needed when operating under standard Galois fields. To be
explicit, the NSA operates under the assumption that 256-bit keys when using elliptic curves
for Diffie–Hellman exchange achieves security comparable to 2048-bit RSA keys [63]. We
depict how two parties may execute elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) to arrive at the
shared key  below using the curve (@, 0, 1, %, =, ℎ) over the field F@:
 : G $← F@, PK0 ← G%
 : ~ $← F@, PK1 ← ~%
→  : PK0
→  : PK1
 :  ← GPK1
 :  ← ~PK0 .
We then have that depending on the security properties of our elliptic curve, and the
protocol in which it is employed, solving for  is a computationally infeasible problem. We
capture one such formulation of the hardness of breaking ECDH below. In Definition 3.3.7
we present the security experiment for the elliptic curve decision Diffie–Hellman problem
(EC-DDH). The basic premise of the typical DDH problem is that given a group, generator
, and uniformly chosen group elements 0 and 1, an adversary cannot distinguish 01
from some other uniformly chosen element 2. We base the experiment off the choice of
elliptic curve as to account for known elliptic curves with vulnerabilities that an adversary
can exploit and potentially have non-negligible probability of success in the EC-DDH
experiment. We direct the reader to [64] and [65] for specific examples of attacks on
elliptic curves, that would result in a non-negligible adversarial advantage in the EC-DDH
experiment.
We focus on the elliptic curve variant of the DDH problem due to Bluetooth’s adoption of
elliptic curves during its key exchange phase; they specify the use of the P-192 curve as
part of Secure Simple Pairing and the P-256 curve when using Secure Connections [11]. Of
note on the security of these curves, both of the above curves were approved by NIST and
have been standardized by the FIPS PUB 186-4 as recommended for government use [66].
However, research by Bernstein and Lange [67] dispute the achievable security of the P-256
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curve, they did not investigate the P-192 curve. Specifically, the P-256 curve did not pass
Bernstein and Lange’s rigidity, ladder, completeness, and indistinguishability tests.
Definition 3.3.7. Let  be an elliptic curve over the field F@ with generator point % of
order =. Let A be a PPT adversary. We state the Elliptic Curve Decisional DH (EC-DDH)
assumption as such: given access to  , %, and knowledge of 0% and 1% for 0, 1 $← F@
and 0, 1 < =, for 2 $← F@ and 2 < =, A cannot distinguish 01% from 2% with more than
negligible probability. We use AdvEC-DDHA to write A’s advantage in breaking the EC-DDH
assumption.
3.4 Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function (PRF), as defined in [68], is an any function that is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from a random oracle. A random oracle is a function whose
outputs are truly random. A common pseudorandom function used in cryptography is the
HMAC as discussed in Section 3.2. We can also define other security properties a PRF may
achieve/contribute toward.
The pseudorandom function oracle Diffie–Hellman (PRF-ODH) assumption is one such
example. Informally, this assumption states that even given knowledge to the public share of
a DH key, and PRF output(s) involving either the left or right DH key, a PRF output with the
full DH key is computationally indistinguishable from random. The PRF-ODH assumption
was originally introduced in [69] in an investigation of TLS 1.2, and later modified to allow
early adversarial access to both the DH public key shares before a challenge query [70],
[71]. Other PRF-ODH assumption variants were analyzed in [72]. We extend the symmetric
generic single-single PRF-ODH assumption of [71] to cover ECDH. This construction is
the same as presented in [70], [71] but with ECDH vice standard Diffie–Hellman.
Definition 3.4.1. Let  be an elliptic curve over the field F@ with generator point % of order
=. Let PRF_ :  × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}_ be a pseudorandom function with keys in  , input
strings in {0, 1}∗, and output strings in {0, 1}_. Let A be a PPT adversary. We define the
symmetric generic single-single PRF Oracle ECDH assumption, EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH, as
follows:
1. The challenger samples 0, 1 $← F@ uniformly at random with 0, 1 < =, computes 0%
and 1%, and provides (, %, 0%, 1%) to A.
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2. Eventually, A issues the challenge query G∗ ← {0, 1}∗.
3. The challenger samples b $← {0, 1} uniformly at randomand sets ~0 ← PRF_ (01%, G)
if b = 0, and ~1 ← {0, 1}_ otherwise. The challenger returns ~b to A.
4. A may issue a single query to the oracles,OECDH0 andOECDH1, handled as follows:
• OECDH0 ((, G): Challenger returns⊥ if ( ∉  or if ((, G) = (1%, G∗), otherwise
it returns ~← PRF_ (0(, G).
• OECDH1 (), G): Challenger returns⊥ if) ∉  or if (), G) = (0%, G∗), otherwise
it returns ~← PRF_ (1), G).
5. Eventually, 3{4AB0A~ outputs the bit guess 1, and wins the experiment if 1 = b.
We define the adversarial advantage in the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH experiment as




and we say that the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumption holds if
AdvEC-sym-ssPRF-ODHPRF_,A (_) ≤ negl(_) .
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CHAPTER 4:
Key Exchange in Bluetooth
In this chapter, we introduce to the Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) protocol as 
described by the Bluetooth SIG Specification 5.1. We also introduce all the necessary 
functions, sub-protocols, symbols, and variables.
4.1 SSP Background
In this section, we give preliminary descriptions of the four Bluetooth pairing methods 
within the Secure Simple Pairing suite, and their requirements for use.
4.1.1 Device Input/Output Capabilities
In order for a device to execute one of the SSP authentication protocols it must first meet 
the minimum device input and output capabilities. Table 4.1 gives a visual overview of all 
possible input/output (IO) combinations afforded to a Bluetooth device and the resultant 
four designations of IO capability. We also display the default authentication method used 
in SSP as a result of the combination of IO capabilities in the two devices executing the 
protocol in Table 4.2.
• NoInputNoOutput. This designation means that the device cannot display or commu-
nicate a 6-digit decimal number to the user and can accept no more than simple binary
input from the user. Since no method relies on only being able to accept binary input,
Bluetooth made the decision to not make a separate IO capability designation for a No
Output and Yes / No device. If even one of the devices executing the SSP protocol is
NoInputNoOutput then either Just Works or the OOB authentication method must be
used. A typical example of a NoInputNoOutput device would be wireless headphones.
• DisplayOnly. This designation means that the device can display or communicate a
6-digit decimal number to the user and does not have the ability to accept any kind of
input from the user. DisplayOnly devices can execute Passkey Entry, Just Works, or
OOB depending on their partner’s capabilities. A typical example of a DisplayOnly
device would be an RSA SecureID keyfob.
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Table 4.1. Table depicting possible device IO capabilities as dened by Blue-
tooth. We dene the various possibilities for input and output capability as
follows. No Input means the device cannot receive signals from the user.
Yes / No means the device can accept binary inputs from the user. Key-
board means the device has the ability to accept digits 0 through 9 and
binary input from the user. No Output means the device cannot display or
communicate at least a 6-digit decimal number to the user. Numeric Out-
put means the device can display or communicate at least a 6-digit decimal
number to the user. Bluetooth uses the terminology display or communi-
cate to account for the possibility that the numeric output could either
be displayed visually to the user or communicated via other means, such as
audibly. Adapted from [11].
Table of Possible Device Output Capability
IO Capability Combinations No Output Numeric Output
Device Input Capability
No Input NoInputNoOutput DisplayOnly
Yes / No NoInputNoOutput DisplayYesNo
Keyboard KeyboardOnly KeyboardDisplay
• DisplayYesNo. This designation means that the device can display or communicate a
6-digit decimal number to the user and has the ability to accept binary inputs from the
user. DisplayYesNo devices can execute any of the possible SSP authentication meth-
ods depending on their partner’s capabilities. Typical examples of a DisplayYesNo
devices can be seen in Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
• KeyboardOnly. This designationmeans that the device cannot display or communicate
a 6-digit decimal number to the user and has the ability to accept digits 0 through
9 and binary input from the user. KeyboardOnly devices can execute Passkey Entry,
Just Works, or OOB depending on their partners capabilities. A typical example of a
KeyboardOnly devices is a wireless keyboard.
• KeyboardDisplay. This designationmeans that the device can display or communicate
a 6-digit decimal number to the user and has the ability to accept digits 0 through
9 from the user. KeyboardDisplay devices can execute any of the possible SSP au-
thentication methods depending on their partner’s capabilities. A typical example of
a KeyboardDisplay device is a your typical smartphone.
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Table 4.2. Table depicting authentication method employed whether in Blue-
tooth pairing, whether it be Just Works, Numeric Comparison, or Passkey
Entry, based on the combination of device IO capabilities. We dierentiate
Passkey Entry into three versions based on how the passkey is generated: via
the initiating device (Init. Gen'd), responding device (Resp. Gen'd), or the
user (User Gen'd). Adapted from [11].
Table of Default Initiating Device
Authentication Methods NoInputNoOutput DisplayOnly DisplayYesNo KeyboardOnly KeyboardDisplay
Responding Device
NoInputNoOutput Just Works Just Works Just Works Just Works Just Works
DisplayOnly Just Works Just Works Just Works Resp. Gen’d Resp. Gen’d
DisplayYesNo Just Works Just Works Num. Comp. Resp. Gen’d Resp. Gen’dNum. Comp.
KeyboardOnly Just Works Init. Gen’d Init Gen’d User Gen’d Init. Gen’d
KeyboardDisplay Just Works Init. Gen’d Init. Gen’d Resp. Gen’d Init. Gen’dNum. Comp. Num. Comp.
4.1.2 Out-of-Band
This protocol is designed for devices that can communicate via a separate communication
method that can be used to authenticate devices. Also of note, Out-of-Band can be used by
any device regardless of IO capability so long as the two devices have a method for shared
out-of-band (OOB) communications. A common method of OOB communication used
is near-field communication (NFC). The security guarantees Out-of-Band affords users is
completely dependent on the OOB communication method used and whether an adversary
has control over the separate medium. Although we choose not to devote analysis to Out-of-
Band, analysis of this protocol could progress similarly to that of cyborg protocols. Since
Out-of-Band pairing does not rely on certificates or a certificate authority for authentication,
an investigation of adversarial capabilities over prominent OOB communication methods,
like NFC, could yield an applicable model for analysis similar to our CYBORG model.
4.1.3 Just Works
Just Works is functionally identical to Numeric Comparison but with no user interaction.
This means that Just Works provides no active MitM protection. The BT–Niño–MitM attack
discussed in Section 2.3.2 exploits this weakness by downgrading Numeric Comparison to
Just Works for authentication. This protocol is used when one of the devices to be paired is
of the NoInputNoOutput classification; one real-world example of Just Works use is pairing
involving Bluetooth headphones, which typically have no display capability and can only
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accept binary inputs from the user. As extensive research has already shown this protocol
is broken, we choose not to devote analysis to Just Works.
4.1.4 Numeric Comparison
Numeric Comparison is a pairing method that requires all devices to be able to display or
communicate a six-digit number to the user and have the ability to accept at least binary
inputs from the user. This method also makes no use of a PIN or password; thereby,
simplifying the pairing process for the user by not requiring any memorization. Motivation
behind the development of Numeric Comparison was twofold. Bluetooth SIG wanted a
pairing method with MitM protection and they desired to have a method for users to
confirm that two devices with non-unique names are communicating with each other. We
devote an entire section to a description of Numeric Comparison in Section 4.3 and analysis
of its security properties in Section 6.2.
4.1.5 Passkey Entry
Passkey Entry has various requirements based on the devices executing the protocol and
refer the reader to Table 4.2 for a detailed description of the pairing possibilities. The main
motivation behind the development for Passkey Entry was for the pairing scenario involving
a wireless keyboard and a computer. For this combination to achieve MitM protection
Numeric Comparison could not be used because wireless keyboards typically do not come
with a numeric display capability as standard. However, Passkey Entry would allow for
an authenticated pairing to take place whereby the computer generated and displayed a
random value to be input to the wireless keyboard by the user. We devote an entire section
to a description of Passkey Entry in Section 4.3 and analysis of its security properties in
Section 6.3.1. We also propose a new version Passkey Entry, termed Dual Passkey Entry
(DPE), and an add-on to original Passkey Entry and DPE, termed Secure HashModification
(SHM), in Chapter 7. These modifications were developed as a result of our analysis and in




Various values and variables are used throughout Bluetooth pairing to accomplish the
pairing to include keys, tags, nonces, and constants. All presented values will be said to be
maintained by aBluetooth device of identity .We state the actual bit lengths for the relevant
variables as required under either BR/EDR Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections
Passkey Entry.
4.2.1 Keys and Random Values
• DHKey ∈ {0, 1}256: Referred to as the Diffie–Hellman Key; this is the long-term key
generated from the DH key exchange.
• LK ∈ {0, 1}128: Referred to as the Link Key; this is the session key generated as a
result of pairing.
• % ∈ {0, 1}256: This is the bit representation of the long-term public key of device
 to be exchanged. This will refer to a point on an elliptic curve. We will write % 8G ,
to refer to the x-coordinate of device ’s public key.
• ( ∈ {0, 1}255: This is the long-term secret key of Device A to be used in DH key
exchange.
• #0 ∈ {0, 1}128: A nonce generated from device A.
• A0 ∈ {0, . . . , 9}6: A 6-digit, decimal, random value for device A; referred to as the
passkey. Can be either device or user generated.
Bluetooth’s specification requires that #0 be sampled fresh for every execution of Passkey
Entry, and recommends the same for ( 0, A. Per the specification, ( should be re-drawn
when ( + 3 > 8 where ( is the number of successful pairings and  is the number of
failed pairing said device has experienced. Though it is highly recommended that a device
change its private key after every pairing, independent of the pairing outcome, this is merely
a suggestion and it is reasonable to assume that implementations exist where this does not
occur. In this analysis, we assume ( 0, #0, and A are fresh ephemeral values. We impose
this restriction to simplify analysis.
One requirement placed on the actual devices in Bluetooth is random number generation.
Bluetooth stipulates that the nonce “should be generated directly from a physical source of
randomness or with a good pseudorandom generator seeded with a random value from a
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physical source” [11]. Without going into a long discussion on what it means to be a “good”
pseudorandom generator, for the purposes of this research it will be assumed that any nonce
used in analysis is indistinguishable from a random value.
Also note that DHKey is computed as the x-coordinate of [( 0]% 1. We require % 0~ as
part of the public key, by way of curve validation checks to prevent the attack described
in [54].
4.2.2 Tags
•  ∈ {0, 1}128: 128 bit tag; referred to as the commitment value.
•  ∈ {0, 1}128: 128 bit tag; referred to as the check value.
• + ∈ {0, . . . , 9}6: 6 digit tag; referred to as the verification value.
4.2.3 Constants
• “btlk”: A fixed 4-byte ASCII string; the constant value 0x62746c6b and acts as a
label in the protocol.
• IOcapA ∈ {0, 1}24: The IO capabilities of device A; defined to be constant across
sessions for device I.
•  ∈ {0, 1}48: The Bluetooth device address of device A, synonymouswith the identity
of device of A.
4.2.4 Elliptic Curves
The specific curve used in Secure Simple Pairing is P-192 as defined by NIST. We define
the curve P-192 below for prime modulus ?, order A, generator x-coordinate G , generator
38





1 = 64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec c146b9b1,
G = 188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb 43a18800 f4ff0afd 82ff1012,
~ = 07192b95 ffc8da78 631011ed 6b24cdd5 73f977a1 1e794811 [11].
The specific curve used in Secure Connections is P-256 as defined by NIST. We define
the curve P-256 below for prime modulus ?, order A, generator x-coordinate G , generator





1 = 0x64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec c146b9b1,
G = 0x188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb 43a18800 f4ff0afd 82ff1012,
~ = 0x07192b95 ffc8da78 631011ed 6b24cdd5 73f977a1 1e794811 [11].
4.2.5 Relevant Functions
Regardless of whether we are operating under Secure Simple Pairing or Secure Connections,
both modes use SHA-256 [55] for the hash function andHMAC-SHA256 [57] for theMAC.
4.3 Protocol Description
In this section, we present the Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols adapted
to fit within previous mathematical definitions and diagrams for visualization in Figures 4.3
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and 4.4.
4.3.1 Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
This phase is not explicitly listed in the Bluetooth v5.1 specification and is not a Phase of any
protocol as presented therein; however, it encompasses a variety of steps performed over an
unsecure channel before pairing commences. This includes device discovery, whereby the
devices to be paired,  and , share Bluetooth device addresses as shown in Figure 4.1, and
initialize a connection. Additionally, the IO capabilities, IOcapA and IOcapB, are exchanged
during this phase to ensure a compatible authentication method is being used as shown in
Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.1. Communication chart for Device Discovery that describes the
process by which a device learns another device's Bluetooth device address
for use in pairing. In the above diagram, we have that Device A broadcasts an
inquiry to all discoverable and connectable Bluetooth devices within range,
usually around 10m. The second step of Device Discovery involves querying
all responders for their display name to be shown to the user. Source: [11].
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Figure 4.2. Message Sequence Chart for the IO Capability Exchange between
an initiating device, Device A, and responding device, Device B. This is a
two-communication request/response protocol whereby device A requests
and communicates his IO capability to device B, and device B responds with
his. Source: [11].
4.3.2 Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 1 refers to the elliptic curveDiffie–Hellman (ECDH) public key exchange as described
in Section 3.3 and calculation of DHKey. The purpose of Phase 1 is to generate a shared
key to be used throughout the rest of pairing. To accomplish this, the public keys of devices
A and B are exchanged in steps 1a and 1b, and then used to calculate DHKey using elliptic
curve multiplication in steps 1c and 1d.
4.3.3 Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
The purpose of Phase 2 is the first half of authentication, whereby the user functions as a
trusted third party (TTP) to ensure devices  and  are actually pairing with each other as
expected. We separate the discussion of Phase 2 into descriptions of Numeric Comparison
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and Passkey Entry in its various modes.
Numeric Comparison
A visual depiction of Numeric Comparison is given in Figure 4.3. Both the initiating
and responding devices generate 128-bit nonces, #0 and #1 respectively, and set device
passkeys, A0 and A1 for both devices, to 0 (these numbers are only used in Passkey Entry) in
steps 6a through 7b. Then the responding device, B, generates a commitment value,1 using
ℎ<02 in step 8. The commitment value is then sent to device A in step 9, which responds
with its own nonce in step 10. Device B then replies with the nonce used to generate
its commitment value in step 11. With the value #1 now known, device A then verifies
if 1 = HMAC(#1, % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1) in step 12 as expected. We model the verification
using the Vfy algorithm for the HMAC message authentication code with key #1, message
(% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1), and tag1, which will output a verification bit, {1 ∈ {0, 1}, as previously
defined. If {1 = 0, the protocol is aborted; otherwise, the verification succeeds and Phase 2
continues with steps 13a and 13b. In these steps, both device A and B generate a verification
value, +0 and +1, respectively, using the hash function H. Both devices then display their
verification values for the User to compare; we model this in step 14a and 14b. The User
then visually compares the two displayed value to ensure +0 = +1. We model the User
interaction with device A and B via steps 15a and 15b. If +0 = +1, the user sends both
devices the message OK, to signal to the devices to proceed with pairing; else, the user
sends the message FAIL to indicate to abort pairing.
Passkey Entry
Passkey Entry has three options for sharing the passkey, A, among the two devices and user,
as shown in Figure 4.4.
• Initiator-Generated (PE-IG). In this version of Passkey Entry, the initiating device
randomly samples the passkey, sends it to the user, and the user sends it to the
responding device.
• Responder-Generated (PE-RG). In this version of Passkey Entry, the responding







2a. % 0 ← [( 0]%
5a. DHKey← [( 0]% 1
6a. #0
$← {0, 1}128
7a. A0 ← 0, A1 ← 0
12. {1 ← Vfy(#1 , (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A0), 1)
13a. +0 ← H(% 0G ‖% 1G ‖#0‖#1)
16a. 0 ← HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1 ‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖)
20. {3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#1 ‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1)





2b. % 1 ← [( 1]%
5b. DHKey← [( 1]% 0
6b. #1
$← {0, 1}128
7b. A0 ← 0, A1 ← 0
8. 1 ← HMAC(#1 , % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1)
13b. +1 ← H(% 0G ‖% 1G ‖#0‖#1)
16b. 1 ← HMAC(DHKey, #1 ‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖)
18. {2 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#0‖#1 ‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖), 0)
21b. LK← HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1 ‖btlk‖‖)
User






14a. +0 14b. +1
15a. OK/FAIL 15b. OK/FAIL
17. 0
19. 1
Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Figure 4.3. Numeric Comparison. Bit sizes shown are reexive of Secure
Connections. Phase 0 takes place before the actual protocol and represents
device discovery and the IO capability exchange; IOcapA, IOcapB, , and
 are distributed among the devices during this phase. Phase 2 shows au-
thentication performed in Numeric Comparison mode. Adapted from [11].
• User-Generated (PE-UG). In this version of Passkey Entry, the user selects the passkey
then sends it to both the initiating and responding device.
The devices then proceed to verify they agree on each of the twenty digits comprising A in
sequence. We use the index 8 to designate the exact digit the devices are in the process of
verifying in A. The index also differentiates the nonce and commitment values, as a fresh
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nonce is chosen by each device for every step of the data authentication for A. Both the
initiating and responding devices generate nonces, #0,8 and #1,8 respectively, and compute
the respective commitment values, 0,8 and 1,8, using the message authentication code
HMAC in steps 9a through 10b. The devices then proceed to exchange their commitment
values in steps 12 and 13. Device A then replies with the associated nonce used to generate
its commitment value in step 14 for the current digit of A. With the value #0,8 now known,
device B then verifies if 0,8 = HMAC(#0,8, % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A1,8) in step 15 as expected. We
model the verification using the Vfy algorithm for the HMAC message authentication code
with key #0,8, message (% 0G ‖% 1G ‖A1,8), and tag 0,8, which will output a verification
bit, {1 ∈ {0, 1}, as previously defined. If {1 = 0, the protocol is aborted; otherwise, the
verification succeeds and Phase 2 continues with steps 16 and 17 similarly to steps 14
and 15, but with the roles reversed. Phase 2 concludes upon successful verification of the
twentieth digit of A by device A.
Remark. Sampling of fresh nonces and computation of a commitment for every bit of the
passkey was done to prevent an adversary frommounting an offline dictionary attack similar
to the one presented in [73] against Bluetooth’s legacy key exchange prior to Secure Simple
Pairing’s introduction in v2.1. This is assuming that a passkeymay be reused across multiple
pairing attempts. In the case where passkeys are not ephemeral, this construction forces an
adversary to induce an average of 10 pairing attempts to learn all 20 bits of the passkey
through active guessing. The assumption behind this is that knowledge of the passkey is
no longer useful once the link key is computed; Bluetooth also recommends that pairing
attempts be minimized [11]. Although Passkey Entry complicates the above attack, it is
more susceptible to other types of eavesdropping attacks [13].
4.3.4 Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
The purpose of this phase is to complete device authentication using the shared key DHKey
from Phase 1. This phase begins with both devices computing their respective check values,
0 and 1, for device A and B. First the initiating device sends its check value to the
responding device to be verified. If {3 = 0 the responding device aborts the protocol;
otherwise, it sends 1 to the initiating device and proceeds to Phase 4. If {4 = 0 the
initiating device aborts the protocol; otherwise, it proceeds to Phase 4.
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4.3.5 Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
The purpose of this phase is the calculation of the link key, LK. Both devices can perform
this calculation in steps 12a and 12b simultaneously using known values. Completion of
this phase concludes pairing.
4.4 Correctness
We now present a discussion on the correctness for Numeric Comparison and Passkey
Entry. When we say correctness, we mean that when two participants execute a run of the
protocol as defined in the specification and they agree on all messages they exchanged in
execution, then the two devices reach the expected conclusion of computing a matching
session key.
4.4.1 Correctness of Numeric Comparison
In order for Numeric Comparison to be correct we must have that both devices generate the
same link key, LK, in Phase 4. In order for this to occur we must have that both devices
compute the same Diffie–Hellman key, DHKey, in Phase 1; all other values that contribute
to the computation of LK are publicly exchanged messages. We also must have that all
verification bits, {8 are set to one and the user is sent the same verification values, +8, in
order for the two devices to reach Phase 4.
DHKey. In steps 5a and 5b, both devices perform a similar calculation using elliptic curve
multiplication to generate DHKey. Observe the following relationships among the public
and private keys of the devices to see that both calculations generate the same value.
DHKey = [( 0]% 1
= [( 0] [( 1] (G , ~)
= [( 1] [( 0] (G , ~)
= [( 1]% 0
= DHKey .
45
v1. In step 12, the initiating device performs the check {1 ← Vfy(#1, (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1), 1)
where Vfy is the verification algorithm for HMAC. Thus we have that {1 = 1 if and only if:
1 = HMAC(#1, % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1) .
Observing step 8 shows that the verification check for {1 will succeed.
OK. In order for the user to send OK to both devices, we must have that +0 = +1. From
a quick observation of steps 13a and 13b we see that this indeed holds since both devices
make the same hash function call:
+0 = H(% 0G ‖% 1G ‖#0‖#1) = +1 .
v2. In step 18, the responding device performs the check {2 ←
Vfy(DHKey, (#0‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖), 0) where Vfy is the verification algorithm for
HMAC. Thus we have that {2 = 1 if and only if:
0 = HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖) .
Observing step 16a shows that the verification check for {2 will succeed.
v3. In step 20, the initiating device performs the check {3 ←
Vfy(DHKey, (#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1) where Vfy is the verification algorithm for
HMAC. Thus we have that {3 = 1 if and only if:
1 = HMAC(DHKey, (#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖) .
Observing step 16b shows that the verification check for {3 will succeed. We have now
shown that two devices executing Numeric Comparison will indeed reach Phase 4.
Therefore, both devices will arrive at the same value for the link key, LK, because they both
make the same call to HMAC as defined in steps 12a and 12b, and we conclude Numeric
Comparison is correct.
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4.4.2 Correctness of Passkey Entry
In order for Passkey Entry to be correct we must have that both devices generate the same
link key, LK, in Phase 4. In order for this to occur we must have that both devices compute
the same Diffie–Hellman key, DHKey, in Phase 1; all other values that contribute to the
computation of LK are publicly exchanged messages. We also must have that all verification
bits, {8 are set to one in order for the two devices to reach Phase 4. We do not allot
explicit discussion to the correctness of the three variants. For the purposes of correctness,
all parties will agree on the same passkey values, A0 and A1, regardless of how they are
generated because they are always exchanged among all parties in steps 6 through 8.
DHKey. In steps 5a and 5b both devices perform a similar calculation using elliptic curve
multiplication to generate DHKey. Observe the following relationships among the public
and private keys of the devices to see that both calculations generate the same value.
DHKey = [( 0]% 1
= [( 0] [( 1] (G , ~)
= [( 1] [( 0] (G , ~)
= [( 1]% 0
= DHKey .
v1. In step 15, the responding device performs the check {1 ←
Vfy(#0,8, (% 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8), 0,8) where Vfy is the verification algorithm for HMAC.
Thus we have that {1 = 1 if and only if:
0,8 = HMAC(#0,8, % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8) .
Observing step 11a shows that the verification check for {1 will succeed.
v2. In step 17, the initiating device performs the check {2 ←
Vfy(#1,8, (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖0), 1,8) where Vfy is the verification algorithm for HMAC.
Thus we have that {2 = 1 if and only if:
1,8 = HMAC(#1, % 1G ‖% 0G ‖0) .
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Observing step 11b shows that the verification check for {2 will succeed.
v3. In step 20, the responding device performs the check {3 ←
Vfy(DHKey, #0‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖, 0) where Vfy is the verification algorithm
for HMAC. Thus we have that {3 = 1 if and only if:
0 = HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖) .
Observing step 18a shows that the verification check for {3 will succeed.
v4. In step 22, the initiating device performs the check {4 ←
Vfy(DHKey, (#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1) where Vfy is the verification algorithm for
HMAC. Thus we have that {4 = 1 if and only if:
1 = HMAC(DHKey, #1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖) .
Observing step 18b shows that the verification check for {4 will succeed. We have now
shown that two devices executing Passkey Entry will indeed reach Phase 4
Therefore, both devices will arrive at the same value for the link key, LK, because they both







2a. % 0 ← [( 0]%
5a. DHKey← [( 0]% 1
6. A $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
9a. A0 ← A, A1 ← A
10a. #0,8
$← {0, 1}128
11a. 0,8 ← HMAC(#0,8 , % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8)
17. {2 ← Vfy(#1,8 , (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A0,8), 1,8)
18a. 0 ← HMAC(DHKey, #0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖)
22. {4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1)





2b. % 1 ← [( 1]%
5b. DHKey← [( 1]% 0
6. A $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
9b. A0 ← A, A1 ← A
10b. #1,8
$← {0, 1}128
11b. 1,8 ← HMAC(#1,8 , % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1,8)
15. {1 ← Vfy(#0,8 , (% 0G ‖% 1G ‖A1,8), 0,8)
18b. 1 ← HMAC(DHKey, #1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖)
20. {3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖), 0)




6. A $← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
0. , , IOcapA, IOcapB
3. % 0
4. % 1
7. A 8. A
8. A 7. A







Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Execute steps 10a – 17




Figure 4.4. Passkey Entry. Phase 0 takes place before execution of the
protocol; , , IOcapA, and IOcapB are distributed among the devices
during this phase. Phase 2, steps 6-8, are version dependent as labeled
(for initiator-generated passkey, responder-generated passkey, and user-
generated passkey), all other steps are version independent. Adapted from
[11]
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CHAPTER 5:
CYBORG Model for User-Mediated, Authenticated
Key Exchange
In this chapter, we present the CYBORG security model as a synthesis of past security
models addressing both cyborg-type protocols [10], [17], [18] and AKEs in general [16],
[40], [45], [69].
5.1 Participant Model
We begin the presentation of CYBORG by defining the two classes of participants in
protocols that CYBORG can handle: devices and users. We also present how session
identifiers will be defined in general and we conclude with rigorous definitions of both
Device-Device and User-Device partnering.
5.1.1 Sessions
We define a session to be a single instance of a protocol and write cB to refer to the B-th
session for participant  where  ∈ ID ∪ {*}. Let ID be the set of all possible device
identities and* be the identity of the user. We only allow one user identity in keeping with
reasons discussed in Section 5.1.1 and [17]. We set no limit on the number of sessions a
single participant can have running at any one time with any other participant.
Devices
Let ID be the set of all possible identities and  ∈ ID to be the identity of device I.
We choose to model participants via membership in a set to ensure all device identities are
unique. To capture the participation of a device  ∈ ID in a specific session, we utilize
session oracles and describe their internal state as the tuple of the following values with _
as the security parameter:
• skey ∈ K ∪{⊥}. This variable holds device ’s completed session key for the session
where K is the associated keyspace.
• state. This variable holds other secret state information.
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• role ∈ {initiator, responder,⊥}. This variable holds device ’s role.
• pid ∈ ID \ {}. This variable holds the identifier for the partner device.
• sid ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. This variable holds the current session identifier.
• X ∈ {accept, reject, ∗}. This variable holds the specific result of the session either
acceptance, rejection, or no decision, respectively.
All variables are assumed to be undefined upon initialization of a session, we model this
through the use of logical falsum, ⊥. At the creation of the B-th session for device ,
the session oracle cB is initiated to (skey, state, role, pid, sid, X) = (⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, ∗). For
session acceptance, we require the following:
X = accept ⇐⇒ skey ≠ ⊥ .
For session cB , we choose to remove  from the set of possible pids. This is done to prevent
trivial attacks. Role is included in the session state in order to differentiate sessions involving
the same two identities but executing different roles in the protocol.
Users
Any user that participates in the CYBORGprotocol is assumed to be honest, whereby honest
means that the user executes its function exactly as described by the protocol specification.
Since any user is said to be honest within CYBORG, nothing is gained from allowing for
multiple users in a protocol since they would all perform the same function. As a result of
this, we choose to model all possible users as the singular entity U vice as a member of a
larger set; this construction and logic matches with that presented in [17], [18]. Similar to
our definition for devices, users are also modeled via session oracles with session state:
• Two device-session pair identifiers device1 = (, B) and device2 = (, C), where
,  ∈ ID and  ≠ .
Initialization of the user session oracles is described in Section 5.2.2. We require the user to
be able to distinguish the fact that he is communicating with two separate devices, but we
do not require him to distinguish the role these devices play in the protocol. The assumption
is that this information is not guaranteed knowledge to the user but is instead protocol
dependent. The ISO/IEC 9798-6 7a mechanism [74] is an example of a cyborg protocol
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where the user has knowledge of the role each device plays, and Numeric Comparison is a
counter-example where the user does not have knowledge of device role.
5.1.2 Partnering
In order to capture what it means for two participants in a protocol to partner, it becomes
necessary to differentiate sessions from each other; we do this via session identifiers.
Ultimately, the decision to use session identifiers vice matching conversations is based off
the fact that devices in a user-mediated protocol tend not to engage in a strict matching
conversation; we see this in Numeric Comparison, where two devices display values to be
compared by the user. This constitutes a point of discontinuity in the conversation between
the devices executing the protocol whereby both devices send a message that does not
match with an identical message received by the corresponding device. Although the user’s
function is to ensure these two values match, the above correspondence would fail to be
classified as a matching conversation under Bellare and Rogaway’s definition. The presence
of the user as a third party is not captured in the original matching conversation model,
which has proven to be too rigid of a definition to encompass user-mediated protocols.
We therefore have two possibilities to rectify this discontinuity: weak session identifiers and
strong session identifiers. Weak session identifiers are protocol dependent and follow the
CK01 model, which places the onus on the analyst to define a protocol specific session iden-
tifier based on relevant exchanged messages or computed values. Strong session identifiers
are constructed as a transcript of mutually held messages; messages a device can reasonably
surmise its partner device also has explicit knowledge of in any given session. This follows
the concept of matching conversations, albeit with transcripts requiring only information
that both devices hold. We give an explicit definition of strong session identifiers below.
Definition 5.1.1 (Strong Session Identifiers). Let two session oracles, cB and cC , execute
an authenticated key exchange protocol, Π, mediated by a user session oracle, c*
9
and let
the following tuple of messages be the ordered transcript of all messages sent/received by
cB over the course of Π:
(msg1, . . . ,msg=) ,
where msg: , is the k-th message sent/received in sequential order. Then we define the session
identifier, denoted sid, as the following subsequence of (msg1, . . . ,msg=) pre-appended by
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an optional msg0:
for 1 ≤ : ≤ =, we append msg: to cB .sid if any of the below criteria are met:
1. msg: is sent by cB to cC , or
2. msg: is received by cB from cC , or
3. msg: is sent by cB to c*9 and c
*
9
sends msg: to cC , or
4. msg: is received by cB from c*9 and c
*
9
received msg: from cC , or
5. msg: is received by cB from c*9 and c
*
9
sends msg: to cC .
Information exchanged prior to protocol execution for use within may optionally be pre-
appended to sid as a fixed msg0.
The above definition follows closely to matching conversations, with two discrepancies. For
one, we do not include messages sent from one device directly to the user that are never
relayed to another device. This captures displayed information devices seek to confirm
match via the user, such as the comparison values in Numeric Comparison or Signal.
We also allow for the inclusion of any pre-exchanged messages the cryptographer deems
necessary be appended to the beginning of the transcript. This case captures pre-shared
data that is common in user-mediated protocols, such as IO capabilities in Bluetooth or
ciphersuites in TLS.
We term this version of session identifier strong because it is both independent of the protocol
being examined and allows one to test if any adversarial presence in protocol execution that
may be overlooked by the weak version. This latter point has a profound impact on the
provable security of a protocol. To demonstrate the importance of the distinction between
strong and weak session identifiers, we examine the security of Passkey Entry under both
weak (Section 6.3.2) and strong session identifiers (Section 6.3.1).
We conclude this section with three more important definitions. First, we present what it
means for one session identifier to be a prefix of another and for two devices to holdmatching
session identifiers. We then present our rigorous definitions of DtD and UtD pairing. We
present no definition of pairing among users, which is not possible because we only allow
for one user identity.
Definition 5.1.2. We say that a session identifier sidB with length ; ≥ 1 is a prefix of sidC if
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all values in sidB match and are in the same order as the first ; messages in sidC .
Definition 5.1.3. We say that a device, , at session B hasmatching session identifiers with
device  at session C if we have that either:
• sidB = sidC where  receives the last message in the protocol, or
• sidC is a prefix of sidB where  sends the last message in the protocol.
Definition 5.1.4 (Device-Device Partnering). We say sessions cB and cC are partnered if
cB .pid = , cC .pid = , cB .role ≠ cC .role, and  and  have matching session identifiers.
We adapt the definitions for prefix and matching session identifier from [69], where Jager,
Kohlar, Schäge, and Schwenk employed similar definitions in an examination of TLS 1.3
to also account for the last message sent/received being dropped. We use this asymmetric
definition for matching session identifiers because we must account for the instance where
a device sends the last message and accepts, but the adversary deletes this message en route
to its intended recipient. Bellare and Rogaway [16] first recognized that the last message
sent/received in a protocol had to be handled differently in analysis to prevent this kind of
trivial win. In such a scenario, the combination of the above definitions would still allow
for these two session oracles to be paired. This becomes important in our definition of the
CYBORG security experiment to prevent a trivial win for an adversary that simply drops
the last protocol message.
Definition 5.1.5 (User-Device Partnering). If c*
9
.device1 = (, B) or c*9 .device2 = (, B),
then we say that c*
9
and cB are partnered.
User sessions are opaque to device sessions. Consequently, if the user is partnered with two
device sessions, we assume that the device sessions always send messages to the correct
partnered user session. We also require that a device session cannot be partnered with more
than one user session, as can be expected in normal user interactions during device pairing.
We find this to be a reasonable modeling choice in keeping with the idea that a user can
distinguish one pairing instance from another, such as executing pairing sessions over the
passage of time or in different real-world settings.
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5.2 Adversarial Model
The adversarial model within CYBORG was developed to provide maximum capability
without allowing the protocol to be trivially broken. The main challenge in this construction
stems from the capabilities an adversary should be given over the UtD channel. On one
hand, giving the adversary full control of the channel at all times would be an unrealistic
modeling of UtD communications. On the other hand, acting as if the UtD channel assumes
away risk for the purposes of rendering a tidy proof. We have thus attempted to establish
a middle ground between these two possibilities and follow in the wake of past work in
three-party protocols where a human user plays an active role in the protocol.
5.2.1 Communication Channels
In this section we look to explicitly define the capabilities of an adversary in regard to
messages sent over the DtD and UtD communication channels.
Definition 5.2.1. An adversarymay read, replay, delete, ormodify anymessage sent between
devices ,  ∈ ID and we call this the DtD channel.
This definition for the DtD channel allows our analysis to operate under the assumption that
an adversary has full control of the DtD communication channel. We do, however, slightly
restrict the adversary over the UtD channel and designate two possibilities of UtD channels
for use as required by protocol specification.
Definition 5.2.2 (User-to-Device Channel, Without Eavesdropping). An adversary may
replay or delete any message sent between a device oracle cB and user oracle c*9 , but may
not modify, to include the intended destination, create, nor read any message. We call this
the UtD channel (UtD).
Definition 5.2.3 (User-to-Device Channel, With Eavesdropping). An adversary may replay,
delete, or read any message sent between a device oracle cB and user oracle c*9 , but may
not modify, to include the intended destination, nor create any message. We call this the
UtD channel with eavesdropping (UtD-E).
Our current definitions assume an authenticated channel for devices to communicate with
their user. This is captured by the fact that the adversary cannot modify a message’s
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content, its sender, nor its receiver in both the UtD and UtD-E channels. We see such a
modification attack as not realistic for the basic adversary without device corruption due
to the physical nature of UtD communications. Replay or deletion can be accomplished
via faulty hardware in the IO mechanisms of a device that do not necessarily allow an
attacker to interpret or modify the inputs. The read capability is addressed separately to
account for protocols that require secrecy on the UtD channel (e.g., in Passkey Entry or
ATM pin codes), from others that do not (e.g., Bluetooth Numeric Comparison or Signal).
We give definitions for two channels, UtD and UtD-E, to model these different adversarial
capabilities. The UtD-E channel specifically allows an adversary to read messages over the
UtD channel, presumably via shoulder-surfing attacks or device compromise via keylogging
or touchlogging. Meanwhile, the UtD channel does afford the adversary a read capability.
We employ the UtD channel in our analysis of Passkey Entry (see Section 6.3 and Chapter 8)
and the UtD-E channel in our analysis of Numeric Comparison (see Section 6.2).
5.2.2 Adversarial Queries
We now present a list of queries for the adversary to use when interacting with SSP
participants. These queries not only allow an adversary to start a protocol run, but also to
gain session specific information he would not otherwise be privy to learning. These queries
were developed to model real-world compromise of a device or a user to ensure the analysis
is as practical as possible. The SendDevice and SendUser queries are needed to allow an
adversary to begin protocol runs between devices of his choosing or to send messages to a
device or the user as desired. The StateReveal, Corrupt, and KeyReveal queries are included
to give an adversary the ability to compromise a device and gain knowledge of its secrets.
The two queries, ShowUser and ControlUser, are included to give an adversary the ability
to compromise the UtD channel. The final query Test, is included to give the adversary the
capability to test whether or not he can distinguish a derived session key from random.
SendDevice (cB , msg)
The adversary can use this query to send a message msg to the given session oracle. The
session oracle will then act on msg as the protocol specifies and any response will be
returned to the adversary. If msg = (start, ) for  ∈ ID, a non-protocol specific special
initiation message, is the first message the given session oracle has received then it will set
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role = initiator and pid =  and output the first protocol message. Else, if the first message a
device session oracle receives does not consist of the non-protocol specific special initiation
message and comes from  ∈ ID, then the oracle sets pid = , role = responder, and
executes the protocol as intended in the role of the responder device. This allows the
adversary to initiate a protocol run between two identities and to send legitimate messages
to a device session oracle.
SendUser (c*B , msg)
The adversary can use this query to send a messagemsg to the given user session oracle c*
9
.
The session oracle will then act on msg as the protocol specifies and any response will be
returned to the adversary. If msg = (start, (cB , cC )) for ,  ∈ ID, a non-protocol specific
special initiation message, is the first message the given session oracle has received, then*
first checks if cB or cC were ever part of a received msg = (start, ·) message for any session
c*
9 ′. If so, the session outputs⊥. Else, the session sets device1 = (, B) and device2 = (, C).
Else, if the first message received by c*
9
does not consist of such a start message, the session
oracle outputs ⊥. The session oracle will then execute the protocol in the role of the user as
intended with the given device identities. This allows an adversary to initiate the user for a
specific protocol run and to send legitimate messages to a user session oracle.
StateReveal (cB )
The adversary may use this query to obtain access to the session state information state.
This query is included to model compromise of a device’s memory at the exact instance the
query is called.
KeyReveal (cB )
The adversary may use this query to obtain access to the session key skey. This query is
used to model the leakage of a session key, either in its use in a channel or through device
compromise.
ShowUser (cB )
This query outputs⊥. After this query, the adversary can modify or create any UtDmessage
sent from the given device to the user within cB . This query allows an adversary to gain
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control of one-half of the UtD channel: communications from a device to a user. Following
this query, the user will still perform in an honest fashion. This is done to model an
adversary’s ability to compromise a device and manipulate messages displayed to a user
within a single session, which is why it requires a specific device session oracle as an input,
such as with a Tag-based Adaptive Ploy.
ControlUser (c*B , )
This query outputs⊥. After this query, the adversary can modify or create any UtDmessage
sent from the user* to the device  of the current session. This query allows an adversary
to gain control of the other half of the UtD channel: communications from a user to a
device. Following this query, the user may no longer perform his role in an honest fashion
when interacting with device  and is assumed to be an extension of the adversary. The
ControlUser query models an adversary’s ability to compromise a user and manipulate his
actions via either social engineering or an attack on the device’s input capability, such as
a Ghost Touch Generator. As is often the case with social engineering or corruption of a
device’s touch screen, there is a time sensitive nature to the user corruption that is captured
by the restriction of this corruption to a single session.
Test (cB )
This query may only be asked once throughout the game. If cB .X ≠ accept, this query
returns ⊥. Else, it samples b $← {0, 1}, and sets : ← cB .skey if b = 1 and :
$← {0, 1}_
otherwise. The query outputs :b. This query simulates the adversarial capability of testing
whether or not he can distinguish the session key from random.
5.2.3 User and Device Freshness
With all adversarial capabilities laid out, it now becomes important to define session fresh-
ness. This becomes important in the following section when we define security under the
CYBORG experiment. Assume, for instance, that an adversary reveals all secret information
and gains full control of the UtD channel. We would be hard pressed to find any protocol
that provides any sort of guarantees under these trying conditions. Thus, we use freshness to
capture the exact sessions an adversary is allowed to attack. Though this places somewhat
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of a restriction on his capabilities, this is necessary to generate applicable results in our
analysis.
Typically, freshness has only been defined with respect to devices. This made sense when
only devices engaged in the action of the protocol, but with the advent ofCYBORG protocols
it becomes necessary to define freshness for device and user session oracles. We define
device and user freshness over two settings: uncompromised user and compromised user.
The uncompromised setting enables us to test the baseline security of the protocol, which
restricts the adversary’s use of both device and user-oriented queries. In the compromised
user setting, the adversary gains varying abilities to issue combinations of ShowUser and
ControlUser queries.
Definition 5.2.4 (Device Freshness). We say that a device session oracle cB is fresh in
the uncompromised setting (UncUser-fresh) and fresh under compromised user type 8
(CompUser8-fresh) unless any of the following hold:
• the adversary issues a StateReveal(cB ) query, or
• if there exists a session oracle cC partnered with cB and the adversary issues a
StateReveal(cC ) query, or
• the adversary has issued a KeyReveal(cB ) query, or
• if there exists a session oracle, cC , partnered with cB and the adversary issues a
KeyReveal(cC ) query.
The freshness conditions whereby we restrict adversarial reveals on both the target device
session and a partnered device session is in keeping with precedent. The restriction of
adversarial queries on a device partneredwith the same user oracle is analogous to restricting
corruption of the intended partner’s long-term keys. CYBORG key exchange protocols rely
on the user to authenticate devices in the same vein as a Certificate Authority authenticates
devices in typical AKE; thus, we rely on the user’s authentication of the intended partner to
limit reveals.
Definition 5.2.5 (User Freshness under No Compromise). We say that a session oracle c*
9
is fresh in the uncompromised setting (UncUser-fresh) unless any of the following hold:
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(cB ) query before the last UtD message is sent
and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
60
with cB , or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query before the last UtD message is
sent and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB .
Definition 5.2.6. We claim that a session oracle c*
9
for U and session 9 is termed fresh-
under-compromised user, type a (CompUser0-fresh) unless either of the following hold:
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(cB ) query before the last UtD message is sent
and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , and cB .role = responder, or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query before the last UtD message is
sent and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB .
Definition 5.2.7. We claim that a session oracle c*
9
for U and session 9 is termed fresh-
under-compromised user, type b (CompUser1-fresh) unless either of the following hold:
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(cB ) query before the last UtD message is sent
and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , and cB .role = initiator, or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query before the last UtD message is
sent and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB .
Definition 5.2.8. We claim that a session oracle c*
9
for U and session 9 is termed fresh-
under-compromised user, type c (CompUser2-fresh) unless either of the following hold:
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(cB ) query before the last UtD message is sent
and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query before the last UtD message is
sent and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , and cB .role = responder.
Definition 5.2.9. We claim that a session oracle c*
9
for U and session 9 is termed fresh-


























Figure 5.1. Visual depiction of the baseline four possibilities of CompUser-
freshness where the adversary is allowed to corrupt only one direction of
the UtD channel at a time, denoted by red coloring. We use the terms
CompUser0, CompUser1, CompUser2, and CompUser3 to describe the at-
tack scenarios represented by Figure 5.1a, Figure 5.1b, Figure 5.1c, and
Figure 5.1d, respectively.
• the adversary has issued a ShowUser(cB ) query before the last UtD message is sent
and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , or
• the adversary has issued a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query before the last UtD message is
sent and received between c*
9
and cB according to the protocol, where c*9 is partnered
with cB , and cB .role = initiator.
We restrict the adversary frommaking ShowUser and ControlUser queries dependent on the
role of the device session, such that only one UtD channel may be compromised in each type
(denoted in red in Figure 5.1). This decision allows us to focus on the exact circumstances
under which a protocol breaks. We provide a visualization of the four baseline types of user
compromise the CYBORG model captures in Figure 5.1.
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We expand upon the baseline definitions presented in Definitions 5.2.6 to 5.2.9 by allowing
for all combinations of these types.
Definition 5.2.10 (User Freshness under Compromise Type Combinations). Let - be a non-
empty subset of the set {0, 1, 2, 3}; we refer to the set - with the label string G constructed
from the elements of - in lexicographical order. We then say that a session oracle c*
9
for
* and session 9 is termed fresh under compromised user, type G (CompUserG-fresh) unless
the adversary issues a single query which breaks CompUserG8 -freshness simultaneously for
all G8 ∈ - .
Note that a session oracle’s freshness must be assessed per query under CompUserG-
fresh; said query must break freshness for the session oracle in all the elements of the set
- individually. This structuring of CompUserG-fresh is needed so we can capture more
advanced attacks that an adversary may mount. With simply Definitions 5.2.6 to 5.2.9 we
would be unable to capture the “Tap ‘n Ghost” attack as it involves the corruption of the
communication channels both from a device to the user and vice versa. However, we can
model this using the CompUser02-fresh environment. In a CompUser02-fresh environment,
the adversary would be allowed to issue both a ShowUser and a ControlUser query so long
as both involved the initiating device; and similarly in a CompUser13-fresh environment for
the responding device. We list out all the types of CompUserG-fresh that are possible under
Definitions 5.2.6 to 5.2.10: a, b, c, d, ab, ac, ad, bc, bd, cd, abc, abd, acd, bcd, abcd.
5.3 CYBORG Security Experiment
In light of all previous definitions, we now present the CYBORG security experiment for
the reader.
Definition 5.3.1. We define the CYBORG-type security experiment for a PPT adversarial
algorithmA against aCYBORG key exchange protocolΠ, and interactingwith a challenger
via all previously defined adversarial queries in the EXPCYBORG-type
Π,A,[? ,[B experiment, where [?
is the maximum number of device participants and [B is the maximum number of sessions
for any participant. We say that the adversary A wins the experiment with the challenger
outputting 1 if any of the following conditions hold for type ∈ {UncUser,CompUser}.
1. Correctness (correct):
there exists two type-fresh and partnered device oracles cB and cC where:
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• cB and cC are both partnered with the type-fresh user oracle c*9 , and
• cB .X ≠ accept, or
• cC .X ≠ accept.
2. Entity Authentication (auth):
there exists a type-fresh session oracle cB where:
• cB .X = accept with intended partner pid =  and
• cB is partnered with the type-fresh user oracle c*9 , and
• if c*
9
is also partnered with cC ,A has not issued a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB .X ≠ accept, and
• there does not exist a unique session oracle at  that is partnered with cB .
3. Key Indistinguishability (key-ind):
at some point in the experiment A issued a Test(cB ) query on a type-fresh session
oracle cB , where
• cB .X = accept with intended partner pid = , and
• cB is partnered with a type-fresh user oracle c*9 , and
• if c*
9
is also partnered with cC ,A has not issued a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB .X ≠ accept, and
• there exists an oracle c
C ′ partnered with c

B , and
• at some subsequent point in the experiment cB responds with its guess 1, where
Pr[1 = b] ≥ 1/2 where b is the randomly sampled bit from the associated Test
query.
Else, the challenger outputs 0. If the adversary wins the experiment via the first condition
then we sayA breaks the correctness (correct) ofΠ. If the adversary wins the experiment via
the second condition then we sayA breaks entity authentication (auth) inΠ. If the adversary
wins the experiment via the third condition then we say A breaks key indistinguishability
(key-ind) in Π. We denote the adversary A winning the experiment and the challenger
outputting 1 as follows:
EXPCYBORG-type
Π,A,[? ,[B (_) = 1 .
We define the advantage for the PPT adversarial algorithm A in the above experiment to
be:
AdvCYBORG-type
Π,A,[? ,[B (_) := Pr[EXP
CYBORG-type
Π,A,[? ,[B (_) = 1] .
Definition 5.3.2. If there exists a negligible function negl(_) such that for all PPT adver-
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saries A interacting according to the CYBORG-type experiment, it holds that:
AdvCYBORG-type
Π,A,[? ,[B (_) ≤ negl(_) ,
then we say that the protocol Π is CYBORG-type-secure.
The above definition presents a change fromMETA in that we require two partnered oracles
to imply acceptance, as captured by correct. However, forcing correct under CompUser is
protocol dependent, and for CYBORG protocols like ISO/IEC 9798-6 Mechanism 7a and
Signal this requirement is unachievable. In the ISO/IEC 9798-6 Mechanism 7a protocol the
final exchanged messages in the protocol involve the user sending OK to both devices; the
devices do not accept until they receive this message. In CompUser the adversary would
be able to change this message to FAIL at will and possibly break the correctness of the
protocol. META handles this as a trivial win for the adversary and, therefore, excludes
breaking correct under CompUser from the model.
We also break from META in that we do not include any formulation of the compromised
device setting. Recall that under the compromised device setting an adversarymay reveal any
device’s secrets at will. This setting is not applicable to CYBORG AKEs because at some
point a device will have to compute the session key, but under CompDev the adversary may
reveal all device secrets immediately before this computation and trivially break key-ind.
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CHAPTER 6:
Results of Analysis under the CYBORG Security
Model
6.1 Association between User Compromise Types
Theorem 6.1.2 provides a framework for conducting our analysis of Numeric Compari-
son and Passkey Entry in the compromised user setting. We begin by starting from our
baseline definitions of CompUserG-fresh within Definitions 5.2.6 to 5.2.9 and advance by
incrementally introducing more capabilities. Conversely, if we prove that a protocol is
CompUser0123-secure, then we know that it is secure for any CompUserG variant.
Lemma 6.1.1. Let - and . be non-empty subsets of {0, 1, 2, 3} such that - ⊆ . with
labels G and ~, respectively. If a session oracle c*
9
is CompUserG-fresh, then it is also
CompUser~-fresh.
Proof. Let Π be a CYBORG key exchange protocol, and let A be a PPT adversary against
the CYBORG-CompUserG security of Π. If some user session oracle, c*9 , is CompUserG-
fresh then we must have that A never issued a single query that broke CompUserG8 -
freshness simultaneously for all G8 ∈ - over the course of the CYBORG-CompUserG
security experiment by Definition 5.2.10. This means that for every query issued byA, c*
9
must have met the definition for CompUserG8 -fresh for some G8 ∈ - . Since - ⊆ . , then
we also have that c*
9
must have met the definition for CompUser~8 -fresh for some ~8 ∈ .
for every query issued by A. Thus, A never issued a single query that broke CompUser~8 -
freshness simultaneously for all ~8 ∈ . and we have that c*9 is also CompUser~-fresh.
Theorem 6.1.2. Let - and . be non-empty subsets of {0, 1, 2, 3} such that - ⊆ . with
labels G and ~, respectively, and let Π be a CYBORG key exchange protocol. If Π is not
CYBORG-CompUserG-secure, then it is not CYBORG-CompUser~-secure.
Proof. Let Π be a CYBORG key exchange protocol, and let A be a PPT adversary that
breaks the CYBORG-CompUserG security of Π. We then construct a second adversary, B,
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against theCYBORG-CompUser~ security experiment. The challenger starts the experiment
and forwards the protocol flows of Π to A and uses A’s responses. By the success of A,
Lemma 6.1.1, and Definition 5.2.10, we have CompUser~ freshness and the success of B.
Therefore, we have that
AdvCYBORG-CompUserG
Π,A,[? ,[B (_) ≤ Adv
CYBORG-CompUser~
Π,B,[? ,[B (_) .
6.2 Numeric Comparison
In this section, we present the initial results of our analysis of Numeric Comparison under
the CYBORG security model. We define the session-state information for all versions of
Numeric Comparison and a given session oracle cB as:
cB .state = (( 0, #0) ,
where all values are as defined in Chapter 4. We capture all randomly generated information
a device considers secret in the session-state. Although nonces are made public in the course
of the protocol, they are included here as they are used as secret keys before such disclosure.
6.2.1 Numeric Comparison under Strong Session Modeling
We define the session identifier for Numeric Comparison from a correctly executed session
involving initiating device  and responding device  as:
sidBCA>= := ((, , IOcapA, IOcapB), % 0, % 1, 1, #0, #1,OK, 0, 1) .
Note that identities are shown as an example above, and may be either an initiating device
or responding device in the following analysis, specified where appropriate.
Numeric Comparison does not meet any level of CYBORG security when analyzed under a
strong session identifier. This is due to the fact that the initiating device does not authenticate
receipt of IOcapB to the responding device, as demonstrated in Theorem 6.2.1.
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Theorem 6.2.1. Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-UncUser-secure under strong ses-
sion modeling.
Proof. Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the CYBORG-UncUser secu-
rity of the Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry protocol. The adversary first issues a
SendDevice(cB , (start, )) to initiate a protocol run between devices A and B, and a
SendUser(c*
9
, (start, (cB , cC ))) query to initiate the associated user oracle. When device
B attempts to send IOcapB to device A, A modifies this message to a different value,
IOcapE, that still enables pairing over Numeric Comparison to occur. A then allows the
devices to progress through the protocol to step 20. Since device will attempt to verify 1
with the incorrect IOcap vairable, the {3 verification check will fail and device A will abort
the protocol. However, device B will continue to step 21b and generate a link key. Thus,
device B will accept but there will not exist a partnered session oracle at A andA wins the
CYBORG-UncUser security experiment by breaking auth.
Although Theorem 6.2.1 presents a break in security under the CYBORG model, it is a
trivial one because the purpose of the IOcap variable is to ensure that the two devices
execute an applicable version of Secure Simple Pairing. In the above case, even in light of
IOcapB being forged, both devices still execute Numeric Comparison as they intended. It
is dificult to envision a real-world application where an adversary would want to modify
this value but still allow the devices to pair exactly as they intended. The more applicable
version of this kind of attack is the BT–Niño–MitM downgrade attack. Nevertheless, we
discuss a modification in Chapter 7 that ensures authentication of both IOcap variables in
Phase 3 to shore up this vulnerability.
6.2.2 Numeric Comparison under Weak Session Modeling
As a result of Numeric Comparison failing to achieve CYBORG security under strong
session identifiers, we execute an analysis underweak sessionmodeling. This enables further
investigation of Numeric Comparison when the trivial attack described in Theorem 6.2.1 is
excluded.
We define the session identifier for Numeric Comparison from a correctly executed session
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involving initiating device  and responding device  as:
sid|40: := ((, , IOcapA), % 0, % 1, 1, #0, #1,OK, 0, 1) .
This should come as an expected definition of the Numeric Comparison session identifier
as it is constructed as described in Section 5.1.2 and it includes all information, outside of
the constant “btlk,” used in the construction of the session key LK. The only information
excluded, which would be included in the strong session identifier for Numeric Comparison,
is the responder’s IO capability variable, IOcapB.
Theorem 6.2.2. Numeric Comparison is CYBORG-UncUser-secure under the EC-DDH
and EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumptions, the col-res security of H, and the SUF-CMA of
HMAC under weak session modeling.
Proof. The proof of this theorem involves a series of game hops between an adversarial
PPT algorithm A and the challenger. We denote the adversarial advantage of a specific
game as Adv8, for the 8-th game hop.
Game 0. This game is equivalent to the original security experiment:
Adv0 = Adv
CYBORG-UncUser
PE-IG,A,[? ,[B (_) ,
where _ is the security parameter, [? is a bound on the number of participants, and [B is a
bound on the number of sessions a participant can run.
Game 1. This game is equivalent to the previous except we raise the event abort, end
the experiment, and output zero if there ever exists two session oracles that generate the
same ephemeral key, ( , in Phase 1. If session keys ever repeat, then A could execute a
StateReveal query on the second session to recover ( and compute DHKey. We have that




where ` is the length of ( .
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Game 2. This game is equivalent to the previous except we raise the event abort, end the
experiment, and output zero if there ever exists a nonce collision in the experiment. This
captures trivial collisions in the computation of the verification values +0, +1. Each session
oracle computes one nonce in each session, therefore, we have that




Game 3. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we guess the
session oracles executing the protocol, the test session cB and its partner cC , and abort if





We continue by separating out cases. In particular, separately addressing adversarial win by








Case 1. Since session oracles with matching session identifiers are guaranteed to accept by
the correctness of Numeric Comparison (Section 4.4.1), we have that:
Advcorrect3 = 0 .
Case 2. Game 4.We continue with Advauth3 . Since we have the requirement that c

B remains
fresh, we will abort the experiment if A issues a StateReveal(), KeyReveal, ShowUser, or
ControlUser queries such that cB or the partnered user session, c*9 , are no longer UncUser-
fresh. If c*
9
is also partnered with cC , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB ≠ accept. We raise the event abort, end the experiment, and output zero ifA succeeds
in replacing % 0, % 1, #0, and/or #1.
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Suppose that the adversary succeeds in this replacement, then we can construct another
adversary, B1, against the collision resistance of H. Per the col-res experiment, B1 need
only find two distinct messages msg1 ≠ msg2 such that H(msg1) = H(msg2). By our
assumption, A succeeds in replacing % 0, % 1, #0, and/or #1 (call these new values






); thus, the computed +0 and +1 verify correctly (+0 = +1) when sent to
the user. As the messages used to compute+0 and+1 do not match, since the devices do not
agree on at least one of the public keys or nonces, A may forward the modified messages
used by devices  and , msg1 = % 0‖% ′1‖#0‖#
′
1
and msg2 = % ′0‖% 1‖#′0‖#1






Following this game we also know that the adversary may not forge 1 via the correctness
of HMAC as the message and key used to compute 1 are now fixed.
Game 5.We replace DHKey with a uniformly random value DHKey = 2% for 2 $← F@
where F@ is the finite field over which we define our elliptic curve  and % is a generator
for  . Suppose that the adversary can distinguish between this and the previous game. Then
we can construct a new adversary, B2, solving the DDH problem, as from the previous game
hop we have that Diffie–Hellman shares 0% = % 0, and 1% = % 1 have been exchanged.
The challenger proceeds as before, but replaces the DHKey with a uniformly random
value DHKey = 2%, which is used for both partners. Algorithms B2 receives as input
(, %, 0%, 1%, 2%) where 0% = % 0, 1% = % 1, and 2% = DHKey. B2 can simulate all
flows for A correctly. Thus, the view of A when interacting with B2 is identical in Game







We continue the proof by first separating two sub-cases based on the test session’s role:







Sub-case 1: cB .role = initiator.
Game 6. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we raise the
event abort, end the experiment, and output zero if A succeeds in forging 1, or , or
some combination thereof.
We construct a new B3, against the SUF-CMA security of HMAC. The challenger sets the
MAC key to DHKey as per the SUF-CMA experiment, and B3 uses the oracle MAC to
compute tags. B3 calls MAC(#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), which returns the tag 1 (note
that A, #1, and #0 are all public at this point in the protocol). B3 then forwards this response
toA. gives the message-tag pair (#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖, 1) toA. IfA is able to forge
a new tag, call it |8=, leading to malicious acceptance, or a new message, call it msg|8=,
by forging , such thatMAC.Vfy(DHKey,msg|8=, 1) = 1, then B3 can win the SUF-CMA






Thus we have matching sid, cB .pid = , cC .pid = . The adversary can only succeed in
breaking auth by breaking role agreement among our test and partner sessions. However,
this is impossible since the responder, and only the responder, always computes and sends
a commitment value, 1, to the initiator as part of Numeric Comparison. Thus we have
Advauth,17 = 0 .
Sub-case 2: cB .role = responder. This case follows similarly to Sub-case 1, but we abort
if A succeeds in forging 1, , and/or IOcapB causing  to accept maliciously in the
responder role.
Combining our previous probability statements for the two sub-cases above we have:
Advauth ≤ Advcol-resB1 (_) + Adv
EC-DDH
B2 (_)
+ 2 · AdvSUF-CMAMAC,B3 (_) .
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Case 3. Game 4.We now bound Advkey-ind3 . Since we have the requirement that c

B remains
fresh, we will abort the experiment if A issues a StateReveal(), KeyReveal, ShowUser, or
ControlUser queries such that cB or the partnered user session, c*9 , are no longer UncUser-
fresh. If c*
9
is also partnered with cC , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB ≠ accept.
Suppose that A can distinguish between the games. Then we can construct a new ad-
versary, B4, solving the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH problem as follows. B4 receives as in-
put (, %, 0%, 1%) where % is a generator of our elliptic curve group, 0% = % 0, and
1% = % 1. B4 then issues the challenge query G = (#0‖#1‖btlk‖‖) also using val-
ues as chosen by our test and partner oracles. The challenger then randomly samples b
and sets ! ← HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1‖btlk‖‖) if b = 1 and ! 
$← {0, 1}_ other-
wise. The challenger then returns ! b to B4. The challenger also allots one-time access
to the left and right HMAC oracles for computation of 0 and 1. At this point, B4
can simulate all other flows between our test session and partner session. If we have that
! b = HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1‖btlk‖‖), then the view ofA when interacting with this
game is identical to Game 4. Similarly, the view of A when interacting with this game is
identical to Game 5 if ! b
$← {0, 1}_. Thus by the success of A in distinguishing Game 4






Since the session key of our test oracle is now uniformly random, we also conclude:
Advkey-ind4 = 0 .
Combining all previous probability statements we arrive at the final security reduction:















From Chapter 4, we know that ` is based off 255-bit keys and _ is based off 128-bit keys,
both within NIST’s standards of security [55]. We also know that the elliptic curve used
will be P-256 under Secure Connections; though not proven, no inherent computational
weaknesses have been found to forgo its use [66]. Additionally, the HMAC and Hash
function used in Numeric Comparison are HMAC-SHA256 and SHA-256. Both HMAC-
SHA256 and SHA-256 are NIST approved algorithms and no consequential breaks in their
security have been presented [55]. We also have that the HMAC construction was proven to
meet Brendel, Fischlin, Günther, and Janson’s highest version of PRF-ODH security in [72].
To address the ([?, [B)2 term, Bluetooth recommends that pairing be executed as few times
as possible. In addition, the hash values +0 and +1 are truncated down to 6 digits (about 20
bits) for the user. Although this bit-length is not in keeping with NIST standards, Bluetooth
considers this length acceptable [11]. Thus, we have that our col-res reduction is acceptable
by Bluetooth standards and all other reductions are computationally hard.
Lemma 6.2.3. Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-CompUser1-secure under strong
session modeling.
Proof. We prove Lemma 6.2.3 via a counterexample by describing how an adversary may
mount a successful MitM attack on the pairing devices. This leads to both devices accepting
without pairing with each other. Additionally, the adversary gains full knowledge of the
derived link keys generated by both devices. Let A be the adversarial algorithm against
the CYBORG-CompUser1 security of Numeric Comparison. The Adversary first issues a
SendDevice(cB , (start, )) and aSendUser(c*9 , (start, (cB , cC ))) query to initiate protocol
participants. A then issues a ShowUser (cC ) query and proceeds with a MitM attack as
shown in Figure 6.1. We describe the steps of the attack as follows:
1. A executes Phase 1 of the protocol with Device A in the guise of B and similarly 
with B; whereby, he exchanges his public key % 4 with each of the devices.
2. A and Device A generate DHKey0, while A and Device B generate DHKey1.
3. A generates a nonce value #4 and sets both A0 and A1 to 0. Similarly, devices A and B 
generate the nonces #0 and #1 , respectively, and both set A0 and A1 to 0. 
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4. A sends a commitment value 4 = HMAC(#4, % 4G ‖% 0G ‖0) to A and receives a
commitment value 1 = HMAC(#1, % 1G ‖% 4G ‖A1) from B.
5. A exchanges generated nonces with both A and B.
6. A verifies that Vfy(#4, % 4G ‖% 0G ‖A0, 4) = 1, which verifies correctly as a result
of the definition of MAC. Similarly for A in regard to 1.
7. A and A generate the confirmation values +4 = +0 = H(% 0G ‖% 4G ‖#0‖#4) and B
generates the confirmation value +1 = H(% 4G ‖% 1G ‖#4‖#1). A and B then send
their confirmation values, +0, +1, to U.
8. Since A issued a ShowUser (cC ) query, he can create messages from B to U in this
run of the protocol. He then deletes the message, +1, from B to U and instead sends
the message +4 from B to U. Since +4 = +0 an honest user will confirm these values
are equal and send an OK message to both A and B.
9. A generates the check value 0 = HMAC(DHKey0, #0‖#4‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖), A
generates the check values 4 = HMAC(DHKey1, #4‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖) and
4′ = HMAC(DHKey0, #4‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), and B generates the check value
1 = HMAC(DHKey1, #4‖#1‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖). A then sends 0 to A and A
sends 4 to B.
10. Bwill then verify thatVfy(DHKey1, (#4‖#1‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖), 4) = 1. This check
will pass because B honestly executes the protocol with A under the belief he is A.
Similarly for A’s verification of 0. B then sends 1 to A and A sends 4′ to A.
11. A will then verify that Vfy(DHKey0, (#4‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 4′) = 1. This
check will pass because A honestly executes the protocol with A under the belief he
is B. Similarly for A’s verification of 1.
12. The attack ends with A and A generating the shared key LK0 =
HMAC(DHKey0, #0‖#4‖btlk‖‖), and B and A generating the shared key
LK1 = HMAC(DHKey1, #4, #1, btlk, , ). Both A and B then accept under the
assumption that they have paired with each other.
At the conclusion of the above attack we have that A has won the CYBORG-CompUser1
security experiment by breaking auth since cB is CYBORG-CompUser1-fresh and has
accepted, c*
9
is CompUser0-fresh, but there does not exist a partnered session oracle for
cB .
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We envision an adversary executing the attack presented in Lemma 6.2.3 by embedding
malware into a device that enables one to modify device display outputs. Similar in function
to the exploits in the Strandhogg Vulnerability and a TAP-like attack, hackers have already
demonstrated the capability to modify device outputs as desired to display corrupted mes-
sages. A potential mitigating factor to the feasibility of this attack is that the displayed value
cannot be pre-set into the embedded malware because it relies on device A’s public key (a
value we assume to be ephemeral). However, since the displayed value is only a single hash
function with 768 bytes of input, we suspect that this computation can be done in a fraction
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Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Figure 6.1. Depiction of adversarial attack (singular actions shown in red)
against Numeric Comparison under the CYBORG-CompUser1 security ex-
periment; the attack runs similarly to the BTNiñoMitM attack.
Lemma 6.2.4. Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-CompUser0-secure under strong
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session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.2.3 with the exception
that A issues a ShowUser (cB ) query, computes +4 = +1 = H(% 4G ‖% 1G ‖#4‖#1) in
Phase 2, and replaces the message sent from A to U with +4. An honest user will still verify
that +4 = +1, send OK to both A and B, and allow the attack to proceed. At the conclusion
of the attack we will have a similar result as in Lemma 6.2.3.
Lemma 6.2.5. Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-CompUser2-secure under strong
session modeling.
Proof. We prove this by describing how an adversary may mount a successful MitM
attack on the initiating device. This leads to the initiating device accepting without pair-
ing with the responder. Additionally, the adversary gains full knowledge of its derived
link key. Let A be the adversarial algorithm against the CYBORG-CompUser2 security
of Numeric Comparison. The Adversary first issues a SendDevice(cB , (start, )) and a
SendUser(c*
9
, (start, (cB , cC ))) query to initiate protocol participants. A then issues a
ControlUser (c*
9
, A) query and proceeds with a MitM attack as shown in Figure 6.2. We
describe the steps of the attack as follows:
1. A executes Phase 1 of the protocol with Device A in the guise of B and similarly
with B; whereby, he exchanges his public key % 4 with each of the devices.
2. A and A then generate DHKey0, and A and Device B generate DHKey1.
3. A generates a nonce value #4 and sets both random values to 0.
4. A sends a commitment value 4 = HMAC(#4, % 4G ‖% 0G ‖0) to A and receives a
commitment value 1 = HMAC(#1, % 1G ‖% 4G ‖0) from B.
5. A exchanges generated nonces with both A and B, and visa versa.
6. A verifies that Vfy(#4, % 4G ‖% 0G ‖0, 4) = 1. This check will pass as result of
honest execution of the protocol with the agreed upon values from Phase 1.
7. A generates the confirmation value+0 = H(% 0G ‖% 4G ‖#0‖#4) and B generates the
confirmation value +1 = H(% 4G ‖% 1G ‖#4‖#1). A and B then send their confirma-
tion values, +0, +1, to U.
8. We will then have that+0 ≠ +1, U will attempt to send FAIL messages to both devices
A and B. Since A issued a ControlUser (c*
9
, A) query, he can create messages from
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U to A in this run of the protocol. A will then delete U’s original message, and then
send OK to device A.A will subsequently only continue the protocol run with device
A as device B will reject as a result of receiving the FAIL message.
9. A generates the check value 0 = HMAC(DHKey0, #0‖#4‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖) and
A generates the check values 4 = HMAC(DHKey0, #4‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖). A
then sends 0 to A for verification.
10. A will verify that Vfy(DHKey0, (#0‖#4‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖), 0) = 1. This check
will pass because A honestly executes the protocol with A under the belief he is B.
A will then send 4 to A.
11. Awill then verify thatVfy(DHKey0, (#4‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 4) = 1. This check
will pass because A honestly executes the protocol with A under the belief he is B.
12. The attack ends with A and A generating the shared key LK0 =
HMAC(DHKey0, #0‖#4‖btlk‖‖)Ȧ then accepts under the assumption that it
paired with device B.
At the conclusion of the above attack we have that A has won the CYBORG-CompUser2
security experiment by breaking auth since cB is CYBORG-CompUser2-fresh and has
accepted, c*
9
is CompUser0-fresh, but there does not exist a partnered session oracle for
cB .
We envision an adversary executing the attack presented in Lemma 6.2.5 by embedding
malware into a device that enables one to modify device inputs. A Ghost touch generator [4]
would certainly enable this type attack by corrupting the user’s press of the OK button
on a touchscreen-enabled device. An adversary could also minimize his possible workload
executing a CompUser2-type attack against Numeric Comparison by pre-seting a device to
always accept regardless of user input.
Lemma 6.2.6. Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-CompUser3-secure under strong
session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.2.5 with the exception
that A issues a ControlUser (c*
9
, B) query, replaces the FAIL message sent from U to B
with OK, and continues the attack with B instead of A. At the conclusion device B will
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13a. +0 13b. +1
14a. FAIL14a’. OK 14b. FAIL
16. 0
18. 4
Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Figure 6.2. Depiction of adversarial attack (singular actions shown in red)
against Numeric Comparison under the CYBORG-CompUser2 security ex-
periment; similar to the CYBORG-CompUser1 attack but utilizes a corrup-
tion of the user's communication to the device.
Theorem 6.2.7. Secure Simple Pairing with Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-
CompUserG secure for
G ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 01, 02, 03, 12, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. By Lemmas 6.2.3 to 6.2.6 we have that Numeric Comparison is not CYBORG-
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CompUserG secure for G ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Since one of 0, 1, 2, or 3 must be an element of every
non-empty subset of {0, 1, 2, 3}, our desired result follows directly fromTheorem 6.1.2.
The results described in this section highlight the weakness of Numeric Comparison under
compromised user attacks. Although Numeric Comparison utilizes all four communication
pathways between the device and the user, if the adversary has the capability to compromise
messages sent over at least one of these pathways, then he gains an avenue to defeat the
protocol. We would also like to note that although all of these counterexamples were
conducted in the UtD-E setting, they would also hold in the UtD setting as none of our
presented attacks rely on reading the actual messages sent between devices and the user in
Numeric Comparison.
6.3 Passkey Entry
In this section we present the initial results of our analysis of Passkey Entry under the
CYBORG securitymodel.We define the session-state information for all versions of Passkey
Entry and a given session oracle cB as:
cB .state = (( 0, A, #0,1, . . . , #0,20) ,
where all values are as defined in Chapter 4. We capture all randomly generated information
a device considers secret in the session-state. Although nonces are made public in the course
of the protocol, they are included here as they are used as secret keys before such disclosure.
Since all versions of Passkey Entry are susceptible to passkey re-use attacks [13], the passkey
A must be generated as an ephemeral secret. This presents a unique modeling challenge. If
generated by a device, the passkey may be derived from the same source of randomness
as other ephemeral keys or nonces. If generated by a user however, this is not the case. In
this scenario, it becomes necessary to operate under the assumption that the user has some
means of random number generation either via a keyfob or other source.
6.3.1 Passkey Entry under Strong Session Modeling
First we define the session identifier for all versions of Passkey Entry from a correctly
executed session involving an initiating device, e.g., , and responding device, e.g., , as
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described in Section 5.1.2:
sidBCA>= := ((, , IOcapA, IOcapB), % 0, % 1, A, 0,1, . . .
. . . , 1,1, #0,1, #1,1, 0,20, 1,20, #0,20, #1,20, 0, 1).
Note that identities are shown as an example above, and may be either an initiating device
or responding device in the following analysis, specified where appropriate.
All versions of Passkey Entry do not meet any level of CYBORG security when analyzed
under a strong session identifier. Even thoughPasskeyEntry complicates the attack discussed
in Section 4.3.3 by using 20 commitments, it allows for breaks in auth. We present attacks
that succeed with probability 1/2 against all versions of Passkey Entry, and an attack that
succeeds with probability 1 against User-Generated Passkey Entry depicted in Figure 6.3.
Ultimately, the decision to rely on a single bit of security when computing the commitments
in Phase 2 is too weak an assumption in the computational setting.
Theorem 6.3.1. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is notCYBORG-UncUser-secure under
strong session modeling.
Proof. We prove Theorem 6.3.1 via a counterexample by describing how an adversary can
entice a device to accept maliciously.
Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the CYBORG-UncUser security of the Initiator-
Generated Passkey Entry protocol. The adversary first issues a SendDevice(cB , (start, ))
to initiate a protocol run between devices A and B, and a SendUser(c*
9
, (start, (cB , cC )))
query to initiate the associated user oracle. The adversary then allows the protocol to
progress through step 8. At this point, A then makes a guess A4,8 for the bit value of A0,8
used by the initiating device to construct 0,8 where 1 ≤ 8 ≤ 19. A then randomly samples
a new nonce #4,8 and calculates a new tag 4,8 = HMAC(#4,8, % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A4,8). When
device A attempts to send 0,8 to device B in step 12, the adversary replaces this value with
4,8, and similarly replaces #0,8 with #4,8 in step 14. If we have that A0,8 = A4,8, then device
B’s verification in step 15 will succeed; A will then take no further actions and allow the
protocol to proceed to completion. This will lead to both cB and cC accepting but they
will not have matching session identifiers since they will disagree on the values for 0,8 and
#0,8 and A succeeds in breaking auth. Since A’s guess of A0,8 is correct with probability
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one-half, we have that




Theorem 6.3.2. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-UncUser-secure
under strong session modeling.
Theorem 6.3.2 follows similarly to Theorem 6.3.1.
Theorem 6.3.3. User-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
strong session modeling.
Proof. We prove Theorem 6.3.3 via a counterexample by describing how an adversary may
mount a successful “role confusion” attack on the pairing devices. This attack leads to both
devices accepting but neither actually pairs with the other.
Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the CYBORG-UncUser security of the User-
Generated Passkey Entry protocol. A first issues a SendUser(c*
9
, (start, (cB , cC ))) to
initiate the user for a protocol run between devices A and B. A then issues both a
SendDevice(cB , (start, )) and a SendDevice(cC , (start, )) query. A will then function
as an intermediary between the session oracles cB and cC , which both run the protocol
in the role of the initiating device. After both device A and B exchange their public keys
through the adversary, they will be ready to accept the passkey from the user. The user
inputs a passkey into both devices according to the protocol (note that the device session
role is opaque to the user). A then simply relays all relevant protocol messages between
device A and device B in keeping with the description of User-Generated Passkey Entry. At
the conclusion of the above attack, we have thatA has won the CYBORG-UncUser security
experiment by breaking auth, since cB and cC have both accepted but there does not exist
a paired UncUser-fresh session oracle for either device, due to role disagreement.
The real-world feasibility of the attacks presented in Theorems 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 are not
equal. Theorem 6.3.1 is a realistic attack for any Dolev-Yao type adversary as the only
requirement is the ability to modify messages sent between devices and execute bit guesses.









$← {0, 1}255, % 0 ← [( 0]
4. DHKey← [( 0]% 1
6. A0 ← A, A1 ← A
7. #0,:
$← {0, 1}128
8. 0,: ← HMAC(#0,: , % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,: )
13. {1 ← Vfy(#1,: , (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A0,: ), 1,: )
14. 0 ← HMAC(DHKey, #0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖)
17. {4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1)
18. LK0 ← HMAC(DHKey, #0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖)
1’. ( 1
$← {0, 1}255, % 1 ← [( 1]
4’. DHKey← [( 1]% 0
6’. A0 ← A, A1 ← A
7’. #1,:
$← {0, 1}128
8’. 1,: ← HMAC(#1,: , % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1,: )
13’. {2 ← Vfy(#0,: , (% 0G ‖% 1G ‖A1,: ), 0,: )
14’. 1 ← HMAC(DHKey, #1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖)
17’. {3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖), 0)
18’. LK1 ← HMAC(DHKey, #1,20‖#0,20‖btlk‖‖)


















Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Execute steps 6 - 13 twenty
times in sequence
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Figure 6.3. Depiction of adversarial attack (singular actions for the adver-
sary shown in red) against User-Generated Passkey Entry. Adversary relays
messages between two devices that both think they are the initiator.
devices must simultaneously attempt to pair with each other for this attack to progress.
This is possible if a user attempted to initiate a Bluetooth pairing on two devices, vice
only initiating the connection on one. However, it is difficult to pinpoint what an adversary
gains from executing the Theorem 6.3.3 attack outside of simply denial of service. On an
unrelated note, this attack cannot progress if both devices are in the responder role because
this would force the adversary to perform the initial computation for 0,8 involving the
unknown passkey.
6.3.2 Passkey Entry under Weak Session Modeling
As a result of all versions of Passkey Entry failing to achieveCYBORG security under strong
session identifiers, we execute an analysis underweak sessionmodeling. This enables further
investigation of Passkey Entry when the relevant attack described in Theorem 6.3.1 and the
trivial attack described in Theorem 6.3.3 are excluded.
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Nowwe consider a weak session identifier for Passkey Entry for a correctly executed session
involving initiating device, e.g., , and responding device, e.g., , as:
sid|40: := ((, , IOcapA), % 0, % 1, #0,20, #1,20, A, 0, 1) .
Again, identities are shown as an example above, and may be either an initiating device or
responding device in the following analysis, specified where appropriate. We leave our defi-
nition of session-state unchanged. Under this weaker session-identifier, Initiator-Generated
and Responder-Generated Passkey Entry can be proved to be a CYBORG-UncUser-secure
protocol.
Although our proof in Theorem 6.3.4 presents Initiator and Responder-Generated Passkey
Entry as CYBORG-UncUser-secure, it does so under the premise of a misleading session
identifier. Instead of including all messages that ought to match in the session identifier, we
only include thosemessages that are involved in the computation of the session key ! at the
conclusion of the protocol. The attacks presented in the previous section against Initiator and
Responder-Generated Passkey Entry still remain, but are veiled due to modeling choices.
In addition to setting a poor precedent of cherry-picking the values for a session identifier
to manufacture a tidy proof, this also hides possible security vulnerabilities from users and
implementors. It is important to not mask possible security vulnerabilities in modeling,
but instead to relay as much information as possible. We thus include this examination
to highlight how definition of a protocol’s session identifier has far-reaching effects on its
provable security. This is also useful for proving the exact messages within a protocol that
come with authentication guarantees.
Initiator-Generated
Theorem 6.3.4. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-UncUser-secure under the
EC-DDH and EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumptions, and the SUF-CMA of HMAC under weak
session modeling.
Proof. The proof of this theorem involves a series of game hops between an adversarial
PPT algorithm A and the challenger. We denote the adversarial advantage of a specific
game as Adv8, for the 8-th game hop.
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Game 0. This game is equivalent to the original security experiment:
Adv0 = Adv
CYBORG-UncUser
PE-IG,A,[? ,[B (_) ,
where _ is the security parameter, [? is a bound on the number of participants, and [B is a
bound on the number of sessions a participant can run.
Game 1. This game is equivalent to the previous except we raise the event abort, end
the experiment, and output zero if there ever exists two session oracles that generate the
same ephemeral key, ( , in Phase 1. If session keys ever repeat, then A could execute a
StateReveal query on the second session to recover ( and compute DHKey. We have that:




where ` is the length of ( .
Game 2. This game is equivalent to the previous except we raise the event abort, end the
experiment, and output zero if there ever exists a nonce collision in the experiment. This
prevents trivial guesses of passkey bits and lets us assume all nonces are generated fresh.
There are 20 nonces generated in each session, therefore, we have that:




Game 3. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we raise the
event abort, end the experiment, and output zero if a passkey is ever reused. Since the
passkey is inherently revealed during the completion of the Passkey Entry protocol, re-use
of this value would allow A to break auth or key-ind with probability 1. Since only one
passkey is generated each session we have that:




where |A | is the length of the passkey A.
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Game 4. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we guess the
session oracles executing the protocol, the test session cB and its partner cC , and abort if





We continue by separating out cases. In particular, separately addressing adversarial win by








Case 1. Since session oracles with matching session identifiers are guaranteed to accept by
the correctness of Passkey Entry (Section 4.4.2), we have that:
Advcorrect4 = 0 .
Case 2. Game 5.We continue with Advauth4 . Since we have the requirement that c

B remains
fresh, we will abort the experiment if A issues a StateReveal(), KeyReveal, ShowUser, or
ControlUser queries such that cB or the partnered user session, c*9 , are no longer UncUser-
fresh. If c*
9
is also partnered with cC , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB ≠ accept. We raise the event abort, end the experiment, and output zero ifA succeeds
in replacing % 0 or % 1.
In order to replace % 0 or % 1,A must either guess all |A | bits of the passkey A , allowing it
to recalculate the commitment under a nonce key of its choice. Accounting for cB in either







Game 6.We replace DHKey with a uniformly random value DHKey = 2% for 2 $← F@
where F@ is the finite field over which we define our elliptic curve  and % is a generator
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for  . Suppose that the adversary can distinguish between this and the previous game. Then
we can construct a new adversary, B1, solving the DDH problem, as from the previous game
hop we have that Diffie-Hellman shares 0% = % 0, and 1% = % 1 have been exchanged.
The challenger proceeds as before, but replaces the DHKey with a uniformly random
value DHKey = 2%, which is used for both partners. Algorithms B1 receives as input
(, %, 0%, 1%, 2%) where 0% = % 0, 1% = % 1, and 2% = DHKey. B2 can simulate all
flows for A correctly. Thus, the view of A when interacting with B2 is identical in Game







We continue the proof by first separating two sub-cases based on the test session’s role:






Sub-case 1: cB .role = initiator.
Game 7. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we raise the
event abort, end the experiment, and output zero if A succeeds in forging 1, #1,20, or
, or some combination thereof. Note that while A may generate a new nonce #1,20 and
commitment1,20 which it passes to  earlier in the protocol, #1,20 is covered by theHMAC
algorithm run on DHKey, so #1,20 will only be accepted if the adversary can also forge the
HMAC.
We construct a new B2, against the SUF-CMA security of MAC. The challenger sets
the MAC key to DHKey, and B2 uses the oracle MAC to compute tags. B2 calls
MAC(#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), which returns the tag 1 (note that A, #1,20, and
#0,20 are all public at this point in the protocol). B2 then forwards this response toA. gives
the message-tag pair (#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖, 1) to A. If A is able to forge a new
tag, call it |8=, leading to malicious acceptance, or a newmessage, call itmsg|8=, by forging
some combination of #1,20, and/or , such that MAC.Vfy(DHKey,msg|8=, 1) = 1, then
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Thus we have matching sid, cB .pid = , cC .pid = . The adversary can only succeed in
breaking auth by breaking role agreement among our test and partner sessions. However,
this is impossible since the initiator always sends the passkey A to the user and the responder
always receives the passkey A from the user as part of Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry.
Thus we have
Advauth,18 = 0 .
Sub-case 2: cB .role = responder. This case follows similarly to Sub-case 1, but we abort if
A succeeds in forging 1, #1,20, , and/or IOcapB causing  to accept maliciously in the
responder role.




+ 2 · AdvSUF-CMAMAC,B2 (_) .
Case 3. Game 5.We now bound Advkey-ind4 . Since we have the requirement that c

B remains
fresh, we will abort the experiment if A issues a StateReveal(), KeyReveal, ShowUser, or
ControlUser queries such that cB or the partnered user session, c*9 , are no longer UncUser-
fresh. If c*
9
is also partnered with cC , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB ≠ accept.
Suppose that A can distinguish between the games. Then we can construct a new ad-
versary, B3, solving the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH problem as follows. B3 receives as input
(, %, 0%, 1%) where % is a generator of our elliptic curve group, 0% = % 0, and 1% = % 1.
B3 then issues the challenge query G = (#0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖) also using values as cho-
sen by our test and partner oracles. The challenger then randomly samples b and sets
! ← HMAC(DHKey, #0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖) if b = 1 and ! 
$← {0, 1}_ otherwise.
The challenger then returns ! b to B3. The challenger also allots one-time access to
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the left and right HMAC oracles for computation of 0 and 1. At this point, B3 can
simulate all other flows between our test session and partner session. If we have that
! b = HMAC(DHKey, #0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖), then the view ofA when interacting with
this game is identical to Game 4. Similarly, the view ofA when interacting with this game
is identical to Game 5 if ! b
$← {0, 1}_. Thus by the success ofA in distinguishing Game






Since the session key of our test oracle is now uniformly random, we also conclude:
Advkey-ind5 = 0 .
Combining all previous probability statements we arrive at the final security reduction:















The discussion followingTheorem6.2.2 holds for the security of Initiator-Generated Passkey
Entry with the exception of |A |, which is only 20 bits in length. A key size of 20 bits is well
below NIST approved key size but is acceptable by Bluetooth standards [11]. Additionally,
20-bit passkeys provides closer to 18 bits of security in the final security reduction. The
strength of the passkey could always be increased by generating larger decimal values or
possibly allowing for alphanumeric passkeys when able. With only 20 bits of security, it
is paramount that implementors heed Bluetooth’s recommendation of minimizing pairing
attempts.
Theorem 6.3.5. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for
G ∈ {1, 2, 12}
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under weak session modeling.
Proof. This proof follows from a triviality. In all three of the above listed CYBORG-
CompUserG security environments, the adversary gains the capability to issue queries that
allow him to compromise a UtD channel that are not employed in Initiator-Generated
Passkey Entry. Therefore, these settings reduce to the CYBORG-UncUser setting, which
was proven secure in Theorem 6.3.4.
Lemma 6.3.6. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser0-secure un-
der weak session modeling.
Proof. We proceed via counterexample. Let A be an adversarial algorithm against the
CYBORG-CompUser0 security of the Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry protocol. A first
issues a SendDevice(cB , (start, )) query and a SendUser(c*9 , (start, (cB , cC ))) query to
initiate protocol participants. A then issues a ShowUser(cB ) query and proceeds with the
MitM attack as shown in Figure 6.4. We describe the steps of the attack as follows:
1. A executes Phase 1 of the protocol with Device B in the guise of A and similarly
with B; whereby, he exchanges his public key % 4 with B.
2. A and Device B generate DHKey1.
3. Device A selects the passkey, A and sends it to the user.
4. Since A issued a ShowUser(cB ) query, he modifies A to a new, known passkey A4.
This new value is then forwarded to the user.
5. User sends the value A4 to device B.
6. A and device B set their values for A0 and A1 to A4.
7. Repeat steps 8 through 12 for values 1 ≤ : ≤ 20.
8. Device B generates a nonce value #1,: and A generates a nonce value #4,: .
9. A sends a commitment value 4,: = HMAC(#4,: , % 4G ‖% 1G ‖A0,: ‖init) to B and
receives a commitment value 1,: = HMAC(#1,: , % 1G ‖% 4G ‖A1,: ‖resp) from B.
10. A sends its nonce #4,: to device B for verification.
11. B verifies that Vfy(#4,: , % 4G ‖% 1G ‖A0,: ‖init, 4,: ) = 1. B then sends its nonce #1,:
to A for verification.
12. A verifies that Vfy(#1,: , % 1G ‖% 4G ‖A1,: , 4,: ) = 1.
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13. A generates the check value 4 = HMAC(DHKey1, #0,20‖#1,20‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖),
A and sends it to B.
14. B generates the check value 1 = HMAC(DHKey1, #1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖ ‖).
15. B will then verify that Vfy(DHKey1, (#0,20‖#1,20‖A1‖IOcapA‖‖), 4) = 1. This
check will pass because B honestly executes the protocol with A under the belief he
is A. B then sends 1 to A.
16. A will then verify that Vfy(DHKey1, (#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1) = 1.
17. The attack ends with B and A generating the shared key LK1 = HMAC
(DHKey1, #0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖). B then accepts under the assumption that it just
paired with A.
At the conclusion of the above attack we have that A has won the CYBORG-CompUser0
security experiment by breaking auth since cC has accepted, cC is CompUser0-fresh, c*9 is
CompUser0-fresh, but there does not exist a paired device session oracle.
Lemma 6.3.7. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser3-secure.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.3.6 with a few changes.
Instead of issuing aShowUser(cB ) query,A issues aControlUser(c*9 , ) query. This allows
him to modify the passkey of A to A4 on input to cC . The rest of the attack can progress as
previously described.
Theorem. Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for
G ∈ {0, 3, 01, 02, 03, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under weak session modeling.
Proof. By Lemmas 6.3.6 and 6.3.7 we have that Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not
CYBORG-CompUserG for G ∈ {0, 3}. Therefore, we have that Initiator-Generated Passkey
Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG secure for - ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} where at least one of 0 or 3










2a. % 0 ← [( 0]%
5a. DHKey0 ← [( 0]% 1
6. A $← {0, . . . , 9}6
1b. ( 1
$← {0, 1}255
2b. % 1 ← [( 1]%
5b. DHKey1 ← [( 1]% 4
9b. A0 ← A4, A1 ← A4
10b. #1,8
$← {0, 1}128
11b. 1,8 ← HMAC(#1,8 , % 1G ‖% 4G ‖A1,8)
15. {1 ← Vfy(#4,8 , (% 4G ‖% 1G ‖A1,8), 4,8)
19b. 1 ← HMAC(DHKey1 , #1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖)
21. {3 ← Vfy(DHKey1 , (#0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖), 4)
24a/b. LK1 ← HMAC(DHKey1 , #0,20‖#1,20‖btlk‖‖)
1a’. ( 4
$← {0, 1}255
2a’. % 4 ← [( 4]%
5a’. DHKey1 ← [( 4]% 1
9a. A0 ← A4, A1 ← A4
10a. #4,8
$← {0, 1}128
11a. 4,8 ← HMAC(#4,8 , % 4G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8)
17. {2 ← Vfy(#1,8 , (% 1G ‖% 4G ‖A0,8), 1,8)
19a. 4 ← HMAC(DHKey1 , #0,20‖#1,20‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖‖)
23. {4 ← Vfy(DHKey1 , (#1,20‖#0,20‖A0‖IOcapB‖‖), 1)
ShowUser(cB )











Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange
Phase 1: Public Key Exchange
Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Execute steps 9a – 17
twenty times
in sequence
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Figure 6.4. Depiction of adversarial attack (singular actions shown in red) )
against Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry under the CYBORG-CompUser0
security experiment, discussed in Lemma 6.3.6. Any instance where the com-
munication ow jumps over a device line is done to illustrate adversarial
inability to read the message.
93
Responder-Generated
Theorem 6.3.8. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
the EC-DDH and EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH assumptions, and the SUF-CMA of HMAC under
weak session modeling.
This proof follows similarly to Theorem 6.3.4.
Theorem 6.3.9. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for
G ∈ {0, 3, 03}
under weak session modeling.
Proof. This proof follows from a triviality. In all three of the above listed CYBORG-
CompUserG security environments, the adversary may compromise UtD channels that are
not employed in Responder-Generated Passkey Entry. Therefore, these settings reduce to
the CYBORG-UncUser setting, which was proven secure in Theorem 6.3.8.
Lemma 6.3.10. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser1-secure
under weak session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described for Lemma 6.3.6, but with  in the
responder role and  as initiator.
Lemma 6.3.11. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser2-secure
under weak session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.3.6 with a few changes.
Instead of issuing a ShowUser(cB ) query, the adversary A issues a ControlUser(c*9 , )
query. This allows him to modify the passkey of A to A4 on input to cB .
Theorem 6.3.12. Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is notCYBORG-CompUserG-secure
for
G ∈ {1, 2, 01, 02, 12, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under weak session modeling.
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Proof. By Lemmas 6.3.10 and 6.3.11 we have that Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is
not CYBORG-CompUserG for G ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, we have that Responder-Generated
Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG secure for - ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} where at least one
of 1 or 2 is an element of - by applying Theorem 6.1.2.
User-Generated
Theorem 6.3.13. User-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
weak session modeling.
This proof follows similarly to Theorem 6.3.3.
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CHAPTER 7:
Proposed Modication to Bluetooth Pairing
In this chapter we present twomodified Passkey Entry protocol variants, see Figure 7.1, with
the following adaptations. The first modification is the Secure Hash Modification (SHM),
which is a modification constructed for the current variants of Passkey Entry to rectify the
vulnerabilities discussed in Chapter 6. The second is Dual Passkey Entry (DPE), a wholly
new variant of passkey entry developed to achieve greater security in under CYBORG −
CompUserG environments. In Chapter 8wewill show that, with thesemodifications, Passkey
Entry can achieve completeCYBORG security under a strong session identifier and the UtD
without eavesdropping channel.
Modifications were made with the goal of introducing minimal change to the protocol, as
well as restricting most changes to Phase 2 in keeping with the requirements for modular
construction of Bluetooth protocols.
7.1 Secure Hash Modification (SHM)
Motivation for the Secure Hash Modification stemmed from the investigation of Passkey
Entry security under weak and strong session identifiers. Recall that all versions of Passkey
Entry were provably insecure under strong session modeling due to not authenticating all
generated nonces and not authenticating the responding device’s IO capability. Additionally,
User-Generated Passkey Entry was susceptible to a role confusion attack. Secure Hash
Modification rectifies all of these faults with minimal changes to existing Passkey Entry
architecture. First, it requires devices to compute two hashes involving all of the initiating
and responding devices nonces, #0,8, #1,8. Also included in the computation of these hashes
are text strings for device role to ensure explicit confirmation of assumed role. Finally, both
IO capability variables, IOcapA, IOcapB, are included in the computation of 0, 1. By
concluding the protocol with an authentication of the entire transcript by both devices, the
Secure Hash Modification mirrors techiniques used in TLS 1.3 (i.e., the computation of
the Finishedmessage) to prevent downgrade attacks. Of note, this modification requires the
addition of a collision-resistant hash function, H, with a 128-bit output length (in keeping
with the specified nonce length) and does not prevent more direct downgrade attacks like
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BT–Niño–MitM.
7.1.1 Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange.
No changes.
7.1.2 Phase 1: Public Key Exchange.
No changes.
7.1.3 Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1.
Each device declares their role in the computation of the commitment values0,8, 1,8 using
the labels “init” and “resp” for the initiator and responder respectively. At the conclusion
of Phase 2, all of a device’s previously generated nonces are concatenated and hashed into
#0 and #1 in steps 8c and 8d. #0 and #1 replace #0,20 and #1,20 in all further Phases. No
other changes.
7.1.4 Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2.
Modified such that previously computed values for #0 and #1 are used in the computation
of check values 0 and 1. Both IOcap variables are included in the computation of 0 and
1. No other changes.
7.1.5 Phase 4: Link Key Calculation.
Modified such that previously computed values for #0 and #1 are used in computation of
the link key ! . No other changes.
7.2 Dual Passkey Entry (DPE)
Motivation forDual PasskeyEntry stems from a desire to achieve a greater level ofCYBORG
security. All current versions of Bluetooth pairing are still susceptible to Tap ‘n Ghost-like
attacks. Dual Passkey Entry on the other hand, proposes a method for protecting against
advanced UtD attacks by by having both devices generate and exchange passkeys. The
observant reader of Chapter 6, specifically the analysis of Passkey Entry under CompUserG
security, may have been able to guess this construction from all of our adversary’s actions
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when attacking Passkey Entry. The adversary never attacks the device that generates the
passkey. Thus, the modification proposed by Dual Passkey Entry in regard to the original
variants of PasskeyEntry, is similar to the idea of bi-directional certificates vs uni-directional
certificates. In this sense, the passkey shared by the generator in original Passkey Entry is
akin to a server-only certificate shared with a client for authentication (the user performs
the function of the certificate authority). Dual Passkey Entry, on the other hand, requires
that the “client” respond with a passkey of its own for bi-directional authentication.
This modification requires the initiator and responder to both possess a numerical display
and numerical input capabilities, a KeyboardDisplay type device as described by the Blue-
tooth classification from Section 4.1. Dual Passkey Entry’s reliance on device’s possessing
both numerical displays and keypad entry is more in line with the requirements for Nu-
meric Comparison. Traditional Passkey Entry in comparison requires a display and entry
mechanism on respective, instead of both, devices (for Initiator Generated and Responder
Generated Passkey Entry), or only requires entry mechanisms on both (for User Generated
Passkey Entry). This begs the question of whether simply using Numeric Comparison would
be a viable alternative vice a new protocol. Note that Numeric Comparison only achieves
the lowest level of CYBORG security (UncUser − secure from Theorem 6.2.2), we show in
Theorem 8.4.1 that Dual Passkey Entry achieves the strongest level of CYBORG security.
Although we do not rule out any possible modification of Numeric Comparison to improve
it’s security, attempting to devise said modification was not investigated in this thesis.
7.2.1 Phase 0: Init and IOcap Exchange.
No changes.
7.2.2 Phase 1: Public Key Exchange.
No changes.
7.2.3 Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1.
Both the initiating and responding device compute and exchange passkeys, A0 and A1 re-
spectively. Both passkeys are then included in the computation and verification of the
commitment values 0 and 1.
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7.2.4 Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2.
No changes.








$← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
11a. #0,8
$← {0, 1}128
12a. 0,8 ← HMAC(#0,8 , % 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8 ‖A1,8)
18. {2 ← Vfy(#1,8 , (% 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1,8 ‖A0,8), 1,8)
19a/b. #0 ← H(#0,1‖ . . . ‖#0,20‖init), #1 ← H(#1,1‖ . . . ‖#1,20‖resp)
20a. 0 ← HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1 ‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖IOcapB‖‖)
24. {4 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#1 ‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖‖), 1)
25a/b. LK← HMAC(DHKey, #0‖#1 ‖btlk‖‖)
6b. A1
$← {0, 1, 2, . . . , 9}6
11b. #1,8
$← {0, 1}128
12b. 1,8 ← HMAC(#1,8 , % 1G ‖% 0G ‖A1,8 ‖A0,8)
16. {1 ← Vfy(#0,8 , (% 0G ‖% 1G ‖A0,8 ‖A1,8), 0,8)
20b. 1 ← HMAC(DHKey, #1 ‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖‖)
22. {3 ← Vfy(DHKey, (#0‖#1 ‖A1 ‖IOcapA‖IOcapB‖‖), 0)
User
User
7. A0 8. A0







Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1
Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2
Phase 4: Link Key Calculation
Execute steps 11a – 18
twenty times in sequence
Dual Passkey Entry
Secure Hash Modification
Figure 7.1. Dual Passkey Entry with Secure Hash Modication. Dual Passkey
Entry (DPE) is depicted with the modications in blue, where both devices
generate passkeys.The Secure Hash Modication (SHM) is depicted green
and can be used in conjunction with DPE or any version of Passkey Entry.
Under this modication all nonces are hashed into the new values #0, #1
for subsequent use. Devices also declare assumed roles, using the strings init
and resp, and both IOcap variables are used in the computation of 0, 1.
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CHAPTER 8:
Results of Analysis of Modied Bluetooth Protocol
In this section we present our analysis of the three original variants of Passkey Entry
when operated with the Secure Hash Modification under strong session modeling. We
refer to these “modified” versions as SHM Initiator/Responder/User-Generated Passkey
Entry. Using Theorem 6.1.2, we advance analysis incrementally introducing more allowable
combinations of user compromise until we reach an environment where the protocol breaks.
At such a point, all subsequent definitions of the compromised user setting where the break
persists can then be addressed as a corollary.
We prove SHM Dual Passkey Entry’s security in the CompUser0123 environment under
strong session modeling, which via Theorem 6.1.2 demonstrates its total CYBORG security
across all variants. All proofs operate under the assumption that the adversary is confined
via the UtD without eavesdropping channel, as required for execution of Passkey Entry, and
definitions for strong session identifiers and state from Section 6.3.1.
8.1 SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey
Theorem 8.1.1. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-UncUser-secure un-
der the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre security of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC under strong session modeling.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows closely to that of Theorem 6.3.4, but with the
following alterations.
Case 2. Sub-case 1: cB .role = initiator.
Game 7. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we raise the
event abort, end the experiment, and output zero if the adversary succeeds in forging the
tag 1 or any of #1, IOcapB, or  in the message used to compute 1.
We bound the abort condition by constructing the adversary, B2, against the SUF-CMA
security of HMAC. The challenger sets the MAC key to DHKey, and B2 uses the oracle
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MAC to compute tags. B2 calls MAC(#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖‖), which returns
the tag 1 (A, #1,8, and #0,8 are all public at this point in the protocol). B2 then gives
the message-tag pair (#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖‖, 1) to A. If A is able to forge
a new tag, call it |8=, such that MAC.Vfy(#1‖#0‖A0‖IOcapB‖IOcapA‖‖, |8=) = 1,
or a new message, call it msg|8=, by forging at least one of #1, IOcapB, and , such that
MAC.Vfy(msg|8=, 1) = 1, then B2 can win the SUF-CMA experiment with the winning






Game 8. This game is equivalent to the previous security experiment except we raise the
event abort, end the experiment, and output zero if the adversary succeeds in forging any
of ’s nonces or ’s role, causing  to accept maliciously.
FromGame 8 we have thatA does not succeed in forging #1. Thus ifA succeeds in forging
any nonce #1,8 or ’s role, we use the success of A to construct a new adversary, B3,
against the second-preimage resistance of the hash function. Per the sec-pre experiment,
B3 is given the message-hash pair (#1,1‖ . . . ‖#1,20‖role1, #1) by A (note that all #1,8
nonces are public at this point in the protocol), where the nonces are as sampled by cC and
#1 = H(#1,1‖ . . . ‖#1,20‖role1). By our abort condition, A is able to forge at least one
nonce #′
1,8





as its guess at a












By Game 8, the adversary can only succeed in breaking auth by forging a commitment
value, 0,8 or 1,8. However, the correctness of HMAC ensures 0,8 or 1,8 against forgery
for all 8 since the messages and keys used to compute them are fixed from previous game
hops. We therefore have matching sid, cB .pid = , cC .pid = , cB .role ≠ cC .role telling us
our session oracles are partnered via Definition 5.1.4 Thus we have
Advauth,18 = 0 .
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Sub-case 2: cB .role = responder. This case follows similarly to Sub-case 1.




+ 2 · (AdvSUF-CMAMAC,B2 (_) + Adv
sec-pre
H,B3 (_)) .
This leads to our final security reduction:
















Theorem 8.1.2. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUserG-secure
for
G ∈ {1, 2, 12}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Theorem 6.3.5.
Theorem 8.1.3. SHM Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG-
secure for
G ∈ {0, 3, 01, 02, 03, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Section 6.3.2.
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8.2 SHM Responder-Generated Passkey
Theorem 8.2.1. SHM Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-UncUser-secure
under the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre security of H, and
the SUF-CMA security of HMAC under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Theorem 8.1.1.
Theorem 8.2.2. SHM Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUserG-
secure for
G ∈ {0, 3, 03}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Theorem 6.3.9.
Theorem 8.2.3. SHM Responder-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG-
secure for
G ∈ {1, 2, 01, 02, 12, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Theorem 6.3.12.
8.3 SHM User-Generated Passkey
Theorem 8.3.1. SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-UncUser-secure under
the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre security of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof follows similarly to Theorem 8.1.1. This is due to the fact that the
adversary is unable to exploit how the passkey is exchanged between the devices, regardless
of which device generated the value, in the CYBORG-UncUser environment.
Theorem 8.3.2. SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for
G ∈ {0, 1, 01}
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under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof follows from a triviality. In all three of the above listed CYBORG-
CompUserG security environments, the adversary may compromise UtD channels that are
not employed in SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry. Therefore, these settings reduce to
the CYBORG-UncUser setting, which was proven secure in Theorem 8.2.1.
Lemma 8.3.3. SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser2-secure
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.3.11. The adversary A
issues a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query, which allows him to modify the passkey of A to A4 on
input to cB . The adversary may then proceed to MitM communications with cB and break
auth.
Lemma 8.3.4. SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUser3-secure
under strong session modeling.
Proof. This proof runs similarly to the one described in Lemma 6.3.7. The adversary A
issues a ControlUser(c*
9
, ) query, which allows him to modify the passkey of A to A4 on
input to cC . The adversary may then proceed to MitM communications with cC and break
auth.
Theorem 8.3.5. User-Generated Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for
G ∈ {2, 3, 02, 03, 12, 13, 23, 012, 013, 023, 123, 0123}
under strong session modeling.
Proof. By Lemmas 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 we have that SHM User-Generated Passkey Entry is
not CYBORG-CompUserG for G ∈ {2, 3}. Therefore, we have that SHM User-Generated
Passkey Entry is not CYBORG-CompUserG-secure for - ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} where at least one
of 2 or 3 is an element of - , by applying Theorem 6.1.2.
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8.4 SHM Dual Passkey
The proof for SHM Dual Passkey follows from two key ideas. First we rely on the contra-
positive of Theorem 6.1.2. From Theorem 6.1.2, we know that if SHM Dual Passkey is
CYBORG-CompUser0123-secure, it is also secure in all other CYBORG security experi-
ments. Secondly, we need only show that the integrity of at least one of the exchanged
passkeys in SHM Dual Passkey remains uncompromised in the CompUser0123 environ-
ment. Specifically, with both devices generating passkeys, the adversary can neither gain
knowledge nor forge the target session’s passkey. The adversary cannot observe the exchange
of passkeys between the devices and user because by definition they are exchanged over
the UtD without eavesdropping channel. The adversary cannot forge the target session’s
passkey because none of the allowed queries in the CompUser0123 allow for this capability.
This ensures at least one passkey remains secret from the adversary throughout execution
of SHM Dual Passkey. We then have that all other reductions can proceed similarly to our
proof of SHM Initiaitor-Generated Passkey Entry in the UncUser setting (Theorem 8.1.1),
which also rely on the security of a single passkey.
Theorem 8.4.1. SHM Dual Passkey Entry is CYBORG-CompUser0123-secure under
the EC-sym-ssPRF-ODH and EC-DDH assumptions, the sec-pre security of H, and the
SUF-CMA security of HMAC under strong session modeling.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows closely to that of Theorem 8.1.1, but with the
following alterations. Following the proof of Theorem 8.1.1, let Adv8 denote the 8-th game
hop in the same series of games between an adversarial PPT algorithmA and the challenger.
Case 2. Game 5.We continue with Advauth4 . Since we have the requirement that c

B remains
fresh, we will abort the experiment if A issues a StateReveal() or KeyReveal queries
such that cB is no longer CompUser0123-fresh. This implies that A may issue ControlUser
queries involving the partnered user oracle c*
9
as desired, since we are under CompUser0123
environment c*
9
remains fresh regardless of adversarial action. Similarly A may issue
ShowUser queries at will. ThusA is only limited on the UtD channel by its inability to read
valid values A0 and A1.
If c*
9
is also partnered with cC , we abort if A issues a StateReveal(cC ) query while
cB ≠ accept. We raise the event abort, end the experiment, and output zero ifA succeeds
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in replacing % 1.
NoteA may issue either a ShowUser(cC ) or ControlUser(c*9 , ) query to forge the passkey
A1 of the would-be partner. In order to replace % 1, the A must guess all |A | bits of the
passkey A0, allowing it to recalculate the commitment under a nonce key of its choice.
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CHAPTER 9:
Formal Analysis in Tamarin
The formal analysis of Secure Simple Pairing was conducted using the Tamarin-Prover,
a cryptographic protocol verification tool developed by Schmidt, Meier, Cremers, and
Basin [76] for a symbolic verification of the NAXOS protocol. Tamarin provides extensive
control to the user to tailor his analysis to the specific needs; it is this flexibility that has
allowed Tamarin to accomplish symbolic verification of a wide range of protocols [77], [78].
9.1 Protocol Model
We now provide insights into how the Tamarin tool was employed in the verification
of Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry, but it is assumed the reader has a baseline
knowledge of Tamarin’s operation and how it leverages the multiset rewriting systems. We
give a brief introduction into Tamarin’s working below, but for futher reading, we direct the
interested party to the Tamarin Prover GitHub page with links to a user manual and teaching
materials [19].
Modeling a protocol in Tamarin typically consists of a series of rules to model protocol
behavior. A rule consists of three parts: premise, action facts, and conclusion. The premise
lists out all facts that must be consumed for the execution of the rule. Tamarin maintains a
listing of all facts, starting from an empty set, in what is termed the state. The conclusion
represents the facts added to Tamarin’s state at the conclusion of the rule. This allows us
to model execution of a protocol as a back and forth between consuming facts/information
in the state and adding more facts/information to the state. Action facts are the third piece
of a rule. They capture properties and are maintained by Tamarin in the verification of
pre-defined properties, termed lemmas. Action facts are not stored in state and cannot be
consumed in the premise of a rule. Instead, action facts exist within the specific trace
Tamarin is executing. When assessing a protocol, the modeler defines lemmas based on
generalizations of the action facts for Tamarin to either prove false, via a counterexample,
or verify. Each attempt by Tamarin to either prove or falsify a lemma is called a trace.
The Tamarin heuristic is written such that it will attempt to find falsification traces for the
lemma, and once all possible avenues are exhausted then the lemma is deemed verified.
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9.1.1 Diffie–Hellman Modeling
One useful aspect of Tamarin is a built-in message theory that enables modeling of Diffie–
Hellman groups. Recall that symbolic modeling () is based off the theory of formal language
and expressions. Therefore, there is no built-in theoretical basis for mathematical group
operations as with computational modeling. Thus, wemust explicitly symbols and functions
to represent Diffie–Hellman operations in our model.
Tamarin predefines the inverse function and multiplicative group identity, inv and 1 re-
spectively, along with symbols to represent the group operations of exponentiation and
multiplication, ∧ and ∗, respectively. These symbols are related using a natural equations list
that captures relevant Diffie–Hellman group identities and properties. Assume G, ~, I below
are all elements of a Diffie–Hellman group and 0, 1 are integers:
(G ∧ 0) ∧ 1 = G ∧(0 ∗ 1) ,
G ∧ 1 = G ,
G ∗ ~ = ~ ∗ G ,
(G ∗ ~) ∗ I = G ∗ (~ ∗ I) ,
G ∗ 1 = G ,
G ∗ inv(G) = 1 .
The above equations allow one to model Diffie–Hellman key exchange as actual group
operations with associativity and commutativity vice with functions as was required in
Scyther and ProVerif. This is necessary for our analysis as the participants in Numeric
Comparison and Passkey Entry create a shared Diffie–Hellman Key in Phase 1 that is then
employed in Phases 3 and 4.
9.1.2 Restrictions
Tamarin allows for the construction of restrictions for the purpose of disallowing certain
traces from being examined during automated analysis. This prevents investigation of un-
realistic traces and saves computational time. Unlike lemmas, which Tamarin attempts to
falsify or prove, restrictions must always be satisfied within the trace. If at any point in
the trace a restriction is broken, the trace is abandoned and that attempt at falsification is
deemed incorrect. This analysis utilizes three specific restrictions from the Tamarin-prover
manual [79]:
restriction Equality: All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @i ==> x = y" ,
112
restriction Inequality: All x #i. Neq(x,x) @i ==> F" ,
restriction OnlyOnceV: All #i #j x. OnlyOnceV(x) @i & OnlyOnceV(x) @j ==> #i = #j .
The above statements can all be read similarly to a statement in formal logic. Equality states
that for all strings, x and y, and instance i, if we declare Eq(x,y) at instance i, then string x
equals string y. When Eq(x,y) is employed as part of a rule in Tamarin, the trace will only
continue if string x equals string y. This allows us to model any verification checks and
ensure a device will only continue executing its role in the protocol if the check passes.
Inequality states that for all strings, x, and instance i, if we declare Neq(x,x) at instance i,
then we have a contradiction. When Neq(x,y) is employed as part of a rule in Tamarin,
the trace will only continue if string x does not equal string y. The Inequality restriction,
allows us to model that the user faithfully executes the protocol into different devices and
only communicates with other devices. We make no attempt to model communication
between users nor multiple users in the protocol. Since this analysis is performed under
the assumption that the user will faithfully execute his role, this restriction is necessary. It
also allows us to prevent devices from attempting to pair with themselves, similarly to the
CYBORG computational model.
OnlyOnceV states that for all strings, x, and instances i and j, if we declare OnlyOnceV(x) at
instance i and OnlyOnceV(x) at instance j, then we must have that instance i equals instance
j. When OnlyOnceV is employed as part of a rule in Tamarin, the trace will only continue
if OnlyOnceV(x) only appears at a single instance throughout. We use the OnlyOnceV
restriction to ensure the user does not reuse passkeys over the course of a protocol run
and that a device only associates a single IO Capability value with itself. It is also useful
when one needs to force certain rules to only execute once when performing debugging and
correctness checks of the encoded protocol.
9.2 Adversarial Model
9.2.1 Device-to-Device Channel
The Tamarin adversary has full control to modify, create, replay, or delete any message
sent over the DtD channel in keeping with Definition 5.2.1 from the CYBORG model.
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Tamarin uses the built-in facts In and Out to model communications received and sent over
this channel. These are unique facts that are not consumed in a one-to-one correspondence
from the state. Instead Out is used to add expressions from a rule’s conclusion to the state
maintained by Tamarin. These expressions can then be employed to fulfill a subsequent
rule’s In fact. The Tamarin adversary has full control to fulfill a rules In facts as it pleases
in its attempts to falsify a lemma.
9.2.2 User to Device Channel
To model adversarial capabilities over the UtD channel in Tamarin, we adopt the recom-
mendations from the Tamarin manual to create authenticated and secure channels, similar
to Definition 5.2.2 and Definition 5.2.3 [79]. Passkey Entry operates under the strict as-
sumption that the passkey shared between devices over the UtD Channel remains secret
from the adversary. We capture this fact by writing two unique rules to create a specific
UtD channel for use in verification that provides confidentiality (adversary cannot read any
messages sent over this channel) and authentication (adversary cannot modify content nor
sender/receiver of messages). We then have that the below two rules in conjunction express
our definition of the UtD channel (similar to Definition 5.2.2) in Tamarin:
rule ChanOut_UtD: [Out_UtD($A,$B,x)][ChanOut_UtD($A,$B,x)]->[!UtD($A,$B,x)] ,
rule ChanIn_UtD: [!UtD($A,$B,x)][ChanIn_UtD($A,$B,x)]->[In_UtD($A,$B,x)] .
The rule ChanOut_UtDmodels sending a message over the UtD channel. When a device or
the user wants to send amessage over theUtD channel, it first includes aOut_UtD($A,$B,x)
rule for public device identites, A (the sender) and B (the recipient) and message, x, in its
conclusion. This fact is then consumed by the ChanOut_UtD rule to create the persistent
!UtD fact, which is used to bind the public sender/receiver to the specific message. This
prevents the Tamarin adversary from modifying the sender/receiver and the content of the
communication. When a fact in the conclusion is pre-fixed with an exclamation point, it can
be consumed asmany times as desired; thus, it is made to be a persistent fact. The persistence
allows this message to be replayed, or consumed by multiple times. The qualifier, $, is used
to signify that this value is publicly known by all and can be freely used in any rule or by the
Tamarin adversary. Additionally, since the two rules do not contain anOut fact, the Tamarin
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adversary has no ability to read the sent message (i.e., no expressions are added to its state,
only entire facts). When a device or the user wants to receive a message over the UtD
channel, it places a In_UtD($A,$B,x) fact in its premise. Then so long as a corresponding
Out_UtD($A,$B,x) fact exists in the state, a In_UtD($A,$B,x) fact can be generated from
ChanIn_UtD to satisfy the original rule.
Numeric Comparison does not list a strict requirement for secrecy in its specification;
however, we still disallow the adversary frommodifyingmessages sent over theUtD channel.
As a result, we slightly modify the ChanOut_UtD rule for use in the analysis of Numeric
Comparison with the inclusion of an Out(<$A, $B, x>) fact, detailed below. The left
and right arrows are used to signify that it is a single message vice three. This modification
allows the Tamarin adversary to read sender/receiver and the message itself, via the contents
of the Out fact, for all communications sent over the UtD-E channel.
rule ChanOut_UtD: [Out_UtD($A,$B,x)][ChanOut_UtD($A,$B,x)]->
[!UtD($A,$B,x), Out(<$A, $B, x>)] ,
rule ChanIn_UtD: [!UtD($A,$B,x)][ChanIn_UtD($A,$B,x)]->[In_UtD($A,$B,x)] .
This allows us to model the UtD-E channel (similar to Definition 5.2.3) for analysis of
Numeric Comparison.
9.3 Formal Security
This section presents various definitions and goals for authenticated key exchange protocols
as Lowe originally formulated them [80] for use in analyzing authentication in a formal
setting. We adapt his definitions for our current context and notation for use within the
Tamarin formal analysis tool as suggested by the Tamarin-Prover Manual [79]. We differ
at points from those instantiated in the Tamarin-Prover Manual in variable names, which
are irrelevant. Our definitions also differ because we do not allow the adversary to reveal
any device secrets (like we do in our computational model with the StateReveal and/or
KeyReveal queries for non-target sessions). This choice was made to simplify analysis and
still allows our definitions to match those originally provided by Lowe. Definitions in this
section operate under the assumption that all protocol participant identities and exchanged
messages are unique strings drawn from the set Σ∗ where Σ is the protocol’s alphabet. We
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use this terminology to be consistent with the Dolev–Yao security model [15], which forms
the theoretical basis of our formal analysis into Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry. All
exchanged messages in a protocol are modeled as occurring in a specific sequence and are
each assigned a sequence number starting from 0 from the set of non-negative integers, Z+.
This is done so we can apply an ordering to any claims or messages sent within a protocol
and performed at a specific point relative to another message sent/received.
lemma aliveness: All a b t #i. Commit(a, b, t)@i ==>
(Ex role_b #j. Create(b, role_b) @ j)" ,
lemma weak_agreement: All a b t1 #i. Commit(a, b, t1) @i ==>
(Ex t2 #j. Running(b, a, t2) @j & j < i)" ,
lemma noninjective_agreement: All a b t #i.
Commit(a,b,t) @i ==>
(Ex #j. Running(b,a,t) @j
& j < i)" ,
lemma injective_agreement: All a b t #i. Commit(a,b,t) @i ==>
(Ex #j. Running(b,a,t) @j & j < i
& not (Ex a2 b2 #i2.
Commit(a2,b2,t) @i2
& not (#i2 = #i)))" ,
lemma secrecy: All val #i. Secret(val) @i ==> not (Ex #j. K(val)@j)" .
In the above definitionswe have that the variable strings a, b, a2, b2 represent the identities of
devices executing the protocol, role_a, role_b represent a participant’s role in the protocol,
t, t1, t2, val are either messages exchanged or computed in conjunction with the execution
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of the protocol, and i, i2, j are sequencing numbers. All strings referenced above can take
any value and are merely variables; the above constructions are similar to the writing of
formulas in formal logic.
The Commit and Running Tamarin action facts are utilized in the same way Lowe originally
did. Commit(a, b, t)@i means that participant a previously received the message t, and
a believes, at instance i, that b previously sent message t. Note that instance i is used to
mark the point at which a commits to who sent message t, not the instance when a received
t. Running(a, b, t)@i means that participant a believes participant b sent message t at
instance i. Although the Running action fact can occur at any point in the protocol, we only
employ the Commit action fact once a device has completed its role in the protocol. The
Create fact is instantiated at the beginning of a protocol session to signify that a participant
sees himself, b, in the role of role_b within the session and captures the requirement of
“previously running the protocol” [80].
Note the strict hierarchy among weak_agreement, noninjective_agreement, and injec-
tive_agreement. Specifically, a protocol that achieves injective_agreement necessarily
achieves noninjective_agreement, and a protocol that achieves noninjective_agreement
necessarily achieves weak_agreement. This is to be expected and echoes Lowe’s own
analysis [80].
All of the above lemmas, with the exception of secrecy, are translations of Lowe’s properties
toTamarin. The secrecy lemma states that for all strings, val, claimed to be secret,Secret(val),
at instance i, it is not that case that the Tamarin adversary learns val,K(val), at some instance
j.
We now address specific strings that we examined with the above lemmas. All strings were
examined from the perspective of both the initiating and responding devices.
9.3.1 Numeric Comparison
• DHKey. Upon computation of theDiffie–Hellman keyDHKey in a protocol sessionwe
used the action fact Running( $A, $B, <`role_$B', `role_$A', DHKey > ) to capture
that identity A believes it is running DHKey with B and the specific roles it believes
each is performing in the session. Upon completion of Phase 4, we then used the action
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fact Commit( $A, $B, <`role_$A', `role_$B', DHKey > ) to capture that identity A
commits to DHKey with B and the specific roles each performed in the session.
Referring back to our above lemmas, say the Commit fact in noninjective_agreement
for example, we see that $A is a specific instantiation of the variable a, similarly for
$B and b, and similarly for <`role_$B', `role_$A', DHKey > and t. Thus, if Tamarin is
able to find a trace where there does not exist a Running(b, a, t) fact that was declared
at an instance before the Commit fact, then Tamarin found a trace that falsified the
lemma. Since the entire message of t must match in the lemma, this allows us to
investigate both role agreement and agreement of DHKey. We also used the action
fact Secret(DHKey) upon completion of Phase 4 to signify that a device believes
the value to be secret at that point. Note that DHKey is qualified with a dollar sign
because it is not assumed to be a public value.
• #0. Upon the generation of identity A’s nonce #0, we used the action fact Running(
$A, $B, <`role_$B', `role_$A', #0 > ) to capture that identity A believes it is running
#0 with B and the specific roles it believes each is performing in the session. Upon
completion of Phase 4, we then used the action fact Commit( $A, $B, <`role_$A',
`role_$B', #1 > ) to capture that identity A commits to #1 with B and the specific
roles each performed in the session.
• LK. Upon completion of Phase 4 we used the action fact Secret(LK) to signify that a
device believes the derived link key LK to be secret at that point.
9.3.2 Passkey Entry
• DHKey. Similar to Numeric Comparison.
• A0. Upon either generation or receipt of the passkey A0 in a protocol session we used
the action fact Running( $A, $B, <`role_$B', `role_$A', A0> ) to capture that identity
A believes it is running A0 with B and the specific roles it believes each is performing
in the session. Upon completion of Phase 4, we then used the action fact Commit(
$A, $B, <`role_$A', `role_$B', A0> ) to capture that identity A commits to A0 with
B and the specific roles each performed in the session. We also used the action fact
Secret(A0) upon completion of Phase 4 to signify that a device believes the value to
be secret at that point.
• #0,8. Similar to Numeric Comparison.
• LK. Similar to Numeric Comparison.
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9.4 Results of Formal Analysis
9.4.1 Modeling Secure Simple Pairing in Tamarin
Utilizing the Tamarin language multiset writing rules and previously discussed facets in this
chapter, we translated Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry as described in Section 4.3
into Tamarin theory files. We included two specific rules to capture Phase 0 to ensure the
devices executing the protocol agree on each other’s intended identities and IO capabilities.
We modeled the user’s identity as the string constant ’User’ to capture the assumption that
all users are equivalent. In Passkey Entry all 82 communication flows of Phase 2 were
modeled in Tamarin; this was accomplished by defining the exchanged random value as a
tuple of 20 strings. Although this greatly increased the computational overhead involved in
verification, it allowed for a faithfulmodel of the actual protocol in Tamarin. Themodeling of
all other phases presented no unique challenges in translations not already addressed. Due to
length concerns, the full write-up of the Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols
as translated can be found at NPS GitLab: https://gitlab.nps.edu/michael.troncoso/thesis/-
/tree/master/inputs/app/theories. We present our formalization of Numeric Comparison in
the following paragraphs to highlight our modeling choices and to provide an example for
reading our models of the Secure Simple Pairing protocols.
Figure 9.1 represents the preamble to our theory file, where we declare the name of the file
(SSP_NC_SID) and our defined functions (hmac/2, h/1), which model our MAC and hash
function as defined in Section 4.2 respectively. We also define the UtD-E channel in this
section as discussed in Section 9.2.
Figure 9.2 depicts our translation of Phase 0. The rule Get_IOcap ensures each device has
a only a single IO capability variable associated with it. The persistent out fact !IOcap(
$A, $IOcap), associates a public device identity, $A, with a public IO capability, $IOcapA.
This acts a device registration and prevents the Tamarin adversary from assigning multiple,
unique IO capability variables to a single device when proving lemmas. SSP_A_IO and
SSP_B_IO then model the rest of Phase 0. In SSP_A_IO, we first require the device to
declare its IO capability variable, and then send this value to a second device $Bwith the out
factOut( <$A, $B, IOcapA>).Out facts will appear regularly throughout our formalization
of Numeric Comparison and will consistently be used to model sending a message over the
DtD channel. The Create action facts associate roles with each device and the Inequality
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/* UtD Channel rules:
Adversary cannot modify a message or its sender/receiver
on the User to Device channel.
Adversary can read/delete/replay messages sent on this channel.
*/
rule ChanOut_UtD:
[ Out_UtD( $A, $B, x )
]
--[ ChanOut_UtD( $A, $B, x )
]->
[ !UtD( $A, $B, x )
, Out( <$A, $B, x> )
]
rule ChanIn_UtD:
[ !UtD( $A, $B, x)
]
--[ ChanIn_UtD( $A, $B, x )
]->
[ In_UtD( $A, $B, x )
]
action facts ensure the devices are not the User. The out fact State_A_IO( <$A, IOcapA>,
$B) models the information stored in device $A’s memory. Facts starting with “State” will
appear regularly throughout our formalization of Numeric Comparison and will consistently
be used to track device memory. SSP_B_IO then proceeds similarly with the addition that
it receives A’s message from the previous rule, modeled with In(<A, B, IOcapA>) and we
require A and B to be different devices (Neq(A, B)) in keeping with the CYBORG model.
In facts will appear regularly throughout our formalization of Numeric Comparison and
will consistently be used to model receiving a message over the DtD channel. Note that
“//” represent comment lines applied to lines giving some description or lines useful in
debugging only.
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Figure 9.2. Numeric Comparison, Phase 0.
//Force a device to only have one IOcap
rule Get_IOcap:
[]
--[ OnlyOnceV( $A )
]->
[ !IOcap( $A, $IOcap )
]
rule SSP_A_IO:
[ !IOcap( $A, IOcapA )
]
--[ Create( $A, 'Initiating' )
, Create( $B, 'NonInitiating' )
// , OnlyOnceV( 'Initiating' )
, Neq( $A, 'User')
, Neq( $B, 'User')
]->
[ Out( <$A, $B, IOcapA> )
, State_A_IO( <$A, IOcapA>, $B )
]
rule SSP_B_IO:
[ In( <A, B, IOcapA> )
, !IOcap( B, IOcapB )
]
--[ Recv( B, A, IOcapA )
, Send( B, A, IOcapB )
// , OnlyOnceV( 'NonInitiating' )
, Neq( A, B)
]->
[ Out( <B, A, IOcapB> )
, State_B_IO( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB> )
]
Figure 9.3 depicts steps 1a, 2a, and 3 from Phase 1 for Numeric Comparison. The device
uses the fact Fr(∼SKa) to draw a fresh secret key, signified by the ∼ qualifier, for use in the
subsequent Diffie–Hellman exchange. The ∼ symbol in front of a string stands for freshness,
and means that said string is ephemeral to the trace that Tamarin is currently executing. We
use the let-in construction to equate the string PKa with the string `g' ∧ ∼SKa. As shown,
device A receives device B’s IO capability variable, IOcapB, sends out its public key, PKa,
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Figure 9.3. Numeric Comparison, Phase 1.





[ Fr( ~SKa )
, In( <B, A, IOcapB> )
, State_A_IO( <A, IOcapA>, B )
]
--[ Recv( A, B, IOcapB )
, Send( A, B, PKa )
]->
[ Out( <A, B, PKa> )
, State_A_0( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, ~SKa )
]
to B, and updates its memory. The action facts Recv and Send do not play a role in analysis
but are useful for debugging.
Figure 9.4 depicts steps 1b, 2b, 3, 4, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8, and 9 from Phase 1 and the beginning
part of Phase 2 for Numeric Comparison. Device B receives device A’s public key, and
responds with its own similarly to the previous rule. In addition, device B computes its
Diffie-Hellman key, DHKey, as PKa ∧ ∼SKb. Since device B is not currently waiting on any
information from device A and has all the information it requires to proceed to Phase 2, it
proceeds with the computation of its commitment value Cb. B draws a fresh nonce, ∼Nb,
and sets its passkeys, rb, ra, to the constant string ‘0’. It then uses the declared function
hmac to compute Cb using ∼Nb as the key and <PKb, PKa, rb> as the message. Device B
concludes this rule by sending out its own public key, its commitment value, and updating
its memory. This rule also contains the first instance of the Running action fact as discussed
in Section 9.3 because we want to verify authentication of both device B’s nonce and
Diffie–Hellman key.
Rule SSP_NC_A_1 in Figure 9.5 proceeds similarly to rule SSP_NC_B_0 from Fig-
ure 9.4 in its modeling of steps 4, 5a, 6a, 7a, 9, and 10. Device A receives device B’s public
key, PKb, and commitment value, Cb, computes its Diffie–Hellman key, DHKey = PKb
∧∼SKa, and responds with its own fresh nonce ∼Na. Rule SSP_NC_B_1models steps 10,
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Figure 9.4. Numeric Comparison, Phase 1 (cont.) and Phase 2.
// B <--PKa-- A
// B: DHKey <- PKa ^ SKb
// B --PKb--> A
// B: Cb <- hmac( ~Nb, <PKb, PKa, rb> )




DHKey = PKa ^ ~SKb
rb = '0'
ra = rb
Cb = hmac( ~Nb, <PKb, PKa, rb> )
in
[ Fr( ~SKb )
, Fr( ~Nb )
, In( <A, B, PKa> )
, State_B_IO( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB> )
]
--[ Recv( B, A, PKa )
, Send( B, A, PKb )
, Running( B, A, <'Initiating', 'NonInitiating', DHKey> )
, Running( B, A, <'Initiating', 'NonInitiating', ~Nb> )
]->
[ Out( <B, A, PKb> )
, Out( <B, A, Cb> )
, State_B_0( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ~Nb, ra, rb )
]
11, 13b, and 14b. Device B receives device A’s nonce, Na, and uses this value to compute
its verification value, Vb = h(<PKa, PKb, Na, ∼Nb). Device B then sends Vb to the user
using the out fact Out_UtD(B, `User', <Vb, ∼Nb>).
Though not referred to in the Bluetooth specification [11], we include ∼Nb in this message
as simulatedmetadata to ensure the Tamarin adversary does not attempt cross-session replay
attacks involving UtD messages, which are disallowed in our CYBORG model. Since all
nonces in Numeric Comparion are guaranteed to be ephemeral, a device can use it as a
session identifier to ensure any received “OK” message from the user is applicable to the
currently executing session. This is a calculated modeling choice to prevent Tamarin from
pursuing un-realistic traces that would lead to falsification of lemmas. To minimize the
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Figure 9.5. Numeric Comparison, Phase 2 (cont.).
// A <--PKb-- B
// A: DHKey <- PKb ^ SKa
// A <--Cb-- B







[ State_A_0( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, ~SKa )
, In( <B, A, PKb> )
, In( <B, A, Cb> )
, Fr( ~Na )
]
--[ Recv( A, B, PKb )
, Recv( A, B, Cb )
, Send( A, B, ~Na )
, Running( A, B, <'NonInitiating', 'Initiating', DHKey> )
, Running( A, B, <'NonInitiating', 'Initiating', ~Na> )
]->
[ Out( <A, B, ~Na> )
, State_A_1( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, Cb, ~Na )
]
// B <--Na-- A
// B --Nb--> A
rule SSP_NC_B_1:
let
Vb = h(<PKa, PKb, Na, ~Nb>)
in
[ In( <A, B, Na> )
, State_B_0( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ~Nb, ra, rb )
]
--[ Recv( B, A, Na )
, Send( B, A, ~Nb )
, Send_UtD(B, 'User', <Vb, ~Nb>)
]->
[ Out( <B, A, ~Nb> )
, Out_UtD( B, 'User', <Vb, ~Nb> )
, State_B_1( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, DHKey, PKa, PKb, ~Nb, ra, rb, Na )
]
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Figure 9.6. Numeric Comparison, Phase 2 (cont.) and Phase 3.
// A <--Nb-- B
// A: Cb == hmac(Nb, <PKb, PKa, ra>)
// A --OK--> B
// A --Va--> User
rule SSP_NC_A_2:
let
Va = h(<PKa, PKb, ~Na, Nb>)
in
[ In( <B, A, Nb> )
, State_A_1( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, Cb, ~Na )
]
--[ Recv( A, B, Nb )
, Send_UtD( A, 'User', <Va, ~Na> )
, Eq(Cb, hmac(Nb, <PKb, PKa, ra>) )
]->
[ Out_UtD( A, 'User', <Va, ~Na> )
, State_A_2( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, ~Na, Nb )
]
// User <--Va-- A
// User <--Vb-- B
// User: Va == Vb
// User --OK--> A
// User --OK--> B
rule SSP_NC_User:
[ In_UtD( A, 'User', <Va, sidA> )
, In_UtD( B, 'User', <Vb, sidB> )
]
--[ Recv_UtD( 'User', A, <Va, sidA> )
, Recv_UtD( 'User', B, <Vb, sidB> )
, Neq( A, B )
, Neq( A, 'User')
, Neq( B, 'User')
, Eq( Va, Vb )
, Send_UtD( 'User', A, <'OK', sidA> )
, Send_UtD( 'User', B, <'OK', sidB> )
// , OnlyOnceV('User')
]->
[ Out_UtD( 'User', A, <'OK', sidA> )
, Out_UtD( 'User', B, <'OK', sidB> )
]
chance that other attacks were also prevented, we ensured the user did not interact with
the ephemeral nonce. As shown in Figure 9.6, the nonces ∼Na and ∼Nb, symbolized by
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the variable strings sidA and sidB respectively, are merely forwarded through with their
associated identity after the user verifies Va and Vb match. Nevertheless, we cannot say
with certainty that this choice did not also prevent other attacks aside from the UtD cross-
session replay attack. However, after much trial and error, including the nonces in the UtD
messages proved to be the most sensible method of preventing erroneous falsification and
allowing analysis to continue with minimal detriment.
Rule SSP_NC_A_2 follows similarly to rule SSP_NC_B_1 and models steps 12, 13a,
and 14a. Note that we use the action fact Eq(Cb, hmac(Nb, <PKb, PKa, ra>)) to model
device A’s computation in step 12. Rule SSP_NC_User models the user’s role in Numeric
Comparison. He receives both of the verification values,Va, Vb, compares them for equality,
Eq(Va, Vb), and inputs 'OK' into both devices. Note that the user performs no actions
involving sidA, sidB, the metadata strings device A and B’s nonces. Thus, our modeling
choice of including the nonces does not fundamentally alter the user’s role in the protocol.
The action facts Recv_UtD and Send_UtD do not play a role in analysis but are useful for
debugging.
Figure 9.7. Numeric Comparison, Phase 3 (cont.).
// A <--OK-- User
// A: Ea <- hmac(DHKey, <~Na, Nb, 0, $IOcapA, $A, $B>)
// A --Ea--> B
rule SSP_NC_A_3:
let
Ea = hmac( DHKey, <~Na, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B> )
in
[ In_UtD('User', A, <'OK', sidA> )
, State_A_2( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, ~Na, Nb )
]
--[ Recv_UtD( A, 'User', <'OK', sidA> )
, Eq( sidA, ~Na )
, Send( A, B, Ea )
]->
[ Out( <A, B, Ea> )
, State_A_3( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, ~Na, Nb )
]
With Figure 9.7 and rule SSP_NC_A_3, we model steps 15a, 16a, and 17. Device A
receives the “OK” message from the user, computes its check value, Ea, and sends Ea to
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device B. Also observe that device A performs the check Eq(sidA, ∼Na). This ensures
that the “OK” received from the user applies to the correct session. Since the device has
confirmation that the “OK” message applies to the session it expects, we can rule out cross-
session attacks over the UtD-E channel with minimal change to the protocol specification.
Figure 9.8. Numeric Comparison, Phase 3 (cont.) and Phase 4.
// B <--OK-- User
// B: Eb <- hmac(DHKey, <~Nb, Na, 0, $IOcapB, $B, $A>)
// B <--Ea-- A
// B: Ea == hmac(DHKey, <~Na, Nb, 0, $IOcapA, $A, $B>)
// B --Eb--> A
// B: LK <- hmac(DHKey, <Na, Nb, 'btlk', $A, $B>)
rule SSP_NC_B_2:
let
Eb = hmac( DHKey, <~Nb, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A> )
LK = hmac( DHKey, <Na, ~Nb, 'btlk', A, B> )
in
[ In_UtD('User', B, <'OK', sidB>)
, In( <A, B, Ea> )
, State_B_1( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, DHKey, PKa, PKb, ~Nb, ra, rb, Na )
]
--[ Recv_UtD( B, 'User', <'OK', sidB> )
, Eq( sidB, ~Nb )
, Recv( B, A, Ea )
, Send( B, A, Eb )
, Eq( Ea, hmac( DHKey, <Na, ~Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B> ) )
, Secret( LK )
, Secret ( DHKey )
, Commit( B, A, <'NonInitiating', 'Initiating', DHKey> )
, Commit( B, A, <'NonInitiating', 'Initiating', Na> )
, SessionKey( B, A, LK )
]->
[ Out( <B, A, Eb> )
]
Rule SSP_NC_B_2 is the concluding rule for device B and models steps 15b, 16b, 17,
18, 19, and 21b. In this rule, device B executes similar actions to those performed by device
A in rule SSP_NC_A_3. Additionally, device B verifies the received check value, Eq(Ea,
hmac(DHKey, <Na, ∼Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B>)). If this check passes, device B sends its
own check value Eb, commits to the Diffie-Hellman key, DHKey, and commits to device
A’s nonce, Na. Device B also computes the link key, LK, and declares this value andDHKey
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to be secret.
Figure 9.9. Numeric Comparison, Phase 4 (cont.).
// A <--Eb-- B
// A: Eb == hmac(DHKey, <~Na, Nb, 0, $IOcapA, $A, $B>)
// A --OK--> B
// A: LK <- hmac(DHKey, <~Na, Nb, 0, 'btlk', $A, $B>)
rule SSP_NC_A_4:
let
LK = hmac( DHKey, <~Na, Nb, 'btlk', A, B> )
in
[ In( <B, A, Eb> )
, State_A_3( <A, IOcapA>, <B, IOcapB>, PKa, PKb, DHKey, ra, rb, ~Na, Nb )
]
--[ Recv( A, B, Eb )
, Secret( LK )
, Secret( DHKey )
, Commit( A, B, <'Initiating', 'NonInitiating', DHKey> )
, Commit( A, B, <'Initiating', 'NonInitiating', Nb> )
, Eq(Eb, hmac( DHKey, <Nb, ~Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A> ) )
, SessionKey( A, B, LK )
]->
[]
Rule SSP_NC_A_4 is final rule in our formalization of Numeric Comparison and models
steps 19, 20, and 21. Device A’s steps in this rule are similar to the phase 4 steps of device
B in rule SSP_NC_B_2.
Though not displayed above, to assist with the verification of the various protocols in this
section, we wrote three oracle programs to guide the Tamarin heuristic in its analysis as dis-
cussed in the Tamarin-Prover manual [79]. These programs are termed oracles because they
act as a black box for the Tamarin heuristic to call when proving lemmas and provide direc-
tion for its choices. All three oracle programs can be found at NPSGitLab due to length con-
siderations: https://gitlab.nps.edu/michael.troncoso/thesis/-/tree/master/inputs/app/oracles.
The python program “ssp-nc-oracle.py” was employed in the analysis of the Numeric Com-
parison protocol, the python program “ssp-pe-oracle.py” was employed in the analysis of the
Initiator/Responder-Generated Passkey Entry protocols, and the python program “ssp-pe-
ug-oracle.py” was employed in the analysis of the User-Generated Passkey Entry protocol.
To assist with automatic proving, the noninjective agreement lemma was modified slightly
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to the following for use in all Passkey Entry protocols.
lemma noninjective_agreement: All a b role_a role_b val #i.
Commit(a,b,< role_a, role_b, val >) @i ==>
(Ex #j. Running(b,a,< role_a, role_b, val >) @j
& j < i)" ,
Attempts to write oracles for the Passkey Entry protocols without this modification proved
unsuccessful. The modification being that we instantiated the commitment string variable,
t, from the original definition described in Section 9.3, as the three-variable string, < role_a,
role_b, val >, for use in these protocols. This change forces Tamarin to instantiate val in
the action fact, which allowed us to direct our oracles based on val and provided a greater
degree of control. The choice to instantiate t as < role_a, role_b, val > stems from the fact
that all Commitmessages in our Passkey Entry protocol theory files are of this general form.
Thus, t is guaranteed to be of the form < role_a, role_b, val > in every Commit action fact
Tamarin examines. Therefore, this change does not alter the correctness of our analysis and
is still in keeping with Lowe’s definitions.
We now walk through the Numeric Comparison oracle program as a example for the reader.
The oracle is essentially a python program that tells the Tamarin heuristic which fact to
attempt to satisfy in attempts to falsify a lemma. We read all facts that need to be satisfied
in the trace via the call lines = sys.stdin.readlines(). We then iterate through the lines,
identified by the preceding number num, and proceed to rank them, from l1 through l8,
based on their contents.We determined the rank of a line based on the probability, arbitrarily
quantified through trial and error, that the line will lead to a contradiction.
Take for instance the rule classifying the l1 rank: “∼SK” in line and “In_UtD” in line.
This basically captures an instance where the Tamarin adversary is attempting to send
a Diffie–Hellman exponent over the UtD channel, which is something that should never
occur in Numeric Comparison based off the specification. Since we suspect this to lead to
a contradiction quickly, we direct the Tamarin heuristic to attempt to satisfy this fact. The
l6 ranking is similar in this facet because it is a line where a Diffie–Hellman exponent is
involved in a group operation outside of the MAC. The next three ranks, l2 through l4,
all involve the Tamarin adversary attempting to gain knowledge of something by trivial
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for line in lines:
num = line.split(':')[0]
if "~SK" in line and "In_UtD" in line:
l1.append(num)
elif "KU( ~N" in line and "^" in line:
l2.append(num)
elif "KU( ~SK" in line:
l3.append(num)
elif "KU( ~r" in line:
l4.append(num)
elif "In_UtD" in line:
l5.append(num)
elif "~SK" in line and "*" in line and "hmac" not in line:
l6.append(num)




ranked = l1 + l2 + l3 + l4 + l5 + l6 + l7 + l8
for i in ranked:
print(i)
means: a nonce involved in a Diffie–Hellman exponentiation, a Diffie–Hellman exponent
itself, or a passkey. The l5 and l7 lines tells Tamarin to try to satisfy UtD channel facts and
device memory requirements first, which typically trigger higher ranked facts in the oracle
in subsequent oracle calls. The final rank, l8, is a default rank when no triggers are present
and directs Tamarin to follow its default programming.
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All numbers are then combined into a singular list and returned to Tamarin for action by
printing to stdout. Tamarin will then act on the first fact in the returned list and attempt
to satisfy it. The inclusion of oracles for the Secure Simple Pairing protocols, like the one
discussed above, allowed for analysis to proceed in a more timely and efficient manner.
9.4.2 Numeric Comparison
The initial summary of results of the analysis of Numeric Comparison with the Tamarin




secrecy (all-traces): falsified - found trace (16 steps)
aliveness (all-traces): falsified - found trace (16 steps)
weak_agreement (all-traces): falsified - found trace (16 steps)
noninjective_agreement (all-traces): falsified - found trace (16 steps)
injectiveagreement (all-traces): falsified - found trace (16 steps)
==============================================================================
Figure 9.11. Initial Tamarin prover output depicting falsication of all ana-




secrecy (all-traces): verified (100 steps)
aliveness (all-traces): verified (74 steps)
weak_agreement (all-traces): verified (120 steps)
noninjective_agreement (all-traces): verified (120 steps)
injectiveagreement (all-traces): verified (1376 steps)
==============================================================================
Figure 9.12. Subsequent Tamarin prover output depicting verication of all
security properties after removing the adversary's ability to mount cross-
session attacks.
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Under our security definitions, Tamarin found falsification traces for secrecy, aliveness,
weak agreement, noninjective agreement, and injective agreement. The steps listed above
in Figs. 9.11 and 9.12 count the number of facts Tamarin had to satisfy before either a
falsification trace was found or all possible traces were deemed to lead to contradictions.
Further examination of the protocol in Tamarin’s interactive mode revealed that the protocol
is susceptible to a cross-session replay attack whereby the adversary replays the “OK”
message from a correctly executed session with an incorrectly executed session. This attack
is similar to the one discovered by the ProVerif analysis in [9]. Ours differs in that includes
all steps of the protocol. These attacks are able to succeed because there exists no session
specific information in the user’s “OK” message to each device. This causes the devices
to be unable to associate “OK” messages with specific sessions. To add relevance to this
attack, one possible execution method would be if an adversary forces a device to replay
the same comparison value to be verified and incites multiple “OK” messages from the
user. Another could be a compromised display that replays a user’s inputs to the device
unbeknownst to the user. Ultimately, since the device is unable to associate each “OK”
message with a specific session, it mistakenly assumes a different session has been verified
and continues pairing with the adversary.
Nonetheless, the power to replay UtD messages across sessions is denied within the
CYBORG model as described in Section 5.2. To prevent the Tamarin adversary from
pursuing this line of attack, a device’s session specific nonce is also included in messages
to/from the user as was discussed previously in our walk-through of the Numeric Compar-
ison formalization. Since the nonce is fresh for each session, it acts as a pre-built session
identifier that can aid in deciphering what session the user has verified. Upon this fix,
Tamarin verified aliveness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement, injective agreement,
and secrecy as shown in Figure 9.12.
9.4.3 Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry
The summary of results of the analysis of Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry with the
Tamarin Prover are depicted in Figure 9.13. Tamarin verified all of the security lemmas with
injectiveagreement taking the largest time investment with 11,127 steps. In comparison to
the verification ofNumericComparison,which took 1376 steps to verify injectiveagreement,
this is noticeably longer. The difference in step count is because of the difference in code
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length. Since all 20 bits of the passkey have to be verified sequentially per specification,
Passkey Entry requires 87 message exchanges while Numeric Comparison only requires
12. Thus, Passkey Entry affords 55 more opportunities for the Tamarin adversary to affect




secrecy (all-traces): analysis verified (66 steps)
aliveness (all-traces): analysis verified (266 steps)
weak_agreement (all-traces): analysis verified (266 steps)
noninjective_agreement (all-traces): verified (582 steps)
injectiveagreement (all-traces): verified (11127 steps)
==============================================================================
Figure 9.13. Tamarin prover output depicting verication of all security prop-
erties for Initiator-Generated Passkey Entry.
difference in abstraction between the CYBORG computational model and the Tamarin
formal model.Mainly that, each bit of the passkey is labeled fresh and the Tamarin adversary
has no capacity to guess its value. Thus, the formal analysis arrives at the conclusion that the
nonces cannot be attacked, while the computational analysis arrives at the guessing attack
discussed in Theorem 6.3.1. Another difference is that Tamarin’s analysis is of a lemma
is a binary: either the lemma is verified or falsified in some number of steps. Meanwhile,
in computational analysis we receive a probability of security and must assess whether the
probability is negligible enough to claim security.
9.4.4 Responder-Generated Passkey Entry
The summary of results of the analysis of Responder-Generated Passkey Entry with the








secrecy (all-traces): verified (73 steps)
aliveness (all-traces): verified (156 steps)
weak_agreement (all-traces): verified (266 steps)
noninjective_agreement (all-traces): verified (494 steps)
injectiveagreement (all-traces): verified (8034 steps)
==============================================================================
Figure 9.14. Tamarin prover output depicting verication of all security prop-
erties for Responder-Generated Passkey Entry.
9.4.5 User-Generated Passkey Entry
The summary of results of the analysis of User-Generated Passkey Entry with the Tamarin






secrecy (all-traces): verified (696 steps)
aliveness (all-traces): verified (704 steps)
weak_agreement (all-traces): verified (704 steps)
noninjective_agreement (all-traces): falsified (90 steps)
==============================================================================
Figure 9.15. Tamarin prover output depicting falsication of noninjective
agreement and injective agreement for User-Generated Passkey Entry. Since
noninjective agreement was falsied, we did not devote further analysis to
injective agreement.
Under our security definitions, Tamarin verified that User-Generated Passkey Entry satisfied
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aliveness, weak agreement, and secrecy on the data elements defined under Section 9.3.
However, Tamarin found falsification traces for both noninjective agreement and injective
agreement. Further examination of the protocol in Tamarin’s interactive mode revealed that
the Tamarin adversary found the same attack described in Theorem 6.3.3 and depicted in
Figure 6.3 to break noninjective agreement. Specifically, Tamarin found a trace where one
device committed to its role, its partner’s role and a message, but no other device had ever
been running this same message with the first device and in the believed role. This situation
occurred because although the two devices agreed on the content of the message, they did
not agree on their respective roles in the protocol.
The efficacy of this attack was previously discussed following its presentation in Theo-
rem 6.3.3. Though the attack is certainly executable in theory, in practice it would require
two devices to attempt to pair with other simultaneously and both in the role of the initiator,
which is an improbable occurrence. The Secure Hash Modification proposed in Chapter 7
was developed to rectify this issue, but was not analyzed in Tamarin and is left for future
work.
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Table 10.1. Table depicting levels of CYBORG security in the uncompro-
mised (UncUser) and compromised user (CompUserG) settings achieved by
the Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols under weak and strong
session modeling, as well as Secure Hash Modication (SHM) Passkey Entry
and SHM Dual Passkey Entry. SHM Dual Passkey Entry is provably secure
under all variants of the CYBORG security model. If a variant of CompUserG
is not depicted, it is because only SHM Dual Passkey Entry achieved security
under said variant. X depicts proven secure in this work, X∗ depicts provably
secure by implication, and X depicts insecure.
Bluetooth BR/EDR Secure Simple Pairing/Secure Connections v2.1–5.2
Num. Comp. Init-Gen’d Resp-Gen’d User-Gen’d Dual
Original Original SHM Original SHM Original SHM SHM












k UncUser X X X X X X X X X X X X∗
CompUser0 X X X X X X∗ X X∗ X X X∗ X∗
CompUser1 X X X∗ X X∗ X X X X X X∗ X∗
CompUser2 X X X∗ X X∗ X X X X X X X∗
CompUser3 X X X X X X∗ X X∗ X X X X∗
CompUser01 X X X X X X X X X X X∗ X∗
CompUser03 X X X X X X∗ X X∗ X X X X∗
CompUser12 X X X∗ X X∗ X X X X X X X∗
CompUser02 X X X X X X X X X X X X∗
CompUser13 X X X X X X X X X X X X∗
CompUser0123 X X X X X X X X X X X X
Comparison of Results The results of our computational analysis are summarized below
in Table 10.1. Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry achieved middling results in the
CYBORG model, with only Numeric Comparison achieving a semblance of security under
strong session modeling. SHM Passkey Entry achieved similar security across all versions,
with variations only in the CompUserG setting. The various results give insight into the
type of attacks Numeric Comparison and Passkey Entry in their current construction can
defend against. In regard to Numeric Comparison, gaining control of any one of a device’s
display or input capabilities will lead to a break in the protocol. The examination of Passkey
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Entry (with a weak session identifier) and SHM Passkey Entry herein reveals that gaining
control of the device display used to generate the passkey, or the device input of the passkey
receiver, also allows for breaks in the protocol. Furthermore, none of the current Bluetooth
protocols are secure against Tap ‘n Ghost-like attacks (CompUser02 and CompUser13).
The UtD weaknesses present in Passkey Entry point to the motivation behind Dual Passkey
Entry, namely to have both devices generate a passkey. This function ensures some measure
of secrecy, which the adversary can neither affect nor learn, is maintained throughout
execution of Dual Passkey Entry. Although the CompUser0123 environment allows the
adversary to change all passkeys being transferred among Passkey Entry participants, the
absence of eavesdropping in the UtD channel (as required for execution of Passkey Entry
per [11]) prevents the adversary from learning the original passkeys before the conclusion of
Phase 2. Furthermore, since both devices generate passkeys, the adversary cannot leverage
its corruption queries to gain knowledge of the target session’s passkey. With the integrity
of at least one of the passkeys ensured by the user transfer and native generation, devices
can successfully authenticate the DH key exchange. We therefore show that under this
strong guarantee, whereby the user functions as a medium for the secret transfer of device
communications, one can create protocols achieving a greater of degree of security than
current methods with minimal increases in user involvement. As proven in Theorem 8.4.1,
Dual Passkey Entry with the Secure Hash Modification maintains CYBORG security in
spite of the adversary having the full capability to modify UtD messages and without
user-generated random numbers.
Future Work We note that the security of Dual Passkey Entry with the Secure Hash Modi-
fication is reliant upon the assumption that it is executed in the UtD without eavesdropping
environment, as required by Bluetooth specification for all variants of Passkey Entry [11].
This lends itself to an investigation into the possible security guarantees a protocol can
achieve in the CYBORG model under an adversarial setting that allows for eavesdropping
on the UtD channel. Past work on Signal [18] presented Modified Device-to-User Signal
Authentication (MoDUSA) as a solution to this problem and proved it secure under an
equivalent instantiation of the CompUser0 and CompUser1 environments. Although Signal
authentication in its current construction did not demonstrate this, MoDUSA achieved it by
relying on ratcheted keys to compute epoch-specific QR and numeric comparison codes for
user verification. This highlights that the techniques for the future advancement of cyborg
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protocols are currently in existence and further investigation is warranted. One protocol
of note that could be the subject of such an investigation would be Numeric Comparison.
Although this thesis did not rectify the security issues present in Numeric Comparison,
the door is open for novel proposals and proofs. The cyborg protocols standardized under
ISO/IEC 9798-6 also present a possibility for future investigation as security analysis of
this protocol family has been limited [17], [81].
10.2 Formal Analysis
Table 10.2. Table depicting formal security lemmas satised by the Numeric
Comparison and Passkey Entry protocols. X depicts veried by Tamarin-
Prover and X depicts falsied.
Bluetooth BR/EDR Secure Simple Pairing/Secure Connections v2.1–5.2







a Secrecy X X X X
Aliveness X X X X
Weak Agree. X X X X
Noninject. Agree X X X X
Inject. Agree X X X X
Comparison of Results The entirety of the formal analysis depicted in Table 10.2 is only
comparable to computational analysis in the CYBORG-UncUser setting, as shown in row
one of Table 10.1, under weak session modeling. The combination of secrecy and injective
agreement analyzed in Tamarin is similar to the key-ind and auth requirements under
the CYBORG-UncUser security experiment. Aliveness, weak agreement, and noninjective
agreement investigate weaker authentication guarantees not investigated computationally.
Our Tamarin analysis is incomparable to our computational analysis under strong session
modeling because we only analyzed specific values (nonces, passkeys, and DH keys) within
our formal lemmas, vice every message exchanged. Under these narrow parameters, all
examined protocols achieved similar security levels in both the symbolic and computational
analysis. Numeric Comparison and Initiator/Responder-Generated Passkey Entry’s Tamarin
results were in keeping with those proved computationally in Chapter 6. User-Generated
Passkey Entry meanwhile, was still found to be susceptible to the role confusion attack
depicted in Figure 6.3.
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Future Work For our formal analysis, we did not give the adversary the capability to
reveal device secrets or compromise the UtD channel as we did in the computational
setting. Including these capabilities in a future analysis is possible by re-working the formal
security lemmas as described in [79]. However, the biggest detriment to including additional
adversarial capabilities would be computing power and time. The current analysis was
conducted using a 2018 Microsoft Surface Book 2, with an eighth generation Intel Quad-
Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM [82]. Assuming that allotting the adversary improved
capabilities to affect communications will increase lemma verification/falsification time for
Tamarin, we recommend a dedicated server with greatly improved processing power for an
extended analysis.
10.3 Concluding Remarks
We have provided a comprehensive cryptographic investigation of cyborg protocols in Blue-
tooth. Although previous investigations had been conducted on both Numeric Comparison
and Passkey Entry, ours was executed with a more faithful abstraction of the user than had
been used in previous analysis. Abstractions are a useful tool in cryptography, but care
must be taken not to over-generalize fundamental protocol functions. Just as it would be a
mischaracterization to simply abstract queues and stacks as linked lists, so too is it a mis-
characterization to abstract the user from cyborg protocols. Cyborg protocols are equally
dependent on both users and devices for their functions, and any modeling decisions for
analysis must be faithful to their relationship.
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